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a panoply of nontax statutes' designed to regulate the employ-

1. Tax-related enactments also regulate the employment relationship, and that
regulation often focuses on defining for tax purposes the concept of an "employee."
For example, while employees are subject to income taxes and social security taxes (FICA), independent contractors are subject to self-employment taxes. See JACOB MEwrES, JR., THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 47A.10 (1995). In the
case of an employee, the employer must not only withhold the taxes from the
employee's wages, 26 U.S.C. § 3402(a) (1994), but must also pay out of its own
funds FICA and unemployment taxes (FUTA) based on the employee's wages. See
MErTENs, supm § 47.10. Payments to independent contractors, on the other hand,
are not subject to withholding. Id. The employee vel non question is therefore
crucial in this area of tax law.
A similar characterization- issue exists for organizations classified as partnerships for federal tax purposes, because, with some exceptions, a genuine partner's
share of profits is taxed as self-employment income:
Bona fide members of a partnership are not employees of the partnership
...
. Such a partner who devotes his time and energies in the conduct
of the trade or business of the partnership, or in providing services to
the partnership as an independent contractor, is, in either event, a selfemployed individual, rather than an individual who, under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship, as the status of an employee.
Rev. Rul. 69-184, 1969-1 C.B. 256. (The distributive share of a limited partner is
not treated as earnings from self-employment unless paid to the limited partner as
part of a guaranteed payment "for services actually rendered to or on behalf of the
partnership." 26 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(13) (1994).)
The IRS is still considering how to treat the distributive share received by
members of limited liability companies. In 1994, the IRS proposed a regulation
aimed at resolving this particular issue, see Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-18, 59
Fed. Reg. 67253 (Dec. 29, 1994), but the proposal elicited numerous negative comments. In early 1997, the IRS withdrew the first proposal and substituted a new
one. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2, 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (January 13, 1997). The
new proposed regulation attempts to provide a uniform approach, applying not just
to limited liability companies but rather "to all entities classified as a partnership
for federal tax purposes." Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2, 62 Fed. Reg. 1702, 1703
(January 13, 1997).
Arguably, at least, tax law regulates the employment relationship only as a byproduct of revenue collection. Nonetheless, that by-product's impact can be substantial. See, e.g., Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 1996),
reh'g granted, 105 F.3d 1334 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding the IRS characterization of an
employee may create rights not contemplated by the employer). See also Kennel v.
Dover Garage, Inc., 816 F. Supp. 178, 183-85 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), affd, 9 F.3d 1536 (2d
Cir. 1993) (citing inter alia "an IRS opinion letter to [one of the parties] that the
lease drivers will not be considered 'employees' for federal income tax purposes"
as evidence "that the relationship between [that party] and the lease drivers . . .
[was not] an employment relationship, but instead was one between lessor and lessee" for the purposes of the ADEA).
For the most part, however, this article limits itself to nontax federal statutes.
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ment relationship.2 Although these statutes have different objectives and address different aspects of the work world, they
all define their scope in the same way: they obligate the "employer" and protect the "employee." Moreover, these statutes all
define those key terms in essentially the same way.' An employee is an "individual employed by an employer."4 An employer is a person who is engaged in commerce and has the
requisite number of "employees."5 Evidently and unfortunately,

As discussed infra note 118, cases construing these statutes make little reference
to comparable issues under the Internal Revenue Code.
2. This article considers the following federal statutes: Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 - 12213 (1994); Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 - 634 (1994); Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 - 1461 (1994); Family
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 - 2654 (1994); Fair Labor Standards Act (FISA) of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 - 219 (1994); Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e - 17 (1994). Under
each of these statutes, the terms "employee" and "employer" are terms of art. See
infta notes 4 & 5. As will be seen, these statutes have in common a key issue Le., the meaning and scope of the term "employee." That issue also arises under
other nontax federal statutes, and the analysis presented in this article may therefore be relevant elsewhere. For example, Shapiro v. Sutheriand, involved claims
under the whistleblower provisions of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), by
a former officer and director of an acquired corporation. 835 F. Supp. 836 (E.D.
Pa 1993). "Defendants . . . moved for summary judgment arguing that Shapiro is
not entitled to relief under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) because Shapiro was not an
'employee' of any of the defendants as is required by the Act." Id. at 837. The
court denied the motion, noting a dispute as to material facts on the employee vel
non issue. lId at 838. The court defined "employee" in light of National Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992), which is discussed ifru
notes 81-112.
3. The Fair Labor Standards Act also defines the term "employ," and the Act's
expansive definition of that term gives the Act an arguably broader scope that the
other statutes covered by this Article. See infa notes 125-31.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (ADA). The ADEA defines "employee" as "an individual
employed by any employer. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 630(0. ERISA defines "employee"
as "any individual employed by an employer." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6). Under FMLA,
the term "employee" has the same meaning as given to "employee" under section
203(e) of the FISA. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(3); 29 U.S.C. § 203(e). Both statutes define
"employee" as "any individual employed by an employer." Id. Title VII defines
"employee" as "an individual employed by an employer . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).
5. Under the ADA, an employer is "a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any
such agent of such person." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). Under the ADEA, "the term
'employer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
twenty or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 630(b).
ERISA defines "employer" as "any person acting directly as an employer, . . . in
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"these definitions are circular and explain nothing."6 As a result, courts have had decades to interpret these definitions and
thereby delineate the categories of protected individuals.7
In contrast, the limited liability company ("LLC") is a recent phenomenon. First created in 1977 by the Wyoming legislature as a way around the tax-shield conundrum,8 the LLC "took
relation to an employee benefit plan; and includes a group or association of employers acting for an employer in such capacity."
29 U.S.C. § 1002(5). Under
FMLA, "the term 'employer' means any person engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce who employs fifty or more employees for
each working day during each of twenty or more calendar work weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year." 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A). The FLSA defines an
"employer" as "any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). Under Title VII "'employer
means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or
more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks
in the current or preceding calendar year . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000(b) (1994).
6. Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 850 F. Supp. 648, 654 (S.D. Ohio 1994), affd 100
F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996).
7. The same issue exists under many state civil rights statutes, but this article
limits its scope to federal employment law. The analysis presented here may nonetheless be helpful in determining state law issues. See, e.g., Strother v. Southern
Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 866 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that "California courts have interpreted [the California Fair Housing and Employment Act] in
accordance with cases interpreting the [ADEA] and the Federal Civil Rights Act . .
• [and therefore] we look to federal cases in those areas that have addressed whatever an individual labelled as a partner can be considered an employee for the
purpose of employment discrimination laws") (citation omitted); Lilley v. BTM Corp.
958 F.2d 746, 750 n.2 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating that "ADEA standards governing employment status also apply to Michigan's Elliot-Larsen Act, Mich. Comp. Laws, §
37.2101 et seq"); Frishberg v. Esprit De Corp., Inc. 778 F. Supp. 793, 798 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (stating that "[sjince New York distinguishes between employees and independent contractors in a sufficiently similar manner, the court will use the federal test
for both state and federal claims") (footnote omitted).
The interpretation of "employer" has other consequences as well. See, e.g.,
infra notes 306-09 (discussing whether ERISA preempts benefit claims brought by a
corporation's sole shareholder/employee). Other issues arising from the concept of
"employer" are beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., Storr v. Anderson
School, 919 F. Supp. 144, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Jendusa v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of
Am., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 1006, 1008 (N.D. IMI 1994) (discussing whether a supervisor
comes within the definition of "employer" so as to be personally liable for a violation of Title VII). See also, Berger Transfer & Storage v. Central States, S.E. and
S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 85 F.3d 1374, 1377-78 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying the common law test described in Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992), to
determine whether owner/operators were "employers" under an ERISA plan that did
not define the term); Coonley v. Fortis Benefit Ins. Co., 956 F. Supp. 841, 848
(N.D. Iowa 1997) (applying same with regard to a life insurance policy that did not
define the term "employee").
8. See CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES:
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off" only after the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") had spent
ten years deciding that the IRS tax classification regulations
meant what they said.9 Now every state and the District of
Columbia have LLC "enabling statutes" permitting the formation
of LLCs, and, according to one source, "as of December 31,
1995, over 210,000 business ventures across the United States
had chosen the LLC form." °
Juxtaposed against federal employment statutes, the LLC
can be a puzzlement. There is no question that an LLC can be
an employer, because the statutory definitions are broad
enough to catch any form of business entity. The Fair Labor
Standards Act, for example, defines an employer as a "person"
and defines "person" to mean "an individual, partnership, association, corporation, business trust, legal representative, or any
organized group of persons."" The perplexing question is
whether an LLC member who provides services to the LLC can
be an employee.
The perplexity has four sources: (i) the novelty of the LLC
and the resulting absence of LLC-specific case law; (ii) the
"magnificent circularity"' 2 of the relevant statutory definitions
and the resulting complexity in the available case law; (iii) the
hybrid nature of an LLC (part partnership and part corporation), and the resulting difficulty in extrapolating from cases
dealing with analogous issues in the context of partnerships
and corporations; and (iv) the dichotomous nature of any LLC
member who actively works for an LLC - one part capitalist
owner, one part laboring service provider. The fourth source is
especially problematic because the available case law has had
difficulty handling that dichotomy in the context of well-established entities - i.e., partnerships and corporations.

TAX & BUSINESS LAW,
1.01[2], at 1-5 (1994).
9. See id.
1.01[1], at 1-4. For a brief discussion of these regulations, see
infra note 20.
10. Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Catalyst Exposing
the Corporate Integration Question, 95 lCH. L REv. 393, 446 (1996) (footnote
omitted). In contrast, as of 1993 corporations organized under the laws of the fifty
states and the District of Columbia totaled approximately 3,964,629. See STATISTICS
OF INCOME SOURCE BOOK, CORPORATION INCOME TA RETURNS, PuB. No. 1053, (Rev.
3-96), catalog No. 46909W (1993).
11. Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(a),(d)(1994).
12. Broussard v. LR Bossier, Inc., 789 F.2d 1158, 1160 (5th Cir. 1986).
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This article seeks to be a guide for the perplexed 3 and to
explain under what circumstances these federal employment
statutes should apply to LLC members. Part I recounts the
advent of LLCs and describes the essential characteristics of
LLCs and their members. Part II explores how federal employment case law handles the employee vel non question and explains the problems in using that case law to determine whether LLC members are "employees" for federal employment law
purposes. Part III attempts to make sense of that case law and
proposes a rule for determining when a business owner can
provide services to the business without becoming an "employee." Part IV applies the proposed rule to LLC members and
provides a number of examples.

I. LIMITED LIABmITY COMPANY AS CHURKENDOOSE

4

Understanding how federal employment statutes apply to
LLCs involves understanding both the scope of the statutes and
the essential characteristics of LLCs. Understanding the latter
requires an examination of the history of LLCs, because the
LLC embodies a legislative intent to facilitate tax avoidance.
Prior to the advent of LLCs, entrepreneurs faced the "tax
shield conundrum." 5 To equip a business with a corporatetype liability shield, 6 entrepreneurs "had to pay some sort of
tax cost." 7 The cost might be the double taxation inherent in
a C Corporation, the operational constraints involved in "zeroing out" a C Corporation to avoid double taxation, or the structural and operational constraints involved in electing and maintaining S Corporation status. 8 A partnership avoided these

13. The phrase is borrowed from a more weighty worlc
See MosEs V.
MAuMoNmEs, GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED (Dover 1950).
14. According to a children's book published in 1946, the churkendoose is a hybrid, "part chicken, turkey, duck and goose." BEN Ross BERENBERG, THE
CHURKENDOOSE (Wonder Books 1946). The limited liability company is comparable
- part general partnership, part limited partnership, part corporation.
15. BISHOP & KLEIMBERGER, supra note 8,

1.01[2], at 1-5.

16. The shield benefits the owners, "sever[ing] the [automatic] relationship between owner status and personal liability" for the business' debts. Id. 6.0111], at
6-4.
17. Id.
1.01[2], at 1-5.
18. See id.
1.01[2], at 1-5 (explaining double taxation in a C Corp.); id.
1.01[2][c], at 1-8 (explaining "zeroing out"); id. l.01[2][b][IJ-[iv], at 1-7 (explaining
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costs, but "the problem with partnership [was], of course, personal liability. In any partnership, at least one partner [had to]
be liable for the business's debts."'9
The Wyoming legislature sought to escape this conundrum
by taking seriously the IRS's "Kintner" Regulations on tax classification. These regulations determined how to classify unincorporated business organizations and were biased toward
partnership status.' The regulations identified four key corporate characteristics - limited liability, continuity of life, free
transferability of ownership interests, and centralized management - and classified an unincorporated organization as a
corporation only if the organization had three or more of the
corporate characteristics.2 1 Although limited liability may seem

S Corp. status). S Corporation constraints have decreased under the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, S. REP. No. 104-281 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1974.
19. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 8,
1.01[2], at 1-5. It was possible to finesse the conundrum by using a limited partnership with a corporate general partner. That approach was at best complicated and moreover. (a) pushed the conundrum into the formation and conduct of the corporate general partner, (b) involved
tax classification concerns, id.
1.02[a], at 1-6 n.21 (discussing the net worth requirements for a limited partnership seeking to escape the corporate characteristic
of limited liability), and (c) raised the specter of a veil piercing claim against the
corporate general. See also Baird Ward Printing Co., Inc. v. Great Recipes Pub.
Assoc., 811 F.2d 305, 307 (6th Cir. 1987); Paul Steehan, Ltd. v. Omnm Realty Partners, 885 P.2d 549 (Nev. 1994); Wilson v. Friedberg, 473 S.E.2d 854, 856 (S.C. Ct
App. 1996). To deal proactively with the latter two concerns, entrepreneurs had to
tie up capital in the corporate general partner. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note
8,
1.021a], at 1-6 n21 (discussing tax classification and net worth requirements);
id,
6.03[1], at 6-27 n122 (noting undercapitalization as a factor in the piercing
analysis). See also Baird, 811 F.2d at 307-08; Paul Steelman, 885 P.2d at 550 (noting undercapitalization as a factor in the piercing analysis); Wilson, 473 S.E.2d at
856. The advent of limited liability partnerships and limited liability limited partnerships has affected the tax-shield conundrum. See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra
note 8,
1.03.

20. See

BISHOP

& KLEINBERGER, supra note 8,

2.02, at 2-11.

The regulations

do not address incorporated businesses because the Internal Revenue Code itself
determines that corporations are to be taxed as corporations. See id.
2.01, at 24. See also Classification of Organization for Federal Tax Purposes, 61 Fed. Reg.
66584, 66588 (1996) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-1) (overview of rules
for determining an organization's federal tax classification); Business Entities; Definitions, 61 Fed. Reg. 66584, 66589 (1996) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-2)
(classifying certain organizations as corporations, in addition to those electing to be
treated as such).
21. See BISHOP & KLEiNBERGER, supra note 8,
1.01[31, at 1-8. Even an organization that "flunked" two or more corporate characteristics was likely be taxed as
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to be the hallmark corporate characteristic, the Kintner Regulations contained no "super" factor. Each characteristic was as
significant as each other.'
The Wyoming legislature started a revolution by exploiting
that aspect of the Kintner Regulations. The Wyoming LLC Act
gave every Wyoming LLC a full, corporate-like liability shield
and partnership-like characteristics as to continuity of life,
transferability of ownership interests, and entity management.' If the Kintner Regulations meant what they said, then a
Wyoming LLC was to be taxed as a partnership.'
The IRS "took over ten years to acknowledge the consequences of its own tax classification regulations."' Revenue
Procedure ("Rev. Proc.") 88-76 classified a Wyoming LLC as a
partnership and caused legislatures around the country to consider seriously the LLC phenomenon.26 For the most part
Wyoming's early emulators were faithful copiers, imposing
through their LLC statutes the same basic structure as ordained
in the Wyoming statute.' This fidelity gave the earliest LLCs
some common characteristics - at least to the extent they
followed the default blueprint of their respective enabling statutes.' In the default mode, an LLC:
* was managed by its members in their capacity as members,2

a corporation if its interests were publicly traded. I.R.C. § 7704 (1994).
op & KLEINBERGER, supra note 8,
2.10, at 2-133 to 2-136.
22. See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 8,
2.01, at 2-5.
23. See id.
2.03[1], at 2-16.

See BIsH-

24. See id.
25. Id, at v.
26. Rev. Proc. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. Prior to Rev. Proc. 88-76 only Florida had
joined Wyoming in enacting an LLC statute. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 8,
1.01[1], at 1-4.
27. For instance, almost all of the early LLC statutes copied verbatim Wyoming's
unartful language concerning the relationship between member dissociation and LLC
dissolution. See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supmr note 8,
9.04[2], at 9-14 to 9-15.
28. In the early days of the LLC phenomenon, some LLC enabling statutes established mandatory rather than default rules on tax-sensitive issues. The drafters of
these "bullet proof" statutes evidently intended to make the tax classification analysis "idiot proof." Id.
2.03[31, at 2-20 (explaining how many early LLC enabling
statutes contained mandatory provisions on tax sensitive issues).
29. For a discussion of LLC management, see id. ch. 7.
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was threatened with dissolution each time a member disso•
ciated, ° and
*
allowed its members to transfer freely the economic rights
associated with membership but prohibited its members from
transferring their membership interest in toto (or any governance rights associated with membership) without the consent
of all the other members. a
In the first respect, LLCs resembled general partnerships.' In
the second respect, LLCs resembled a limited partnership that
had lost a general partner.31 In the third respect, LLCs resembled both general and limited partnerships.'
This characteristic picture began to lose focus in 1989 as
the IRS began to loosen its approach to tax classification.' In
a series of public and private rulings, the IRS allowed for increasing flexibility of form, especially as to the continuity of
life characteristic.' This characteristic had done much to keep
a "family resemblance" among LLCsF because, until 1989, ev3
ery LLC "blessed" by the IRS had lacked that characteristic. 8

30. For a discussion of LLC dissolution, see id, ch. 9.
31. For a discussion of member exit rights, see id. ch. 8. Under some enabling
statutes it was not, strictly speaking, the LLC that established these constraints.
The constraints were "hard wired" into the statute that enabled the LLC's forma2.03[3], at 2-20.
tion. See id.
32. See UNIF. PArNERSmP ACT § 9, 6 U.LA. 400 (1914) (stating the agency powers of partner); id. § 18(e) (stating that "[aill partners have equal rights in the
management and conduct of the partnership business"); id § 18(h) (providing for
the resolution of management disputes among partners).
33. See REv. UNIF. LTD. PAirrN_ asH' AcT § 801(4), 6A U.LA. 240 (1976) (providing that an event of withdrawal of a general partner threatens the limited partnership with dissolution).
34. See UNiF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 27, 6 U.L.A. 736 (1914) (stating the effect in a
general partnership of the assignment of a partner's interest); REV. UNIF. LTD. PARrNERSHIP AcT § 702, 6A U.LA. 230 (1976) (same with regard to a limited partnership).
2.03[21,[41, at 2-19, 2-20.
35. BISHOP & KLEiNBERGER, supm note 8,
36. See id.
37. The phrase "family resemblance" is borrowed from the approach used by
securities law to determine whether a note constitutes a security. See Reves v.
Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 67 (1990) (holding that whether a note constitutes a
security depends on whether the note resembles the family of instruments common-

ly thought of as securities).
38. There was nothing in the Kintner Regulations to make continuity of life a
"super" factor. Nonetheless, until PLR 9010027, every favorable revenue ruling and
private letter ruling involved an LLC that lacked continuity of life.
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Then the IRS began to accept both a shrinking of the categories
of member dissociation that threatened dissolution and a decrease in the quantum of member consent necessary to avoid
dissolution following member dissociation. As a result, LLC
organizers had a greater variety of structures from which to
choose.
At the same time, however, the IRS's pronouncements on
continuity of life and free transferability of interests were conducing toward a new characteristic LLC structure. Beginning
with Private Letter Ruling ("PLR") 9210019, the IRS revealed a
bias toward manager-managed LLCs.' In contrast to a member-managed LLC or an LLC managed by a non-member manager, an LLC managed by one or more member-managers could
achieve partnership tax status while enjoying significantly
greater safety from business disruption and significantly greater
control over member exit rights.' In both official and unofficial ways, the IRS "suggest[ed] that limited liability companies
are properly analogized to limited partnerships, rather than
general partnerships, for purposes of [tax] classification.""
In 1994, the IRS issued Rev. Proc. 95-10 and made its earlier suggestion a matter of policy. Rev. Proc. 95-10 purported to
provide guidelines for LLCs seeking advance assurance of partnership tax status under the Kintner Regulations,' but in essence constituted a series of safe harbors. Those safe harbors
rested heavily on the limited partnership analogy.' For example, under Rev. Proc. 95-10, an LLC managed by a membermanager could avoid the corporate characteristic of continuity
of life even if only that member-manager's dissociation threatened dissolution.' That dissociation/dissolution nexus paral-

39. See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 8,

2.03[4], at 2-20 to 2-21.

40. See id.
41. Id.
2.03[41, at 2-20 to 2-21.
42. See Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-3 I.I.B. 20, § 1.01 ("This revenue procedure specifies the conditions under which the Internal Revenue Service (Service) will consider a ruling request that relates to classification of a domestic or foreign limited liability company (LL) as a partnership for federal tax purposes").
43. Indeed, one part of Rev. Proc. 95-10 incorporates by reference an earlier
Revenue Procedure dealing with limited partnerships. Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-3
I.R.B. 20, § 5.01(3) (incorporating Rev. Proc. 94-46, which defines "majority in interest" with reference to limited partnerships).
44. See Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-3 LRB. 20, § 5.01(1); CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL
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leled the approach of the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership
Act ("RULPA"), under which (in the default mode) the dissociation of a limited partner has no effect on the partnership's existence, but the dissociation of a general partner threatens the
partnership with dissolution.' Similarly, under Rev. Proc. 9510, an LLC managed by a member-manager could avoid the
corporate characteristic of free transferability even though only
the member-manager possessed the authority to approve the
transfer of a member's complete membership interest.' This
structure went beyond the default rules of RULPA (which require the consent of all the remaining partners), 47 but it paralleled the IRS's longstanding approach to transferability of interests in limited partnerships.'
Although Rev. Proc. 95-10 also offered some safe harbors
for member-managed LLCs, those harbors carried greater
nontax risks, especially as to business continuity. For instance,
for a member-managed LLC to be assured of an advance ruling
that it lacked continuity of life, it was necessary for the dissociation of any member to threaten dissolution. 49 Rev. Proc. 9510 did not require unanimous consent to avoid dissolution; a
mere majority in interest sufficed.' However, for these purposes, majority-in-interest meant a majority of both the capital
and profit interests.5 ' As a result, a member-managed LLC that

S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX & BuSiNESS LAW
2.07[3][c][i],
at S2-38 (Supp. 1 1996).
45. REV. UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 801, 6A U.LA. 1 (1976) (listing causes of
dissolution, omitting any reference to the dissociation of a limited partner and providing in subsection 4 that "an event of withdrawal of a general partner" threatens
the limited partnership with dissolution).
46. See Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-3 LR.B. 20, § 5.02(1); CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL
S. KLEiNBERGER, LIMITED LIABILTY COMPANIES: TAX & BusiNESS LAW
2.07(3][c][i],
at S2-38 (Supp. 1 1996).
47. See REv. UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 704(a), 6A U.LA. 1 (1976) (providing
that in the default mode the transfer of a partner's complete interest requires the
consent of "all other partners").
48. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-2(e) (1996).
49. See Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-3 I.R.B. 20, § 5.01(2).
50. See Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-3 LR.B. 20, § 5.01(3) (adopting the definition of
"majority in interest" found in Rev. Proc. 94-46, 1994-28 LRB. 129); Rev. Proc. 9510, 19953 I.I.B. 20, § 5.01(2) (negating continuity of life when, following the dissociation of any member, dissolution is avoided by consent of a majority in interest).
51. See Rev. Proc. 94-46, 1994-28 LR.B. 129 (defining majority in interest).
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sought to avoid continuity of life under Rev. Proc. 95-10 could
face various governance anomalies, including: (i) effective veto
power resting with holders of large capital accounts, and
(ii) incongruity between member voting power generally and
member voting power on the crucial issue of dissolution avoidance.5
Rev. Proc. 95-10 might well have pushed LLCs into the
limited partnership mold if the IRS had not subsequently decided to do away with the Kintner Regulations. Effective January
1, 1997, the Treasury Department adopted a "check the box"
tax classification regime.' Under "check the box," each domestic entity - other than one organized pursuant to a corporate or joint stock statute - determines its own tax status
simply by checking or not checking a box.' Indeed, unless an
unincorporated organization elects otherwise, it will be taxed
as a partnership.'
Thus, under "check the box," the tax status of an unincorporated organization no longer depends on any of the Kintner
factors or on any other attribute of the organization's structure.
Except for the publicly traded partnership rule,' tax classification will no longer dictate organizational structure.5 7 With tax
52. See Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-3 LRB. 20, § 5.01(1). The same majority-in-interest quantum applies to dissolution avoidance in LLC managed by member-managers. However, the problems discussed in the text are far less likely to arise, because the events threatening dissolution are far less likely to occur. I&
53. See Classification of Certain Business Entities, 61 Fed. Reg. 66584, 66590
(1996) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-3).
54. For entities organized under the laws of other nations, the analysis is more
complicated. 26 CFR § 301.7701-2 lists certain organizations which are organized
under the law of foreign jurisdictions and which will be classified as corporations.
The regulation also provides for the grandfathering of existing organizations as
other than corporations. 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-2. However, in certain situations a
grandfathered foreign entity could lose its grandfathered status. Id.
55. See Classification of Certain Business Entities, 61 Fed. Reg. 66584, 66590
(1996) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-3).
56. See LR.C. § 7704 (1994). See also BisHoP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 8,
2.01, at 2-4 to 2-5 (explaining that most publicly traded partnerships are taxed as
corporations).
57. Partnership tax accounting rules will continue to apply, but their requirements will not fundamentally affect LLC structure. See infra note 64; 26 C.F.R.
§ 3 0 1.6 231(a)(7)-(2). Estate and gift tax concerns may continue to exert influence.
For LLCs to function as "family LLCs" and provide substantial valuation discounts
for gift tax purposes, the LLC structure must take into account LR.C. §§ 2701, 2704
and Treas. Reg. § 25.2704 (dealing with "applicable restrictions").
See CArrER G.

1997] "MagnificentCircularity"And The Churkendoose

489

classification constraints removed, LLC varieties will proliferate
and any "family resemblance" among LLCs will attenuate. LLCs
may well differ from each other more than they resemble each
other.
Nonetheless, it remains possible to identify some essential
LLC characteristics and to describe a range of possibilities for
other important attributes. Even after "check the box," every
LLC will:
*
be organized pursuant to some state statute other than a
corporation statute,"
*
come into existence through the filing of a public document with some state agency,'
*
exist as a legal entity, separate from its owners, and
*
have a full, corporate-like liability shield to protect its owners against automatic, vicarious liability for the debts of the
enterprise.'
IC governance structure will run the gamut from a New England town-meeting style, with decisions made through discussion and consensus among all members,6' to an enterprise
dominated autocratically by a single managing member.'
Moreover, some LLCs will undoubtably use corporate-style
governance. Indeed, two state LLC statutes already provide that
arrangement as the default structure.6
BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILrrY CoMPANIEs: TAX & BUSINESS
LAW I 8.04[I],[2],[2][b], at 8-34 to 8-39, S8-4 (1994 & Supp. 2 1996). However, only
legislative action can address applicable restriction issues. That is, if LPC. § 2704
and Treas. Reg. § 25.2704 are to influence LLC structure, they will do so by influencing the statutory default rules. That result has already occurred in Georgia.

See

BISHOP

& KLEINBERGER, supra note 46,

8.04[21[b].

Some states may decline

to follow the IRS on "check the box" and may persist in a Kintner-like approach
for state tax purposes. If so, the Kintner factors may continue to influence LLC
structure.
58. See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 8, 5.02[1], at 5-5.
5.05[1][b][11, [11], at 5-7 to 5-49.
59. See id.
60. See id. 1 6.01[l], at 6-3.
61. This arrangement resembles the governance approach of some general partnerships. See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79-80 (1984), (Powell,
J., concurring) ("The essence of the law partnership is the common conduct of a
shared enterprise. The relationship among law partners contemplates that decisions
important to the partnership normally will be made by common agreement. . . or
consent among the partners."). Id.
62. This latter arrangement resembles a typical limited partnership. See, e.g.,
Evans v. Galardi, 546 P.2d 313 (Cal. 1976).
63. See MINN. STAT. § 322B (1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-69 (1993). See also
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Even greater flexibility will exist as to LLC members and
their rights and roles in the organization. Due to IRS tax accounting requirements for partnerships,' members' interests
will continue to reflect a capital account and a profit percentage. In other respects, however, there will be no paradigmatic
construct. Some members will be unremittingly passive, their
governance rights scant and their financial rights preferred.
Such members will in essence resemble preferred shareholders.' Other members will have a "hands on" role in their LLC.
That role will range from intermittent to constant; responsibilities will range from the most senior, supervisory of management duties to the most prosaic of day-to-day work.' For the
myriad of members who do provide services to an LLC, remuneration will come in many forms. For some members, the
services they provide will be their means of investing in the
enterprise; thus, their work will constitute "sweat equity" and
will qualify them for an owner's share of the profits. 7 In other

MINN. STAT. § 322B.01 (1996), Reporter's Notes-Overview Comments (stating that
the Minnesota LLC Act adopts "the governance and management provisions of the
Minnesota Business Corporation Act").
64. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv) (requiring that capital accounts for partners be established and maintained throughout the term of partnership); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.704-(b)(1)(i) (providing that, if the partnership agreement does not provide for
the allocation of income, gain, and loss, then the distribution will be in relation to
the partner's interest in the partnership). See also BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra
note 8, Operating Agreement, Article VII, § 7.02, app. at A-47 (providing for the
establishment and maintenance of member capital accounts in accordance with IRS
requirements); Article VI § 6.01, app. at A-44 (providing for the allocation of profits).
65. See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 8,
5.0412][b], at 5-25 (describing
how LLCs have great flexibility in delineating membership interests).
66. See ifra
notes 368-398 (discussing how the make-up of a member's duties
affects the question of whether the member is an "employee" for federal employment law purposes).
67. In closely held businesses it is commonplace for some entrepreneurs to use
their labor to buy into the enterprise. See, e.g., Daniel S. leinberger & Barbara A.
Wrigley, Who Owns the Christmas 7Wes? The Disposition of Property Used by a
Partnership, 39 U. KAN. L REV. 245, 272-80 (1991) (discussing the phenomenon in
the context of general partnerships); F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON,
O'NEAL'S CLOSE COaPORAnONS § 2.23 (3d ed. 1994) (discussing same in the context
of close corporations). Virtually all, if not all, LLC enabling statutes allow members to obtain membership interests in return for services.
See BISHOP &
KIEINBERGER, supra note 8, $ 5.04[3][b], at 5-29. If the services also earn the
member a capital interest, then the member recognizes income as of the date the
(member] acquires the equity interest." Id. I 5.04[4][b], at 5-34.
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instances, members' remuneration will be calculated as a share
of the profits, but each year's allocation will depend on the
relative productivity of the members.' In still other instances,
a member will receive both a profit share and some additional,
perhaps guaranteed payment on account of services.' 9
In sum, if the role of LLC members within their businesses
determines whether federal employment statutes cover those
members,' then that coverage question has no categorical answer.7 The role of members differs too widely for any per se
rule to apply to all members in all LLCs. To use a phrase commonplace in the federal employment case law, the analysis will
have to take into account the "totality of the circumstances."'
II. THE CIRCULAR DEFINITION OF "EMPLOYEE"

"Totality of the circumstances" is a vacuous concept unless
guided by rules that determine which circumstances are important and why.' Since the federal employee statutes seek to

68. This arrangement is most likely to be found inan LLC providing professional
services.
69. Guaranteed payments raise self-employment tax questions, which are beyond
the scope of this article. For the current IRS position on these questions, see Proposed Rule, Definition of Limited Partner for Self-Employment Tax Purposes, 62
Fed. Reg. 1702-01 (Jan. 13, 1997).
70. As discussed infra notes 346-452, the analysis should indeed focus on the
role of the member in the business. But see infra notes 290-307 (discussing the
categorical approach of some close corporation cases).
71. As discussed infra notes 346-452, the analysis should indeed focus on the
role of the member in the business. But see infra notes 290-307 (discussing the
categorical approach of some close corporation cases).
72. See, e.g., EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1539 (2d Cir. 1996)
(stating that "the somewhat nebulous 'common law agency' test of employment - .
. requires a broad examination of the totality of the circumstances"); Frankel v.
Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1993) (contrasting the common law agency test
and the hybrid test, noting "that in practice there is little discernible difference between the hybrid test and the common law agency test," and stating that both
"consider a non-exhaustive list of factors as part of a flexible analysis of the 'totality of the circumstances'"); Lilley v. BTM Corp., 958 F.2d 746, 750 (6th Cir. 1992)
(characterizing the now disfavored economic realities test as "a loose formulation,
leaving the determination of employment status to case-by-case resolution based on
the totality of the circumstances"); Golden v. A.P. Orleans, Inc. 681 F. Supp. 1100,
1101-02 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
73. See, e.g., Jackson v. Jackson, 478 A.2d 1026, 1033 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984)
(looking at the totality of the circumstances to evaluate the diligence of a divorce
litigant and her counsel); Martinez v. Erickson, 535 N.E.2d 853, 858 (111.1989)
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protect "employees," the statutory definition of that term would
seem the logical place to look for those rules. Unfortunately,
although all the statutes considered in this article define "employee" in essentially the same way,' the definitions are virtually useless. For example, in the words of the Supreme Court,
"ERISA's nominal definition of 'employee' as 'any individual
employed by an employer,'.., is completely circular and explains nothing."'5 As to the definition of "employee" in OSHA,
the Ninth Circuit has stated: "The Act circularly defines
'employee' as 'an employee of an employer who is employed in
a business of his employer which affects commerce. ' "7 As to
Title VII, its definition of employer - "in effect, that an employer is one who employs employees - begs for a clarifying
construction by the courts."'

Courts have responded to this "magnificent circularity"'m
with clarifying constructions, stating that case law must direct
any inquiry regarding the statutes' application to LLC members.

(holding that totality of the circumstances must be considered in assessing plaintiffs diligence in attempt to serve process); New York v. Finlayson, 427 N.Y.S.2d
341, 344 (N.Y. County Ct. 1980) (stating that in determining the propriety of a temporary stop '[tlhe dispositive test is whether under the totality of the circunstances, the conduct of the police was reasonable and the extent of the intrusion justified by articulable facts"); North Carolina v. Yananokwiak, 309 S.E.2d 560, 563
(N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (considering the totality of the circumstances in determining
whether sufficient exigency existed to permit warrantless entry into a home); West
Virginia v. Canby, 252 S.E.2d 164, 167 (W. Va. 1979) (stating that "[tihe test of exigent circumstances for the making of an arrest for a felony without a warrant in
West Virginia is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the police had
reasonable grounds to believe that if an immediate arrest were .not made, the accused would be able to destroy evidence, flee or otherwise avoid capture, or
might, during the time necessary to procure a warrant, endanger the safety or
property of others").
74. See supra note 4 (providing definitions). The Fair Labor Standards Act has
an additional definition of the term "employ" which causes FISA to have a broader
scope than the other statutes considered here. See infr notes 125-31.
75. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (citing 29
U.S.C. § 1002(6)).
76. Loomis Cabinet Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n., 20
F.3d 938, 941 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing 29 U.S.C. §652(6)).
77. Hill v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 808 F. Supp. 141, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
See also Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 985 (Ist Cir. 1997) (stating that "the
parameters of the term 'employee' have proven elusive" and characterizing the circularity problem as "a turn of phrase which chases its own tail").
78. Broussard v. LH. Bossier, Inc., 789 F.2d 1158, 1160 (5th Cir. 1986).
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There are, however, at least seven problems with extrapolating
that case law into the LLC context.
1. A recent Supreme Court case has foreclosed the
normal first resort when construing an ambiguous statute. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden blocks any
inquiry into legislative purpose.'
2. The case law arises under several different statutes.
Although for the most part these statutes share the key
definitions, they do address different issues.
3. Most of the case law arises in two different contexts - disputes as to whether the particular plaintiff is
covered as an employee and disputes as to whether the
particular defendant has a sufficient number of covered
employees so as to constitute an "employer" and therefore be subject to the statute invoked by the plaintiff/employee. 8
4. Some cases seem almost hostile to the notion that
the statutes have limits. These cases misplace the
definitional focus and fail to understand that the term
"employee" serves in part to limit the statutes' reach.
5. The largest, best-developed section of the case law
is inapposite. That case law deals with the distinction
between independent contractors and genuine employees, and that distinction has little relevance to deciding
whether a business' owner should be protected as an
employee.
6. The case law dealing with the most analogous situations - partners in a general partnership and shareholders in a closely held corporation - is confused. The
partnership cases do not clearly explain why partners
are beyond the statutes' scope, and the corporation
cases are contradictory.
7. The case law treats only occasionally and superficially the key issue applicable to LLC members - i.e.,
when an individual both works for a business and co-

79. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 325.
80. The employee vel non issue also arises in a recondite area of ERISA preemption law. See infra notes 306-09.
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owns it, how does the concept of "employee" address
those mixed roles?
Some of these problems are more troubling than others. Each
will be addressed in turn.
1. Foreclosure of Legislative Purpose: Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden is the most important case for determining employee status under federal employment law.8' Decided
in 1992, the case considered in particular whether Robert
Darden was an employee or independent contractor for purposes of ERISA.' More generally and more significantly, the case
rejected legislative purpose as a reference for determining the
scope and meaning of the term "employee." The Supreme Court
incorporated its holding from an earlier case, which had defined "employee" for Copyright Act purposes, and stated:
"[w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated
settled meaning under... the common law, a court
must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that
Congress means to incorporate the established meaning
of these terms .... In the past, when Congress has
used the term 'employee' without defining it, we have
concluded that Congress intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by
common-law agency doctrine."'
The decision means in essence that the term "employee" is
to be looked up in the dictionary of the common law.' In so

81. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 318. Darden's holding does not control the issue
for the FLSA. Id. at 326. See also infra notes 125-131 (explaining that the FISA
contains an additional and very broad definition of the term "employ").
82. See id. at 323-24.
83. Id. at 322-23 (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S.
730 (1989)).
84. Compare Uniform Commercial Code, § 1-205, cmt. 1 (rejecting the "'lay
dictionary' and the 'conveyancers' reading of a commercial agreement" and stating
that "[t]he measure and background for interpretation are set by the commercial
context"). Quoting from Reid, and citing other authority as well, the Darden court
provided the following common law definition of the term "employee":
"In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general
common law of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control
the manner and means by which the product is accomplished. Among
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holding, the Supreme Court rejected its earlier reasoning that
the definitional scope of the term should be construed "in light
of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained. " s
Darden has at least two major consequences. First, it undermines a raft of lower court rulings that had interpreted the
term "employee" broadly so as to serve remedial purposes. Of
these rulings, Armbruster v. Quinn' is one of the most prominent examples:
The primary purpose of the Civil Rights Act, and Title
VII in particular, is remedial. Its aim is to eliminate
employment discrimination by creating a federal cause
of action to promote and effectuate its goals. To effectuate its purpose of eradicating the evils of employment
discrimination, Title VII should be given a liberal construction. The impact of this construction is the broad
interpretation given to the employer and employee provisions.'

the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required;
the
source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the
duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party
has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party;, the extent
of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; the
method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring
party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party." 490 U.S., at
751-752, 109 S. Ct., at 2178-2179 (footnotes omitted). Cf RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958) (listing nonexhaustive criteria for
identifying master-servant relationship); Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 Cune. Bull.
296, 298-299 (setting forth 20 factors as guides in determining whether an
individual qualifies as a common-law "employee" in various tax law contexts). Since the common-law test contains "no shorthand formula or
magic phrase that can be applied to find the answer . . . all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive." NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S., at
258.
Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-24.
85. Darden 503 U.S. at 324 (quoting United States v. Silk, 331 U.S.
(1947), which in turn was quoting NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322
124 (1944)). See also Wilde v. County of Kandiyohi, 15 F.3d 103, 105
1994).
86. 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983).
87. Id. at 1336 (citations omitted). See also Lilley v. BTM Corp., 958

704, 713
U.S. 111,
(8th Cir.

F.2d 746,
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Armbruster and similar cases labelled their approach to employee status the "economic realities" test.' To the extent
those cases and that test required an analysis or produced results at odds with the common law agency test, they are no
longer good law.8

750 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating that -[t]he term 'employee' is to be given a broad construction in order to effectuate the remedial purposes of the ADEA"); Hyland v.
New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that "[tihe
statute is considered remedial in nature and must be given a liberal interpretation
in order to effectuate its purposes"); Caruso v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 664
F. Supp. 144, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Dixon v. Burman, 593 F. Supp. 6, 9 n.10 (N.D.
Ind. 1983) (citing Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 657 F.2d 909, 915 n. 8 (7th
Cir. 1981) and stating that "Unger made it clear that in the Seventh Circuit [the]
analysis [of the employee vel non question] 'should keep in mind [the] remedial
nature of Title VII and construe it liberally so as to further the goals and purposes
of eliminating discrimination in employment'").
88. Doty v. Elias, 733 F.2d 720, 722-23 (10th Cir. 1984); Carter v. Dutchess Community College, 735 F.2d 8, 14 (2d Cir. 1984); Arnbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332,
1339; (6th Cir. 1983) Li//ey, 958 F.2d. at 750; Ross v. William Beaumont Hosp., 678
F. Supp. 655, 675 (E.D. Mich. 1988). The phrase "economic realities" can be confusing because courts have used the same term to label two different concepts.
For the most part, the term refers to an analysis which determines employee status
in light of the remedial purpose of the statute, the economic dependence of the
putative employee on the putative employer and the susceptibility of the putative
employee to the mischief the statute seeks to correct It is this analysis that
Darden discredited. In contrast, some cases use the term "economic realities" as
part of the common law agency test These cases note, correctly, that the common law agency test considers various economic realities. Cobb v. Sun Papers,
Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 341 (11th Cir. 1982) exemplifies the latter approacIh
The analysis of the question in a given case should take into account the
economic realities ....
This does not mean, however, that the economic realities with respect to the dependence of the individual on the employment will control. Rather, it is the economic realities of the relationship viewed in light of the common law principles of agency and the
right of the employer to control the employee that are determinative.
Whether it would be desirable to import the . . . 'dependence test' into
the Title VII area, or to include all independent contractors within Title
VII coverage for that matter, is a decision for Congress, not the court.
Id. See also Loomis Cabinet Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n.,
20 F.3d 938, 942 (9th Cir. 1994) (using "economic realities test" to mean looking
past the labels of a relationship); Franke, 987 F.2d at 90-91 (stating that "[i]n appropriate circumstances, factors relating to an individual's economic dependence
upon the hiring party may be taken into account under the common law agency
test").
89. This situation explains why, in EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, 91 F.3d 1529
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Darden's second and perhaps more significant consequence concerns the available techniques of statutory interpretation. It is almost axiomatic that "legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered."' However, Darden
quite explicitly rejects this technique and has thus closed off
the most commonly used avenue for deciphering ambiguous
statutes.
Although Darden's rule simplifies matters in some ways,9 '
it "offer[s] no paradigm of determinacy."' The common law
agency test is not a straightforward, mechanical analysis but
rather a list of factors. At best these factors comprise an "ideal
type"' - i.e., a picture of a worker subject to detailed control
as to the manner and means of performance.' The picture is

(2d Cir. 1996), the majority took pains to preserve the Second Circuit's decision in
Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Associates, 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986). After
acknowleding that "the Hyland court began its analysis with the 'liberal
construction' language subsequently rejected in Darden," the Johnson & Higgins
majority stated: "However, Hyland did not turn on the court's adoption of an unduly broad definition of an 'employee' or its deviation from the common law agency
test for employment." Id. at 1538. For a further discussion of Hyland and Johnson & Higgins, see infra. Even before Darden, many courts resisted using the
"remedial purpose" economic realities test for statutes other than the FLSA. See,
e.g., EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32, 37 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that "[clourts
have ...
refrained from using the broader 'economic realities' test in Title VII
cases"); Thomason v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 866 F. Supp. 1329, 1334 (D. Kan.
1994) (stating that the economic realities test "is most often applied to cases arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act"). The economic realities test may still be
good law for the FLSA. See infra notes 125-31.
90. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SurHERLAND STAT. CONST. § 45.05, at 23 (5th ed.
1992).
91. Simplicity, or at least predictability, was one rationale adduced by the
Darden court. "[A]pplication [of "the traditional agency law criteria"] generally
turns on factual variables within an employer's knowledge, thus permitting categorical judgments about the 'employee' status of claimants with similar job descriptions." Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 327 (1992).
92. Id.
93. 1 MAX WFER, ECONOMY & SOCilTY 20-21 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich
eds., 1978).
94. See Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating "[t]he traditional test, derived from common-law principles of agency, focuses primarily on
the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is
accomplished"); Daughtrey v. Honeywell, Inc., 3 F.3d 1488, 1496 (11th Cir. 1993)
(stating "the traditional common-law agency test emphasize[s] the hiring party's
right to control the manner and means by which the work is accomplished");
Rivera v. Puerto Rican Home Attendants Serv. Inc., 922 F. Supp. 943, 949 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (stating that when applying the common-law agency test "particular emphasis
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general and "not capable of exact definition."95 The common
law indicates neither how important each aspect of the picture
may be, nor what to do if different aspects of the picture point
in different directions.
The picture approach works well enough in its original,
common law context, because there the picture is tied to a
policy. The common law arrays its factors to determine servant
status' which in turn helps determine respondeat superior liability. 7 In the common law context, therefore, the picture
analysis serves to answer a particular question of policy namely, whether a worker is sufficiently integrated into and
subject to the control of a business so as to fairly subject the
business to liability without fault for the worker's misconduct.9
Darden, in contrast, provides only the picture without the
policy. Indeed, Darden essentially holds that Congress, in
choosing the word "employee," adopted a picture rather than a
policy: "we have concluded that Congress intended to describe
the conventional master-servant relationshipas understood by
common-law agency doctrine."9' The resulting analysis can be
frustratingly problematic, especially in "grey area" situations.
Imagine having to answer the question, "is a mule more like a

should be placed on a defendant's right to control the 'manner and means' by
which work is accomplished" (citations omitted)). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY, § 220(1) (1958) ("A servant is a person employed to perform services
in the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other's control or right to control").
95. Id. § 220 cmt. c.
96. See id. § 220 (Definition of Servant).
97. See id. § 219(1) (stating that "[a] master is subject to liability for the torts
of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment"). "Scope
of employment is the other main respondeat superior battleground." DANIEL
KLEINBERGER, AGENCY AND PARTNERSH.

EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS

§ 3.2.5, at 88

(Little Brown 1995). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 228-237 (1958)
(describing scope of employment).
98. "The relation of master and servant . . . is an important relation in that
upon it depends the liability of the master to third persons . . . under the provisions of various statutes as well as under the common law." RESTATEMENT (SECSee also KLEINBERGER, supra note 97, §
OND) OF AGENCY § 220 cmt. c. (1958).
3.2.2, at 84.
99. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1992) (quoting
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1989)) (emphasis added).
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donkey than a horse?" without knowing why the question is
important.
Simpson v. Ernst & Young illustrates the problem."°
Simpson, who had been styled a partner of defendant, brought
suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")
claiming to be an employee for ADEA purposes."0 ' The district
ts but what does
court noted its obligation to follow Darden,"
it mean to apply the common law agency test when the issue is
not employee versus independent contractor but rather employee versus partner?"m
To reiterate, the trouble with Darden is not the picture
approach, but rather the approach of divorcing picture from
policy. Furthermore, if Darden correctly assesses the Congressional intent, the problem originated with Congress rather than
the Supreme Court. Certainly the Supreme Court knows how to
couple picture and policy where "the statute [so] dictates.""
For example, in Reves v. Ernst & Young, the Court adapted the

100. 850 F. Supp. 648 (S.D. Ohio 1994), affd, 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996).
101. See id. at 649-50.
102. See id. at 655.
103. The court resolved this conundrum by applying "traditional legal principles"
of partnership law, thereby following Darden's focus on picture rather than policy.
See id. at 655. For a critique of this resolution, see infia notes 247-273. For
another example of a court struggling with the problem of a picture without a
policy, see Salinas v. Rodriguez, 978 F.2d 187, 188 (5th Cir. 1992) (concluding that,
for purposes of the FLSA and Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection
Act (MSAWPA) "a farmer who hires migrant labor through a third-party contractor
jointly employs the harvest hands with the contractor insofar as the calculation of
days worked is concerned," but "rejectfing] as unreasonable ... any reading of the
statute or administrative guidelines which would have attributed to every farmer
the hours worked for other farmers solely because the workers 'were supplied by
the same third-party contractor"). The Salinas court justified its decision in part
with reference to the policy and rules of respondeat superior.
[O]nce the worker has departed for another farm, the first farmer no
longer possesses the power to control the manner and means by which
the work is performed, just as the second farmer had no control over
work performed for the first. Further, neither farmer would be vicariously liable for the torts of the worker committed during the course and
scope of duties on the other farm.
Id. at 189. The court did not explain, however, what respondent superior has to
do with the FLSA or the MSAWPA.
104. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 322 (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989)).
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Second Circuit's "family resemblance" test for determining
whether a note constitutes a security under federal securities
law. 0 5 The Court did not, however, merely describe the relevant families. Instead, the Court first noted the problem inherent in analysis by picture:
We agree that the items identified by the Second Circuit
are not properly viewed as "securities." More guidance,
though, is needed. It is impossible to make any meaningful inquiry into whether an instrument bears a "resemblance" to one of the instruments identified by the
Second Circuit [as not constituting securities] without
specifying what it is about those instruments that makes
them non-"securities." 1°6
Then, keeping in mind that "Congress was concerned with regulating the investment market, not with creating a general federal cause of action for fraud,"0 7 the Court presented four factors to guide the family resemblance analysis."
Perhaps because Darden gives no comparable guidance,
the lower courts have followed the decision with varying degrees of fidelity. The Eighth Circuit, for instance, sees the matter as clear cut, at least as to the decision's effect on the economic realities test.
Application of the economic realities test results in Title
VII coverage for some common-law independent contractors because they are vulnerable to discrimination
arising in the course of their work. Because the economic realities test is based on the premise that the
term should be construed in light of Title VII's purpose
and the construction is broader than at common law,
Darden precludes the test's application."°
The Second Circuit has been a little more equivocal, acknowledging that, outside the FLSA, "Dardenmandates the applica-

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

See 494 U.S. 56, 63 (1990), rehg denied, 494 U.S. 1092 (1990).
Id. at 65-66.
Id. at 65.
See id. at 66-67.
Wilde v. County of Kandiyohi, 15 F.3d 103, 105-06 (8th Cir. 1994).
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tion of the common law agency test""' but noting "that in
practice there is little discernible difference between the hybrid
test [which pre-dates and is not adopted in Darden] and the
common law agency test.""' Other courts have been even
more equivocal."'
Nonetheless, Darden is the law, and the employee vel non
analysis must proceed within its strictures. In determining em-

110. Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1993).
111. Id. See also Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enters., 68 F.3d 480 (9th Cir. 1995)
(concluding that "the common law agency approach discussed in Darden is in practice largely indistinguishable from the hybrid approach we had already established"); Lambertsen v. Utah Dept of Corrections, 79 F.3d 1024, 1028 (10th Cir.
1996) (holding that there "is little discernible difference between the hybrid [approach] and the common law agency [approach]") (quoting Frankel v. Bailey, Inc.
987 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1993) (alteration in original); Thomason v. Prudential Ins.
Co. of An, 866 F. Supp. 1329, 1336 (D. Kan. 1994) (discussing Darden at some
length, but concluding that "[b]ecause all of the parties essentially agree that the
court should utilize the hybrid approach in analyzing this issue, and because the
approach is similar to the 'common law test' . . . there is essentially no reason . .
. to mince through the esoteric distinctions between the two tests") (citations omit-

ted).
112. For example, the Fifth Circuit has mentioned and cited Darden, but to date
no Fifth Circuit cases have directly applied Darden's factors. See, e.g., Abraham v.
Exxon Corp., 85 F.3d 1126, 1129 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that Exxon had conceded
for the purposes of its summary judgment motion that the plaintiffs were "common
law employees" under the Darden criteria). Moreover, one Fifth Circuit decision
inexplicably fails to mention Darden even though Darden should have been controlling; see also Nowlin v. Resolution Trust Corp., 33 F.3d 498, 506 (5th Cir. 1994)
(holding that the district court committed error when it used the "Borrowed Servant Doctrine" instead of the hybrid test to determine whether the defendants were
employers for the purposes of Title VII and making no mention of Darden or the
common law agency test). Compare State v. National Council of Allied Employees,
791 F. Supp. 1154, 1157 (W.D. Tex. 1992) ("[flollowing the Supreme Court's rationale in Darden" and adopting "a similar common law test to determine whether a
labor organization is an entity in which employees 'participate' for the purposes of
ERISA"). The Third and Fourth Circuits have cited Darden to reach the opposite
conclusions in cases involving essentially identical points of law and relevant facts.
Matinchek v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 96, 100-101 (3d Cir. 1996) (referring
to Darden and holding that ERISA did not govern an insurance plan which covered
only a sole business owner and his immediate family. The court reasoned that, in
light of the common law meaning of the term "employee," Congress intended "employer" and "employee" to be mutually exclusive concepts). In contrast, Madonia
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Virginia, 11 F.3d 444, .449 (4th Cir. 1993) relied on
Darden to reach precisely the antithetical result, holding that for ERISA preemption
purposes a sole shareholder was indeed an employee of his corporation. For further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 306-09.
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ployee status, what matters is Congress' picture, not Congress'
policy.
2. Multiplicity of statutes: For the most part the variety of
statutes does not pose interpretative problems. With one major
exception, the case law interpreting "employee" or "employer"
under one statute is authority for interpreting the terms under
other statutes.' For example, according to the Sixth Circuit,
"[tjhe provisions of the ADEA generally receive an identical
interpretation to corresponding provisions of Title VII."' 4 Similarly, in a case "consider[ing] the meaning of 'employee' under
the ADEA," the Second Circuit "referred to an ERISA case...
for guidance.""5
The Second Circuit has stated generally that, at least with
regard to federal anti-discrimination statutes, "cases construing
the definitional purposes of one are persuasive authority when
interpreting the others.""' The Sixth Circuit has remarked
even more broadly that the process of "interpreting the term
'employee'" is essentially the same for "social welfare legislation such as the ADEA, Title VII, the Fair Labor Standards Act
and the National Labor Relations Act."" 7 Other courts, including the Supreme Court, have also noted and engaged in
definitional cross fertilization."' This interpretative approach
113. That exception is the FLSA. See infra notes 125-31.
114. Lilley v. BTM Corp., 958 F.2d 746, 750 n.2 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing Coburn v.
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1983)); EEOC v.- First
Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass'n, 694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir. 1982).
115. Ehrlich v. Howe, 848 F. Supp 482, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing Frankel v.
Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1993) as having referred to Roth v. American
Hosp. Supply Corp., 965 F.2d 862, 867 (10th Cir. 1992)). See also Mukhtar v.
Castleton Service Corp., 920 F. Supp. 934, 939 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (noting that the
definitions of "employee" under ERISA and ADEA are alike); Simpson v. Ernst &
Young, 850 F. Supp. 648, 656 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (noting a common thread of analysis
between the impact of "employer" status under ADEA and ERISA), affd, 100 F.3d
436 (6th Cir. 1996); Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 728 n.4 (3d Cir.
1995) (discussing the scope of "employee" under ADEA and citing Darden, a case
on the definition of "employee" under ERISA, as well as several ADEA cases).
116. Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir. 1986).
117. Slovak, 694 F.2d at 1070. Slovak's inclusion of the FLSA is no longer appropriate. See supra note 81 and infra notes 125-31 (discussing how Darden categorizes the FLSA as far broader than other federal employment statutes). See also
Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 263 (10th Cir. 1987) (stating that "[i]n general,
cases construing definitions of one of the Acts are to be viewed as persuasive
authority when interpreting the others").
118. See, e.g., Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 847 (3d Cir. 1987)
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reflects Congress' drafting strategy - i.e., repeatedly using the
same definition. 19
Cross fertilization remains appropriate even though some
of the cases that support it rest on a now discredited approach
to statutory interpretation. That is, some of the cross fertilization cases assert that "employee" has essentially the same
meaning under the several statutes because the several statutes
have substantially similar purposes. For example, in Caruso v.
Peat,Marwick, Mitchell'& Company, the district court invoked
Hishon v. King & Spalding to resolve an ADEA issue, and noted:

(noting similarity between § 510 ERISA claims and employment discrimination
claims under Title VII), cited in Ehrlich v. Howe, 848 F. Supp. 482, 486 (S.D.N.Y.
1994); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 76 n.8 (1984) (noting analogies between Title VII and the NLRA in various contexts). See also Moebus v. OB-GYN
Assoc., Inc., 937 F. Supp. 867, 868 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (stating that in Darden "the Supreme Court stated the general rule for construing the term 'employee' where the
statute containing the term does not helpfully define it") (emphasis added);
Rosenblatt v. Bivona & Cohen, 969 F. Supp. 207, 215 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (using the
.cross construction method" with reference to Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA)
and Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 985 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating that "[wie regard Title VII, ADEA, ERISA, and FLSA as standing in par passu and endorse the
practice of treating judicial precedents interpreting one such statute as instructive
in decisions involving another").
Under Darden the same term may have the same meaning in various contexts.
See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (adopting for
ERISA purposes the same concept of "employee" as previously adopted for the
Copyright Act of 1976). However, the cross fertilization described here does not
necessarily extend beyond federal employment statutes. See, e.g., EEOC v. Dowd
& Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177, 1178 n.2 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating: "[T]he term
'employee' [may mean] different things for different purposes. Thus, both partners
and shareholders of professional corporations are 'employees' when the partner or
shareholder asserts a fifth amendment privilege for partnership or corporation documents.") (citing Bellis v. U.S., 417 U.S. 85 (1974) and. In re Zisook, 430 N.E.2d 1037
(111. 1981)). Also, although federal tax law makes much 'of the category of "employee," tax law cases have had relatively little impact on non-tax federal employment law cases. On occasions, a federal employment law case will cite a tax
case. See, e.g., Grantham v. Beatrice Company, 776 F. Supp. 391, 404 (N.D. 111.
1991) (citing Porter v. Commissioner, 856 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1988) for the proposition that federal judges are employees of the government despite the fact that
federal judges "answer to no one," Darden itself quotes a passage in Reid that
cites a Revenue Ruling containing twenty factors for determining whether an individual qualifies as an "employee" in various tax contexts. See supra note 83.
However, for the most part the tax and non-tax jurisprudence are separate.
119. For example, according to the House Report, the term "employee" is "defined
for the purpose of the [Title VIII in the manner common for Federal statutes." H.R.
Rep. No. 914 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.AN. 2355, 2402, and quoted in
Zimmerman v. North American Signal Co., 704 F.2d 347, 352 (7th Cir. 1983).
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The fact that Hishon was brought as a sex discrimination action under Title VII, rather than an age discrinmnation case under the ADEA, does not make this decision of any less relevance to the instant case. Since the
ADEA and Title VII "have a similar purpose - to
stamp out discrimination in various forms - cases
construing the definitional provisions of one are
per1 20
suasive authority when interpretingthe others.
As discussed above,1 2' Darden rejects this purpose-based
approach to definitions and instructs courts instead to use a
term's "accumulated settled meaning... under the common
law. " " Nonetheless, Darden supports cross fertilization, because under Darden the definition depends on matters outside
the statutory context - i.e., the common law." As a result,
definitional exegesis from one legislative
context should be
"persuasive authority" in other contexts. 24

120. 664 F. Supp. 144, 147 n.3, (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (quoting Hyland v. New Haven
Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir. 1986), and citing Geller v. Markham,
635 F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980)) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also
the cases cited infra note 142.
121. See supra notes 81-85.
122. Darden, 503 U.S. at 323 (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989)) (alteration in original).
123. See, e.g., Mukhtar v. Castleton Serv. Corp., 920 F. Supp. 934, 940 (S.D. Ind.
1996) (raising the notion that the test for "employee" might be different depending
on the statute involved "on the theory that ERISA does not share the same remedial purposes of the ADEA or Title VII" and then rejecting that notion per Darden).
See also Stouch v. Brothers of the Order of Hermits of St. Augustine, 836 F. Supp.
1134, 1139 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (stating that "[a]lthough Darden was an ERISA case, its
implications for the statutory construction are broad," and that "Darden announced
a general rule of statutory construction which is in no way limited to ERISA").
124. This notion does have one important limit. As explained both in Reid and
Darden, the common law analysis applies to a term "unless the statute otherwise
dictates." See Darden, 503 U.S. at 323 (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989)).
A statute might otherwise dictate by
supplying its own definition, by authorizing an adminstrative agency to define the
term, by defining some other term related to the term at issue, or by using the
defined term in different ways in different statutory contexts. For an example of
the second situation, see NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 450, 455
(1995) (stating that "when reviewing the [National Labor Relations) Board's interpretation of the term 'employee' as it is used in the N[ational] L[abor] Rielations]
Aict], we have repeatedly said that since the task of defining the term 'employee'
is one that has been assigned primarily to the agency created by Congress to ad-
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Within the statutes discussed here, one important exception does exist - the FLSA. As the Supreme Court explained in
Darden, like the other federal employee statutes, the FLSA:
defines an "employee" to include "any individual employed by an employer," [but] it defines the verb "employ" expansively to mean "suffer or permit to work."
This latter definition, whose striking breadth we have
previously noted, stretches the meaning of "employee"
to cover some parties who might not qualify as such
under a strict application of traditional agency law principles."2
Post-Darden decisions accordingly continue to "construe[]
the FLSA's definitions broadly, so as to give effect to
Congress's intentions and policies"12 and have continued to

minister the Act, . . . the Board's construction of that term is entitled to considerable deference") (citations and internal quotations omitted). For an example of the
third situation, see infru notes 125-31 and the discussion of how the definition of
"employ" affects the definition of "employee" under the FLSA. For an example of
the fourth situation, see Robinson v. SheU Oil Co., 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997). Robinson
considers whether Title VIrs anti-retaliation provision extends to former as well as
current "employees." The opinion first notes that the term "employee" lacks any
"temporal qualifier" and that "a number of . .. provisions in Title VII use the term
'employees' to mean something more inclusive or different than 'current employees.'" Id. at 846-47. On this basis the opinion deems the term "employees" to be
ambiguous as to the temporal issue. Id. at 848. Then, stating that "several sections of the Statute plainly contemplate that former employees will make use of
the remedial mechanisms of Title VII" and acknowledge that "exclusion of former
employees from the protection of [Title VIrs anti-retaliation provision] would undermine the effectiveness of Title VII," the opinion holds that, for the purposes of that
anti-retaliation provision, the term "employees" includes former employees. Id. at
848-49. Robinson does not undermine Darden's common law approach, because
the ambiguity revealed and resolved by Robinson relates only to the "temporal"
issue.
125. Darden, 503 U.S. at 326 (citations omitted).
126. Salyer v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Comp., 83 F.3d 784, 786-87 (6th Cir. 1996)
(noting the "wide swath these definitions cut" while discussing the "domestic service" exclusion). See also Herr v. McCormick Grain, 841 F. Supp. 1500, 1511 (D.
Kan. 1993) (holding that "if [an individual] was an employee under ERISA,
then [a fortiori the individual] must be an employee under the FLSA").
The FLSA's expansive scope may also apply to the FMIA "FMLA's definitions
of 'employ' and 'employee' are 'borrowed' from the FLSA." Family Medical Leave
Act of 1993, 60 Fed. Reg. 2180, 2186 (1995) (Department of Labor comments regarding publication of the final rules pertaining to the FMLA).
Nonetheless,
"[p]ersons who are partners in a business are not employees for purposes of the
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use the "economic dependence" version of the "economic realities" test.'27 Even so, "the FLSA does not apply to everyone
who has a job."" For example, a recent unreported district
court decision rejects the FLSA claims of a restaurant "manager, maitre de, buyer, and dishwasher" because "[b]y becoming a
stockholder in a closely held corporation plaintiff took a risk in
an investment" and because "plaintiffs investment was more
akin to an entrepreneur than a wage earning employee." "
Similarly, a Sixth Circuit case essentially assumes that genuine
partners are outside the FLSA and concentrates on whether the
plaintiff had actually become a partner."m The decision holds
the plaintiff to have been an employee because the parties "did
not 'do the things that they agreed to do' to form the proposed
business" and transform the plaintiff from an "incipient partner"
into an actual partner." 3 ' In sum, it appears that, even under
the FLSA's expansive approach, the term "employee" does not
encompass the genuine owners of closely held businesses.
3. Cases Arising in Different Contexts: Cases considering the
meaning of the term "employee" arise mostly in two different
contexts."3 Often the plaintiffs status is at issue. For exam-

FMLA because partners are not included within the definition of employee under
the FISA . . . even if their names appear on the payrolL" I& at 2233. As to
shareholder/employees, a topic discussed infra notes 274-345, the Department of
Labor is more equivocal. "[E]quity owners (e.g., stockholders) of a corporation
may also be employees of the corporation and, as such, when their names appear
on the payroll, are included in such employee counts and they may also become
eligible employees." Id. (emphasis added).
127. Herr v. Heiman, 75 F.3d 1509, 1512 (10th Cir. 1996); Henderson v. InterChem Coal Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 567, 570 (10th Cir. 1994); Fegley v. Higgins, 19 F.3d
1126, 1131 (6th Cir. 1994). For an explanation of the two different versions of the
economic realities test, see supra note 88.
128. Sayler, 83 F.3d at 786.
129. Golizio v. Antonine Holding Inc., No. Civ. A. 96-3142, 1997 WL 47781, at *1,
4 (E.D. La Feb. 5, 1997).
IM0. See Fegley v. iHiggin-s, 19 F.3d 1126 (6th Cir. 1994).
131. Id. at 1132 (noting that "the things" include plaintiffs making a $65,000 capital contribution).
132. Ironically, one of the most important opinions on employee status is an exception. Justice Powell's concurrence in Hishon arose in neither context. See
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring). The
plaintiff in Hishon, an associate attorney, was clearly an employee and the defendant, a very large law firm, just as clearly met the numerical threshold of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act. The case held that access to partnership might be a "term,
condition, or privilege of [Ms. Hishon's] employment, " and remanded the case with
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ple, in Wheeler v. Hurdman, the plaintiff sought protection
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Equal Pay Act; the defendant responded that the plaintiff was a partner rather than an
employee.1" Similarly, in Lilley v. BTM Corporation, the
plaintiff asserted empl6yee status, and the defendant defended
that the plaintiff was an "independent contracby asserting
34
tor."
Other cases define "employee" as a step in determining
whether the defendant/employer is subject to suit. Most of the
federal employment statutes exclude from coverage businesses
employing fewer than a specified number of employees."m As
a result, cases sometimes arise in which the plaintiff is concededly an employee, but the defendant argues that it has too few
other employees to be covered by the statute." For instance,
the statement, "if the evidence at trial establishes that the parties [so] contracted.
d at 75. Justice Powell chose to write sepa"
* . then [access] was a term ....
rately, to emphasize, albeit somewhat cryptically, the distinction between partner
status and employee status. The employee vel non issue has also arisen in a recondite and largely self-contained area of ERISA law. See infra notes 306-09.
133. 825 F.2d 257, 258 (10th Cir. 1987). The court sided with the defendant. Id.
at 276. For further discussion of Wheeler, see infta notes 205-30.
134. 958 F.2d 746, 750-51 (6th Cir. 1992). The case involved the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994). The court ruled for the plaintiff. Darden itself was an employee versus independent contractor case. See
Darden, 503 U.S. at 318.
135. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)
(1994) (establishing a threshold of 15 employees); See also Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994) (establishing a threshold of twenty employees); Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) ot 1993, 29 U.S.C.
§ 2611(4)(A)(i) (1994) (establishing a threshold of 50 employees); Americans With
Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (1994) (establishing a
threshold of 15 employees).
136. This issue goes to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Mukhtar
v. Castleton Service Corp., 920 F. Supp. 934, 936 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (stating that
"[tlhe Seventh Circuit treats the 'employer' issue as an element of the court's subject matter jurisdiction under the ADEA," and citing Rogers v. Sugar Tree Products,
Inc., 7 F.3d 577, 579 (3d Cir. 1993)); Powell-Ross v. All Star Radio, Inc., No. 951078, 1995 WL 491291 at 2-3 (E.D. Pa., Aug. 16, 1995) (discussing how the question
of subject matter jurisdiction is "intertwined with the merits of the case'); Simpson
v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 439 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that the employee vel
non question "is a preliminary jurisdictional issue" and stating that "[iln the absence of a conflict of material fact, it is appropriate for the court to resolve the
issue as a matter of law"). Sometimes the numerical threshold issue allows a
court to finesse the question of whether the plaintiff is truly an employee. For
example, in Zimmerman, the court without much analysis treated the plaintiff as
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in Moebus v. OB-GYN Associates, the plaintiff's status as an
employee was not at issue.'37 The case turned on whether a
shareholder/doctor counted toward the ADEA threshold of 20
employees."m3 Likewise, in Burke v. Friedman, the court considered the meaning of "employee" in order to determine
whether an accounting firm with four partners and 13 non-partner employees met the 15 employee threshold of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act.13
This difference of context does not create interpretation
problems. Although one case suggests that the numerical
threshold issue calls for "a broad[er] interpretation of the term
employee" than the plaintiff/employee issue," the weight of
authority is to the contrary. Cases in one context routinely, and
usually without comment, rely on cases from the other.' In-

an employee, even though he owned one third of the defendant corporation's outstanding stock See Zimmerman v. North Amer. Signal Co., 704 F.2d 347, 352-53
(7th Cir. 1983). The court focused instead on whether the corporation met the
numerical threshold. Id.
137. 937 F. Supp. 867, 868 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
138. Id. at 869. The court ruled that the shareholder was not an employee and
dismissed the plaintiff's case. Id. at 870.
139. 556 F.2d 867, 869 (7th Cir. 1977). The court ruled that the partners were
not employees and accordingly dismissed the plaintiffs suit. Id. at 868. See also
EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177, 1178 (7th Cir. 1984) (dismissing Title
VII claims because, with three shareholders held not to be employees, the defendant law firm did not meet the 15 employee threshold).
140. See EEOC v. Pettegrove Truck Service, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1430, 1433 (S.D.
Fla. 1989) (stating: "The court here is not asked to determine whether the Plaintiff
is an employee for purposes of Title VII. Rather, the court is asked to consider
whether Donna and Julie Pettegrove are employees in the context of its determination of Defendant's status as an employer under the statute. Under the circumstances, the court finds that a broad interpretation of the term employee is necessary to effectuate the purposes of Title VII."). The opinion gives no further analysis or justification, and, as explained in the text, the weight of authority is to the
contrary. Moreover, Darden substantially undermines Pettegrove's rationale. Under
Darden, courts are not to construe the term "employee" with reference to legislative purpose. See upma notes and i0fra notes.
141. See, e.g., Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 850 F. Supp. 648, 657 (S.D. Ohio), affd,
100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996) (determining the plaintiff'employee issue and citing
inter alia a threshold case EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, 736 F.2d at 1177); EEOC v.
Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1538 (2d Cir. 1996) (determining the plaintiff'employee issue and citing inter alia a threshold case, Dowd, 736 F.2d at 1177);
Moebus v. OB-GYN Assocs., Inc., 937 F. Supp. 867, 869 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (determining the threshold issue and citing inter a/ia a plaintiff/employee case, Hyland v.
New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986); Dowd, 736 F.2d at 1178
(determining the threshold issue and citing inter alia a plaintiff/employee case,
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deed, the notion that "employee" means the same thing in each
context goes essentially without saying.142 In any event,
Darden compels this interchangeablity. As explained above,
under Darden, the definition depends on matters outside the
statutory context.'4
4. Hostility to Statutory Limits: Any element of a legal rule is
in a sense a term of limitation.1' Yet some of the federal employment law cases seek to deny that role to the term "employee."1" Ambruster v. Quinn is again a good example.'" Interpreting Title VII, the opinion states:
Since this statute has been universally held to be broadly remedial in its purpose, such remedial effect can be
given only upon a broad interpretation of the term employee. We are unpersuaded that the term "employee"
from the
was meant in a technical sense, divorced
47
broadly humanitarian goals of the Act.
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984)).
142. See, e.g., Devine v. Stone, Leyton & Gershman, 100 F.3d 78 (8th Cir. 1996).
The case determined inter alia whether the defendant employer met the jurisdictional threshold for Title VII, and cited inter alia Johnson, 91 F.3d at 1529;
Hyland, 794 F.2d at 793; Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Co., 925 F.2d 1398 (11th Cir.
1991). Each of these cases concerns the employee vel non status of a plaintiff,
but Devine took no note of the differing contexts. See Devine, 100 F.3d at 78.
See also Johnson v. Cooper, Deans & Cargill, 884 F. Supp. 43, 45 (D.N.H. 1994)
(determining whether the defendant employer met Title Vil's jurisdictional limit, citing with approval Hyland, a plaintiff/employee case, and stating that
"[s]hareholder-employees of professional associations are, in law, 'employees' not
only for purposes of bringing their own Title VII claims, as in Hyland, but also for
purposes of determining whether the requisite number of people have been employed to bring the employer within Title VI's remedial reach"). For a critique of
Hyland, see infra notes 290-303.
143. Supra notes. See also infra notes.
144. See, e.g., McGray Constr. Co. v. Director, Office of Workers Comp. Programs,
112 F.3d 1025, 1027 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that "the 'status requirement' of 33
U.S.C. § 902(3) . . . restricts coverage" under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act).
145. 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1340-41. See also, Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139 (6th
Cir. 1977). Dunlop describes the FLSA as "a broadly remedial and humanitarian
statute . . . designed to correct 'labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of
the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general wellbeing of workers.'" Id. at 143 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)). Although in 1992
Darden separated the FLSA from other federal employment law statutes, before
that time FLSA case law influenced cases under other statutes. See supra notes
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The humanitarian appeal can be hard to resist. Who could
be so callous as to leave in place "private contracts... which
endanger[] national health"?'" Should not every right-thinking
person wish "to eliminate racial discrimination in all business
enterprises"? " Are not all statutes, and especially remedial
statutes, interpreted to effectuate their purposes?
The problem with these questions is that they obscure an
important aspect of the Congressional purpose - namely, the
decision to limit protection to "employees." As the Tenth Circuit explained in Wheeler v. Hurdman:
To suggest that Congress intended the provisions of
Title VII, the ADEA, and the FLSA to reach all situations
where discrimination may arise in a business setting is
to suggest that it enacted these statutes with the intent
that they cover all individuals having an economic relationship with a business. This would make employee
status largely irrelevant and would essentially transform
the employment discrimination statutes into business
discrimination statutes. If this were the case, then we

125-131. See also Hyland, 794 F.2d at 796 (stating that since the FLSA, Title VII,
and the ADEA have similar definitions of "employer" and "employee," and "[slince
all three statutes have a similar purpose - to stamp-out discrimination in various
forms - cases construing the definitional provisions of one are persuasive authority when interpreting the others"); Hill v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 808 F. Supp.
141, 147 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting and applying Hyland); Frankel v. Bally, Inc.,
987 F.2d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting cases that "focused on the purposes underlying the anti-discrimination laws"); Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066, 1067 n.1 (5th Cir.
1985) (recognizing that the test devised under the FISA may be applicable in a
Title VII case trying "to unravel the employee/independent contractor conundrum").
But see Wilde v. County of Kandiyohi, 15 F.3d 103, 105 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that
"[biecause Title VII and the . . . ADEA . . . do not include the FLSA's expansive
definition of the term 'employ,' most courts have reasoned that application of the
expansive economic realities test [common in cases under the FLSA] is unwarranted in discrmination cases brought under Title VII or the ADEA").
148. Dunlop, 548 F.2d at 143 (describing the purpose of the FLSA).
149. Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 340 (1lth Cir. 1982) (quoting Matiis
v. Standard Brands Chemical Indus., Inc., 10 Fair EmpL Prac. Cas. (BNA) 295, 297
(N.D. Ga. 1975)).. See also Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 850 F. Supp. 648, 654 (S.D.
Ohio 1994) (criticizing the defendant's theory and stating that "[t]he inescapable
logic of this position is that Ernst & Young claims to be free to discriminate
against hundreds of its accountants due to age, race, sex, religion, national origin,
and handicap because it asserts they. are not employees").

1997] "MagnificentCircularity" And The Churkendoose

511

must question why Congress bothered to limit each
statute's reach to employment practices. The requirement that the statutes cover only employment situations
suggests that Congress perceived a need to limit the
application of these statutes."5
Thus, despite their good intentions and even though mischief may remain to be remedied, the statutes have limited
reach. As to Title VII, for instance, "[wlhile it would be a desirable goal to eliminate racial discrimination in all business enterprises, it does not appear that the Congress intended such a
broad objective for Title VIL."' 5' Likewise, with regard to the
ADEA.
Although the Age Discrimination in Employment Act has
such a laudable title that might induce laymen to infer
that the statute was designed to prevent all age discrimination against those who work for a living, its congressional purpose was far less extensive since it prohibits
only some types of age discrimination. Although some
people who discriminate against the aged might offend
an increasingly shared social value which condemns
such discrimination, such discrimination would not

150. Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 275-76 (10th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).
See also Grantham v. Beatrice Co., 776 F. Supp. 391, 401 (N.D. i. 1991). Describing the Tenth Circuit's "conclusion [inWheeler] that a partner is not an employee under the anti-discrimination acts," the Grantham court explained.
[TIhe court in Wheeler sought to be "mindful of their remedial purposes,
and liberally interpret their provisions to that end." However, the court
admonished that "[sluch interpretation . . . cannot be used as a justification for- rewriting the statutes." There were, the court found, "statutory
limitations to the argument that the remedial ends of the Acts justify as
means any definition of employee which results in coverage."
In the
court's view, these statutory limitations prevented the application of the
anti-discrimination acts to partners.
Grantham, 776 F. Supp. at 401 (citations omitted). See also EEOC v. Zippo Mfg.
Co., 713 F.2d 32, 37 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Cobb v. Sun Paper, Inc., 673 F.2d at
340-41 (11th Cir. 1982)). Cf. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 65 (1990) (considering which notes constitute securities under federal securities laws and observing that "Congress was concerned with regulating the investment market, not with
creating a general federal cause of action for fraud").
151. Cobb, 673 F.2d at 340 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
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thereby violate any federal law unless it was specifically
prohibited by Congress.'5
These observations, made prior to Darden, are all the more
powerful given Darden's rejection of the "mischief to be remedied" approach to interpreting "employee."" Congress' choice
of the well-known term was purposeful, and the statutes' purposes are accordingly limited."5
Courts make mistakes when they fail to heed the twin
notions of limited Congressional intent and limited statutory
reach. The danger is especially great when complex situations
are involved. In Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Association,
for example, the Second Circuit had to decide whether the
ADEA protected a shareholder/employee of a closely held, professional corporation.'" The question is complex, since the
plaintiff co-owned the corporation for which he provided services, and the defendant corporation sought a nuanced approach." The Second Circuit dismissed nuance out of hand,
however.
[t]he status of Dr. Hyland is clear... . There was nothing inconsistent between his proprietary interest (whether or not it was exactly equal to the interests of each of
his associates) and the corporate employment relationship he held. An analysis of his status need proceed no
further. His fellow shareholders, officers and directors
in NHRA simply are precluded from expelling him from
the corporation on the statutorily disapproved basis of
57
age discrimination.'
The case provides a fine example of moralizing that obscures. The question is not whether the statute disapproves of

152. Zippo, 713 F.2d at 35.
153. Supra notes.
154. See Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating: "[Darden]
eliminates the chief rationale for employing a broader test in the context of
anti-discrinination legislation - namely, that a more liberal construction would better effect the remedial purposes of the ADEA and similar legislation").
155. 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986).
156. Id. at 798.
157. Id. at 798 (emphasis added).
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age discrimination, but rather how far the statute's enforceable
disapproval extends. The question is not whether Congress
disapproves of age discrimination in employment, but rather
what Congress meant by the term "employee."" Any analysis
that seeks to make sense of these statutes as applied to LLC
members will need to keep the proper questions in mind.
5. Making Use of the Independent ContractorCases: The great
majority of cases interpreting the term "employee" involve the
distinction between an employee and an independent contractor," 9 so the case law on that distinction is by far the richest." Unfortunately, that case law focuses on factors largely
irrelevant to the status of LLC members.

158. Cf. Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 445-46 (Daughtrey, J., concurring). Judge Daughtrey stated.
I write separately, however, to encourage the legislative branch of our
federal government to recognize as well that the realities of today's global marketplace no longer justify distinguishing between "employees" and
"partners" in all instances....
Only by statutory modifications redefining
the class of individuals to be protected from [discriminatory] mistreatment
can we ensure that hiring, promotion, and firing decisions are undertaken
with proper regard for the law of the land.
Simpson, 100 F.3d at 445-46. The Second Circuit recently reaffirmed Hyland. See
EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529 (2d Cir. 1996). For a detailed critique of Hyland, see infra notes.
159. See, e.g., Grantham v. Beatrice Co., 776 F. Supp. 391, 393 (N.D. M. 1991)
(stating that "Imlost of the appellate decisions which address the general question
of how the term 'employee' is to be interpreted for purposes of ERISA concern
independent contractors").
See also, e.g., Bartes v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126
(1947) (discussing SSA); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944)
(discussing NLRA); Frankel, 987 F.2d at 86 (ADEA); Doty v. Elias, 733 F.2d 720
(10th Cir. 1984) (discussing FLSA); Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir.
1983) (discussing Title VII); Robinson v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 899 F. Supp. 848
(D.N.H. 1995) (discussing ADA).
160. The wealth of authority has not always meant clarity. Especially prior to
Darden, the different circuits used different tests for determining employee status,
and often the differences were most marked in dealing with the independent contractor/employee distinction. See, e.g., Thomason v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 866
F. Supp. 1329, 1334 (D. Kan. 1994) (discussing how some courts used the economic
realities test and others the hybrid test in "attempting to distinguish between employees and independent contractors"); Oestman v. National Farmers Union Ins. Co.,
958 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1992); Frankel, 987 F.2d at 86, 89-90 (stating that "ft]he
choice of a standard in the context of anti-discrimination legislation posed somewhat of a conundrum" and discussing the common law agency test, the economic
realities test, and the hybrid test).
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As the term "independent contractor" suggests, the independent contractor cases inquire into the putative employee's
independence from the putative employer. 6 ' Put another way,
the cases assess the extent of the putative employee's integration into the putative employer's enterprise." That integration
has at least three aspects. The foremost is the putative
employer's right to control the details of the work performance."6' Also important is the significance of the work to the
putative employer's business. Indeed, according to Darden, one
of the key factors for distinguishing an independent contractor
from an employee is "whether the work is part of the regular
business of the hiring party."" In short, as a district court put
it, the question is "whether the work is an integral part of the
business of the 'employer."'"
The third aspect relates to permanency.
The duration of [the putative employee's] working relationship with [the putative employer] is another factor
which the Court must consider. If a worker's relation-

161. Clancey v. American Management Ass'n, Inc., 781 F. Supp. 286, 288 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (stating "For example, did plaintiffs each have an opportunity to make a
profit and in turn accept the risks involved which comes from being independent?").
162. See, e.g., Lilley v. BTM Corp., 958 F.2d 746, 750 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting that
"Lilley was integrated into BTM's normal business operations," and characterizing
that fact as strong evidence that Lilley was an employee rather than an independent contractor). See also Devine v. Stone, Leyton & Greshman, 100 F.3d 78, 81
n.4 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that "[c]ases that distinguish employees from independent contractors are not directly applicable here") Id. (citation omitted). "Those
cases use agency principles to determine whether an individual is part of the enterprise. The shareholder-directors are clearly part of [the defendant firm]. The question is whether they manage and own the firm." Id. (citations omitted).
163. See Golden v. A. P. Orleans, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 1100, 1101 (E.D. Pa. 1988)
(stating "The common law 'right to control' standard focuses on employer's right to
determine the manner in which the work is done"). See also Norman v. Levy, 767
F Supp. 141, 44(N.D. W. 199) (stating that, with the hybrid test, "the primary
emphasis [is] placed upon the degree of control exercised over the alleged employee"); Thomason v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. 866 F. Supp. 1329, 1334 (D. Kan.
1994).
164. Nationwide Mut Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324 (1992) (quoting
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)).
165. Thomason, 866 F. Supp. at 1334 (D. Kan. 1994) (quoting Spirides v.
Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1979), a pre-Darden case articulating the
hybrid test). See also Frishberg v. Esprit De Corp, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 793, 798-99
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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ship with an employer appears permanent, or continues
with little or no interruption for a significant period of
time, then that worker's status tips toward employee
and away from independent contractor."
None of these aspects help determine the status of an LLC
member who works for the LLC because, as a co-owner of the
business, the member is perforce integrated into the enterprise.'6 7 It would be wrong, therefore, to try to apply the independent contractor analysis directly to the LLC member question." But how then does one make use of the independent

166. Clancey v. American Management Ass'n., Inc., 781 F. Supp. 286, 289 (S.D.N.Y.
1992). But cf. Caruso v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 664 F. Supp. 144, 149
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that job security and the resulting permanence help identify
a genuine partner as distinguished from an employee); Rosenblatt v. Bivona & Cohen, 969 F. Supp. 207, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing and following Caruso).
167. See Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 802 (2d Cir.
1986) (Cardamone, J., dissenting). As Judge Cardamone explained:
the focus is different when analyzing employment in a partnership setting
since the question is the status of the individual within an organization of
which he is concededly a part. By contrast, when testing whether someone is an independent contractor the question is not the individual's status within the entity, but rather whether the person is or is not a member of that entity.
Id. But see Puckett v. Mangelsdorf, Civ. Action No. 3:96-CV-1240-R, 1997 WL
135614, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 1997) (holding that the three "individuals [who]
comprise 10096 of the ownership of [a] closely held corporation [and] are the very
nerve center of the entire . . . operation" were employees for Title VII purposes
becuase those individuals were integrated in into the "day-to-day" work of the business). The question of right to control is relevant, but only when reconstituted.
See infra notes 368-98.
168. See Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 985 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating that "a
single individual in a single occupational setting cannot be both an employer and
an employee"). Cf. Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc., 812 F.
Supp. 1379, 1386 (D. Md. 1993) The case held the independent contractor test to
be inapposite to determining whether Title VII covered a volunteer firefighter.
This Court will not attempt to fit those activities performed by volunteer
members of a Fire Company into formulae designed for contexts in
which all concerned were aware that the individuals were paid (and thus
.employed") by someone, with the central disputed issue being simply by
whom they were so employed.
Haavistola, 812 F. Supp. at 1386. Cf. also Roth v. Am. Hospital Supply Corp., 965
F.2d 862, 866-67 (10th Cir. 1992) (considering which of two related corporations
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contractor case law?
There are at least three possibilities: (i) ignore this large
body of case law; (ii) see Darden as controlling, view Darden's
core holding as requiring the application of common law concepts across the board and consider the independent contractor
cases as interesting only to the extent that they demonstrate
the use of common law concepts; (iii) use those independent
contractor cases that are consistent with Darden to flesh out
the picture Congress chose when it used the word
"employee"" and then use that picture to develop its obverse
i.e., a picture of those with "'the unique status of business
owners and managers' that is incompatible with status as employees."7 °
The first approach has the virtue of simplicity and, for
courts hostile to Darden, has the added advantage of curtailing
Darden's impact. For example, in E.E.O.C. v. Johnson &
Higgins, the Second Circuit set aside the independent contractor cases and refused to allow Darden to influence its evaluation of shareholder employees:
We reject defendant's contention that we are no longer
bound by Hyland [a pre-Darden, Second Circuit case
holding shareholder/employees to be per se covered by
federal employment law] in light of Nationwide Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Darden and Frankelv. Bally, Inc, [a Second
Circuit case that applies Darden], both of which looked
to common-law agency principles in determining whether an individual was an employee. We agree with plaintiff that these opinions must be viewed in their context,
which involved the difference between an "employee"
and an "independent contractor" for purposes of the
federal employment laws.'7 '

employed the plaintiff and stating that "[t]he issue here . . . is one not squarely
addressed by the common law test: namely, whose employee was he?").
169. For an explanation of the Congressional picture, see supra notes.
170. EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1545 (2d Cir. 1996) (Jacobs,
J., dissenting) (quoting Hyland, 794 F.2d at 797).
171. EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 682, 687 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(citations omitted).
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This approach does more than slight Supreme Court precedent; it also undercuts Congress' conscious choice of language.
Dardenteaches that the word "employee" reflects a Congressional picture of covered individuals,'" and the independent contractor cases that apply Darden provide the most plentiful and
sharply focused depictions of those individuals. To wall off
those cases is to ignore insights that ought to be involved when
deciding the employee status of business owners.
The second approach, exemplified by the district court
opinion in Simpson v. Ernst and Young,1" appears more
faithful to Darden, but the fidelity reflects only a superficial
understanding of Darden's meaning. Assessing whether a partner in a large accounting firm could claim the protection of the
ADEA and ERISA, the district court stated: "Although neither
the Supreme Court nor the Sixth Circuit has addressed the
proper test to be used to distinguish partners from employees,
Darden strongly counsels the use of traditional legal principles
to determine this issue rather than a broader test."74 By "traditional legal principles" the district court meant partnership
law's traditional view of a genuine partner. The caption to the
opinion's core section reads: "The Court Should Apply Traditional Partnership Law Concepts In Determining Whether
Simpson Was A Partner Or An Employee." 75
The problem with this approach is that Darden contains no
open-ended predilection for "traditional concepts." Darden
invoked traditional agency law concepts only because Congress
had used the word "employee" - a term with "accumulated
settled meaning under.., the common law."' 76 Congress did
not, however, choose to use the term "partner" to define an
exception to employee status. In consequence, Dardengives no

172. See supm notes.
173. See Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 850 F. Supp. 648 (S.D. Ohio 1994), affd, 100
F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996).
174. Id. at 655.
175. Id, at 653.
Referring to "a qualitative test to determine whether the claimant actually met the traditional legal definition," the court stated, "in order to determine whether Simpson was a bona fide partner, we must examine the traditional
legal concepts of partnership." Id. at 654.
176. Darden, 503 U.S. at 322 (citing Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,
490 U.S. 730 (1989)).
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primacy to traditional notions of partnership. If genuine partners are not employees, that is because someone possessing
the characteristics of a genuine partner necessarily lacks the
characteristics of a Darden employee. The analysis remains superficial, however, until it explains precisely how and why
partner status negates employee status.'7
The third approach is more arduous but will provide the
needed explanation. Although the independent contractor cases
inquire into integration, their factors also comprise a portrait.
An employee relates to the business in a hierarchical and subordinate way. The business and those who run it control the
details of the employee's work life."7h They decide "when and
how long [the employee will] work."" They have "the right to
assign additional projects to the [employee]."" s They, not the
employee, "hir[e] and pay[J assistants."'
The employee's

177. The following passage from the Simpson district court opinion illustrates the
case's analytic failings.
Although the traditional agency law test is not applicable to the partner
vs. employee cases, one common thread exists between the latter cases
and the independent contractor vs. employee cases: bona fide independent contractors and partners are employers, not employees. As an employer, an individual is not entitled to ADEA or ERISA coverage.
Simpson, 850 F. Supp. at 656 (emphasis added). Finding an individual to be an
independent contractor is not the same as finding the individual to be an employer.
It merely means that the individual is "his own man," or woman.
178. See, e.g., Thomason v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 866 F. Supp. 1329, 1334
(D. Kan. 1994) (describing the hybrid test as focusing on "the employer's right to
control the 'means and manner of the worker's performance"); Mares v. Marsh, 777
F.2d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating that the hybrid test "considers the 'economic realities' of the work relationship as an important factor . . . [but] focuses more
on 'the extent of the employer's right to control the 'means and manner' of the
worker's performance") (and quoting Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831 (D.C.
Cir. 1979); EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32, 37 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that "a
hybrid approach . . . looks at the economic realities of the situation but focuses
on the employer's right to control . . . the 'means and manner' of the worker's
performance [as] the most important factor") (citations and quotations omitteed);
Spirides, 613 F.2d at 831 (holding that the "extent of the employer's right to control the 'means and manner' of the worker's performance is the most important
factor" in determining whether an individual is an employee).
179. Darden, 503 U.S. at 323 (citing Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,
490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989)).
180. Id.
181. Id.
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work is "part of the regular business" of the employer, not the
employee." The work typically occurs at a location the employee does not own,"8 3 using tools and instrumentalities in
which the employee lacks even an indirect property interest." 4 Thus the employee is a worker, not a business own8
er. 5
The obverse portrait - i.e., the picture of those with "the
unique status of business owners and managers that is incompatible with status as employees"" will have the opposite
characteristics.
6. Confusion in the Closely Held Businesses Cases: The best
source for developing the obverse portrait should be the cases
dealing with partners in general partnerships and shareholders
in closely held corporations. These cases necessarily involve individuals claimed to be owners rather than employees."m7 Unfortunately, as a body of law, these cases are incoherent.
The partnership cases make too much of Justice Powell's
concurrence in Hishon," and essentially take for granted that

182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See, e.g., Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1339 (6th Cir. 1983) (describing Congress as intending "to cover the full range of workers") (emphasis added); Thomason v. Prudential Ins. Co. of An., 866 F. Supp. 1329, 1334 (D. Kan.
1994) (stating that "under the economic realities test the central question becomes:
Is this worker . . . in business for himself?" and describing the hybrid test as focusing on "the employer's right to control the 'means and manner' of the worker's
performance") (emphasis added); Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (referring to "the employer's right to control the 'means and manner' of the
worker's performance") (emphasis added); Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 90
(2d Cir. 1993) (referring to "worker's performance") (emphasis added); Golden v. A.
P. Orleans, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 1100, 1101 (E.D. Pa 1988). See also Fleming v.
Palmer, 123 F.2d 749, 751 (1st Cir. 1941) (considering whether a supposed cooperative was a sham and stating: "The main issue is one of fact: Is this business
controlled by the Palmers [who had owned the predecessor business] or is it controlled by the workers?").
186. EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1545 (2d Cir. 1996) (Jacobs,
J., dissenting) (quoting Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 797
(2d Cir. 1986)).
187. As explained supra notes, defendants sometimes make the claim to assert
that the plaintiff, as an owner, is outside the protection of the federal statute involved and sometimes to assert that, while the plaintiff may be an employee, the
defendant employer lacks the sufficient number of employees to come within the
statute.
188. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 80-81 (1984) (Powell, J., concur-
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a genuine partner cannot be an employee for federal employment law purposes. As a result, the partnership case law focuses on what constitutes a genuine partner and misses the
opportunity to explain why a genuine partner cannot be an
employee.
The close corporation cases are, for the most part, hung up
on the partnership cases, debating whether for federal employment law purposes shareholder/employees of a close corporation are properly analogized to general partners. Some close
corporation cases adopt the analogy. Others reject it categorically, proclaiming that a corporation is a corporation is a
corporation"t and holding that, for federal employment law
purposes, shareholder/employees are per se employees. For the
most part, therefore, the close corporation cases also fail to
explain how and why ownership can negate employee status.
I. PARTNERSIP CASE LAW
The case law is consistent on at least one point. A genuine
partner, whatever that may be, cannot be an employee for federal employment law purposes."ts The seminal statement on
the topic comes from Justice Powell's concurrence in Hishon:

ring).
189. Cf. J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 627: 4 (16th ed. 1992) (quoting GERTRUDE STEIN, SACRED EMILY 187 (1913) ("Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose.")).
190. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 266 (10th Cir. 1987) (stating
that as of 1987, "not one court has applied [various federal employment) Acts to a
bona fide general partner against his or her partners or partnership"). Simpson,
discussed infra notes 271-73, is not to the contrary. See Simpson v. Ernst &
Young, 850 F. Supp. 648 (S.D. Ohio 1994), affd, 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996).
Simpson held essentially that Simpson was not a bona fide general partner. Id.
(noting that the partnership's conduct constituted a breach of fiduciary duty and
thus undercut the partnership's claim that Simpson was a co-partner). The cases
likewise agree that the mere label of partner is not dispositive. See, e.g., ilishon,
467 U.S. at 79 na2 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that "an employer may not
evade the strictures of Title VII simply by labeling its employees as 'partners'");
Loomis Cabinet Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 20 F.3d
938, 942 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that "[iln determining whether an employment relationship exists, the label of 'partner' is meaningless"); EEOC v. Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co., 775 F.2d 928, 930 (8th Cir. 1985) (stating that the label of partner
is not dispositive); Caruso v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 664 F. Supp. 144, 147
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (rejecting defendant's arguments "for a per se rule that an individual denoted as a 'partner' falls outside the ADEA definition of employee").
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I write to make clear my understanding that the Court's
opinion should not be read as extending Title VII to the
management of a law firm by its partners. The reasoning
of the Court's opinion does not require that the relationship among partners be characterized as an "employment" relationship to which Title VII would apply. 9 '
Although Justice Powell referred specifically to law firm
partnerships, his pronouncement has had general effect."9 For
example, the court in Grantham v. Beatrice Company refers to
"the decision of the circuit courts not to extend the protection
of the broadly-applied anti-discrimination acts to partners,"'93
and a recent Second Circuit decision actually refers to a "partnership exemption.""9 An older Second Circuit case states: "It
is generally accepted that the benefits of the antidiscrimination

191. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 79.
192. For example, Wheeler refers to Justice Powell's "much-quoted concurring
opinion." Wheeler, 825 F2d. at 257. A more recent opinion, Serapion v. Martinez,
states that "[flederal courts have extensively cited Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Hishon" to support the notion that federal employment statutes do not cover genuine partners. 942 F. Supp. 80, 84 (D.P.R. 1996) (holding that Title VII does
not apply to genuine partners). See also Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Co., 925 F.2d
1398, 1400 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing Powell's Hishon concurrence and stating that
Title VII does not cover partners); Grantham v. Beatrice Co., 776 F. Supp. 391, 402
(N.D. 1l. 1991) (holding the same with regard to ERISA); Hyland v. New Haven
Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 797 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding the same with regard
to the ADEA); EEOC v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 775 F.2d 928, 932 (8th Cir.
1985) (holding the same with regard to the ADEA); EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd.,
736 F.2d 1177, 1178 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding the same with regard to Title VII).
193. 776 F. Supp. 391, 393-94 (N.D. I1. 1991).
194. See EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1538 (2d Cir. 1996)
(holding that, although individuals properly classified as partners are exempt from
the ADEA, the exemption would not be extended to closely held corporations).
Note the exemption, if any, is for partners not for partnerships. The Hishon majority opinion states: "Respondent argues that Title VII categorically exempts partnership decisions from scrutiny. However, respondent points to nothing in the
statute or the legislative history that would support such a per se exemption.
When Congress wanted to grant an employer complete immunity, it expressly did
so." Hishon, 467 U.S. at 77-78. Federal agencies take a comparable view. See,
e.g., Grantham, 776 F. Supp. at 393 (N.D. I. 1991) (stating that "Department of Labor regulations do not extend ERISA protection to partners"). See Labor Management Relations - Conference Report, 93 CONG. REC. (June 5, 1947), reprinted in 2
NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT 1537 (1947).
For a discussion of the EEOC's views, see Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 265.

Oklahoma City University Law Review

[Vol. 22

statutes... do not extend to those who properly are classified
as partners."195
What is less clear is why partners fall outside the employee
category. In many instances, the analysis is superficial at best.
For example, in Burke v. Friedman,the appellate court's entire
analysis read as follows:
The narrow question which is raised in this case is
whether a partner can be an employee within the meaning of § 2000e(f) despite the fact that the partnership
can be an employer pursuant to § 2000e(b). A partnership is generally said to be created when persons join
together their money, goods, labor, or skill for the purpose of carrying on a trade, profession, or business and
when there is community of interest in the profits and
losses .... In light of the foregoing, we do not see how
partners can be regarded as employees rather than as
employers who own and manage the operation of the
business. '"
The lower court had not done much better. "It is the court's
opinion that, as partners in a partnership, defendants must be
considered employers rather than employees and that they
cannot be both. Defendants were responsible for the hiring and
firing of plaintiff and must be considered her employer."'97
Justice Powell did provide somewhat greater guidance in
his brief Hishon concurrence, but that guidance came more as
a sociological generalization than as legal rule:

195. Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 797 (2d Cir. 1986).
See also Serapion v. Martinez, 942 F. Supp. 80, 84 (D.P.R. 1996) (stating that "[i]t
has long been undisputed that '[w]hile employees of a partnership are protected
under Title VII, the partners themselves are not'" and citing COOK & SOBIESKI, JR.,
4 CrFL RiGhr
A......
Er ')r nr
(lQQ4))
196. 556 F.2d 867, 869 (7th Cir. 1977) (citations and quotations omitted). See
Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 850. F. Supp. 648, 657 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (noting that the
Burke panel had reached its conclusion "with little analysis").
197. Burke, 556 F.2d at 869. The notion that an individual must be "one or the
other" contradicts Supreme Court precedent.
See Goldberg v. Whitaker House
Coop., 366 U.S. 28, 32 (1961) (treating memberstowners of a knitting cooperative as
employees and stating that there is nothing necessarily inconsistent about having a
proprietary interest and being an employee). For a discussion of the "mixed roles"
issue, see infra notes 362-67.
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The relationship among law partners differs markedly
from that between employer and employee - including
that between the partnership and its associates. The
judgmental and sensitive decisions that must be made
among the partners embrace a wide range of subjects.
The essence of the law partnership is the common conduct of a shared enterprise. The relationship among law
partners contemplates that decisions important to the
partnership normally will be made by common agreement ... or consent among the partners."
Although this description may have been apt at the time
and for the context at issue, it does not encompass all possible
general partnership arrangements. According to the Uniform
Partnership Act, the inter se relations of partners are subject to
wide variation by agreement." At least according to state
partnership law, a partnership can still constitute "the common
conduct of a shared enterprise" even though "decisions important to the partnership" are delegated to a management committee or made over the strenuous objection of dissident partners.' Justice Powell's description thus fits only a general
partnership structured essentially in the default mode - i.e.,
with little deviation from the default governance structure provided by partnership law."°

198. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79-80 (1984). Justice Powell in
effect acknowledged the descriptive nature of his pronouncement. "Law partnerships usually have many of the characteristics that I describe generally here." Id.
at 79 n.2.
199. UNIF. PARTNERSIP AcT, § 18, 6 U.LA 526 (1914) (stating key inter se rules
for a general partnership and providing that the rules are "subject to any agreement between" the partners). See KLEINBERGER, supra note 97, § 7.1.2, at 200-02
(discussing UPA flexibility, default rules and agreements among partners).
200. KLEINBERGER, suprm note 97, § 9.6 (discussing agreements that change management rights). See also Day v. Sidley and Austin, 394 F. Supp. 986 (D.C. Cir.
1975), afd sub nom., Day v. Avery, 548 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that
partner had no claim after he lost position as sole manager of partnership's branch
location, because he had signed a partnership agreement that gave broad discretion
to a management committee and did not expressly protect his position).
201. State partnership law permits comparably wide variations with regard to economic relationships as well, and general partnerships adopt by agreement various
rules as to the necessity and amount of capital contributions, pay-out rights upon
partner dissociation, the allocation of profits, etc. For Justice Powell, these varia-
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Judge Powell's concurrence has another defect as well.
Rather than identifying the characteristics that comprise employee status and then showing how a "true" partner lacks all
or some critical mass of those characteristics, the concurrence
merely asserts that "the relationship among law partners differs
markedly from that between employer and employee." 202 Although the relevant statutory category is "employee" rather
than "partner," the concurrence suggests that the proper ques-

tions in financial rights seemed immaterial, so long as "true" partnership governance overlay the financial arrangements. In Justice Powell's world of partnerships, "decisions concern[ing] such matters as participation in profits and other
types of compensation," were among "the judgmental and sensitive decisions that
must be made among the partners." Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79
(1984). Justice Powell further stated:
Divisions of partnership profits, unlike shareholders' rights to dividends,
involve judgments as to each partner's contribution to the reputation and
success of the firm. This is true whether the partner's participation in
profits is measured in terms of points or percentages, combinations of
salaries and points, salaries and bonuses, and possibly in other ways.
Id. at 80 n.3. The EEOC seems to give similar primacy to the partnership governance structure. "In determining whether the individual is a partner or an employee in a particular case, the Commission will consider relevant factors including, but
not limited to, the individual's ability to control and operate the business and to
determine compensation and the administration of profits and losses." EEOC Decision No. 85-4, Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH)
6840, 7040-41 n.4 (Mar. 18, 1985) (quoted
in Hyland, 794 F.2d at 797). See also Eq. EmpL Comp. Man. (Callaghan)
2179,
at 2337-38 (listing governance issues as two of the four factors used to determine
whether a partner is to be treated as an employee). The EEOC also looks to
profit sharing, and the case law sees a business's financial structure as directly
relevant. Id. In Simpson, for example, the district court relied in part on the
financial arrangements to find that the plaintiff was an employee rather than a
genuine partner. The court found that Simpson had made no real capital contribution. See Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 850 F. Supp. 648, 659 (S.D. Ohio 1994), affd,
100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996). The court saw Simpson's remuneration as at odds
with a partner-like sharing of profits:
Simpson's salary did not vary based on the rise and fall of firm profits.
There was no evidence that Simpson or any other Party were required to
return any amount of salary due to declining profits. Nor was there evidence that his salary was calculated as a proportionate share of the
firm's profits.
Simpson, 850 F. Supp. at 660. For further discussion of the role of profit sharing
in the employee vel non inquiry, see infra notes.
202. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring).
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tion is whether a so-called partner is a genuine partner, not
whether a so-called partner possesses the characteristics that
would negate employee status.
This misplaced focus, combined with the concurrence's
description of a "New England town-meeting" style partnership,
has had three major effects in the partnership case law. First,
the cases take for granted that partner status automatically
negates employee status. As a result, they have concentrated
their attention on what is at best a surrogate for the real
question." Second, the cases have struggled to determine
how far a particular partner's circumstances can deviate from
the default role before the partnership loses the protection of
the so-called "partnership exemption."2°4 Third, in that struggle courts have sometimes overemphasized or misconceived
individual facets of the archtypical partner's role.
All of these problems are well illustrated in Wheeler v.
Hurdman and Simpson v. Ernst and Young, the two cases
containing the most careful and detailed analyses of the "genuine" partner question. The cases span seven years and straddle

203. See Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 850 F. Supp. 648, 656 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (stating that "[i]n order to determine whether [plaintiff] was a bona fide partner, we
must examine the traditional legal concepts of partnership"); Simpson, 100 F.3d at
444 (noting that the pivotal question in the case is whether plaintiff can "qualify as
a partner for purposes of the ADEA, ERISA," and state law anti-discrimination statutes, or is instead "an employee in contradistinction to a partner"). See also
Thomason v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 866 F. Supp. 1329, 1335 (D. Kan. 1994)
(characterizing the Wheeler analysis as resting on "the unique nature of
partnerships").
204. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 261 (10th Cir. 1987) (noting
that both the plaintiff and the EEOC as amicus "effectively concede that under
laws governing partnerships Wheeler [the plaintiff] was a bona fide and general
partner of Main Hurdman [and that] Main Hurdman is a bona fide general partnership," but proceeding nonetheless to consider whether Wheeler might nonetheless
be an employee for Title VII, ADEA, and FLSA purposes); Simpson v. Ernst &
Young, 850 F. Supp. 648, 658 (S.D. Ohio 1994), affd, 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996)
(discussing Wheeler and stating that "[i]mplicit in the Tenth Circuit's decision is the
concept that, had Wheeler possessed something less than the 'total bundle of partnership characteristics,' she would not have been considered a bona fide partner,
even though the firm so denominated her"); Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d
436, 443 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Lilley v. BTM Corp., 958 F.2d 746, 750 (6th Cir.
1992) (acknowledging that "[t]he circuits that have already judged the partner/employee dichotomy have done so by 'leaving the determination of employment
status to case-by-case resolution based on the totality of the circumstances,'.
against the backdrop of the Uniform Partnership Act").
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the Darden decision. Wheeler was decided in 1989 by the Tenth
Circuit. Simpson was decided by a court in the Southern District of Ohio in 1994 and by the Sixth Circuit in 1996.
Wheeler foreshadowed Darden in declining to determine
the plaintiffs status in light of her alleged lack of power and
susceptibility to discrimination.'
Instead, Wheeler identified
what it considered to be the significant indicia of partner status, applied those indicia to the plaintiff and found that they all
marked her as "partner" rather than "employee."
Wheeler's circumstances as a partner are portrayed as
indistinguishable from her prior employee status. Yet
they are distinguishable, and substantially so. Her participation in profits and losses, exposure to liability, investment in the firm, partial ownership of finrn assets, and
her voting rights - plus her position under the partnership agreement and partnership laws - clearly placed
her in a different economic and legal category."
The court reached this conclusion despite acknowledging
that the plaintiff had delegated away many of her management
rights 2 7 and despite the fact that the defendant-partnership
included more than 500 partners." Although the court discussed other possible perspectives on the partner versus employee issue, it held fast to its indicia of partner approach.
Since genuine partner status was assumed to negate employee
status, the only material question was partner vel non.2"
Wheeler seems a well-reasoned decision until juxtaposed
with the view of partnership reflected in Justice Powell's
Hishon concurrence. When Wheeler became a partner, "approximately 14%, or 502 of Main Hurdman's 3570 personnel were
partners."" ' Thus, as the Wheeler panel somewhat grudgingly

205. See Wheeler, 825 F.2d. at 260. Darden militates against a "susceptibility"
approach. See supra notes 81-85.
206. Wheeler, 825 F.2d. at 276.
207. See id. at 267.
208. See id. at 273.
209. See id. at 276 (stating that "in general the total bundle of partnership characteristics sufficiently differentiates between [partner status and employee status) to
remove general partners from the statutory term 'employee'").
210. Id. at 260.
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recognized, Wheeler's firm was no New England town-meeting
style of partnership. "Wheeler and the EEOC... emphasize
that Main Hurdman is a large firm, with eighty offices nationwide. They portray it as a highly organized, centrally managed,
business institution of indefinite and ongoing duration; in other
words, it looks like a [modem, hierarchical] corporation."211
Nonetheless, the court held that Wheeler had sufficient
indicia of partner status to fall outside the protections of Title
VII, the FLSA, and the ADEA.212 In doing so the court exemplified the problem of misplaced focus, for the opinion expressly
invokes Justice Powell's concurrence. "Partnerships, as Justice
Powell so aptly stated in his concurring opinion in Hishon,
embody very special relationships and sensitive management
concerns inter se."1 3
The problem here is that Wheeler's ostensible fealty to
Justice Powell makes no sense. The relationships among the
hundreds of so-called partners within Main Hurdman were not
"special." Main Hurdman was simply not the kind of partner-

211. Id. at 261. '[Ain exhibit to Wheeler's affidavit in the district court" detailed
that hierarchical structure:
That exhibit shows the partners of Main Hurdman as the governing body,
below which is a policy board and an advisory board to which partners
are elected. Below those two boards there is a managing partner/CEO
and a chairman who, presumably, are responsible for the day-to-day operations of the partnership. Thereafter, there appear on the organizational
chart a myriad of assignments, including international, marketing, human
resources, management consulting, professional standards, tax services,
finance, and so on. The chart also shows a partner in charge of operations and under that partner six geographical regions with a partner in
charge of each. Within each region the location of Main Hurdman offices
is identified, with a local "partner in charge" of each office. The local
partner in charge oversees assignment of department heads, allocation of
partner credit for client hours managed, the establishment of performance
goals for all personnel, assignment of CPAs to clients, the amount to be
charged for services, and the hours, dates and places when and where
work is to be performed. It is contended that although each partner is
entitled to vote at annual or special meetings, the votes are primarily for
the purpose of ratifying decisions made by the managing partner, policy
board or "nominating" committee.
Id. at 261-62.
212. See id. at 277.
213. Id. at 273.
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ship in which "[t]he relationship among... partners contemplates that decisions important to the partnership normally will
be made by common agreement... or consent among the partners."" 4 The hierarchical, "highly organized, centrally managed, business institution"215 of Wheeler's firm cannot be reconciled with the decentralized, largely horizontal governance
structure envisioned by Justice Powell. Thus, Powell's concurrence and the Wheeler opinion are incongruous, and the incongruity was inescapable once the Wheeler court lost sight of the
relevant statutory category (i.e., nonemployee vel non) and
focused instead on a surrogate (i.e., partner vel non).
Wheeler also illustrates the second problem created by
Hishon. Wheeler provides no apparatus for determining how far
a partner's role can deviate from the default norm before the
partner ceases to be "genuine" for federal employment law
purposes. In essence, Wheeler asks whether a putative employee possesses sufficient indicia to qualify for partner status under state law.216 This question is too narrow, even assuming
that partner vel non is the proper approach. State law decisions
almost never -answer the partner vel non question in the abstract. Instead, they decide the issue as a "partner or" question
- e.g., partner or creditor, partner or employee.217 In close
cases, the two alternatives serve as ideal types positioned at
opposite ends of a continuum, with the courts deciding which
218
antipode is closer to the circumstances sub judice.
Wheeler deprives itself of such a graduated approach, giving short shrift to the argument that plaintiffs "elevation" from
so-called employee to so-called partner left her situation little
changed.2" 9 Moreover, Wheeler's frame of reference is wrong.
The proper question is not how far a partner may fall from the
norm before ceasing to be a partner, but rather how closely an
individual must resemble an archtypical common law employee
before being treated as one for federal employment law purposes.

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 80 (1984).
Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 261.
Id. at 276.
KLEINBERGER, supra note 97, § 7.4.4, at 220-21.
Id.
Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 261.
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Wheeler also illustrates the third problem occasioned by
Hishon - the mishandling of the partnership norm. The first
mishandling concerns a partner's personal liability for partnership debts and occurs as Wheeler attempts to distinguish
Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc.' Goldberg involved a cooperative whose members had no personal liability
for the cooperative's debts. 1 Wheeler viewed this distinction
as fundamental.
Employees do not assume the risks of loss and liabilities of their employers; partners do. It is no small thing
to be exposed to unlimited liability .... There is simply
no equivalent to unlimited liability in any case dealing
with the definition of employee, nor is there any equivalent in any understood definition of the term ....
... The homeworkers in Goldberg, for example, bore no
risk of liability or risk of loss of the business. '
The problem with this observation is not its accuracy but
its emphasis. Personal liability is indeed a hallmark of general
partner status,223 but not every business owner is automatically liable for the debts of the business.' Indeed, if personal
liability were a prerequisite to "genuine" partner status, the
advent of limited liability partnerships would be the death-knell
for Powell's Hishon concurrence.'
In any event, Wheeler had available a far simpler way to
distinguish Goldberg. The cooperative in Goldberg was a transparent attempt to evade a federal statute. In the shadow of the

220. 366 U.S. 28 (1961).
221. See id. at 29-30.
222. Wheeter, 825 F.2d at 274-75 (emphasis in original) (footnoes omitted).
223. See KLEINBERGER, supra note 97, § 7.3. Note - that hallmark disappears
with limited liability partnerships. See infra note 225.
224. See infra note 227 (discussing how some corporate cases focus unduly on
the liability shield).
225. A limited liability partnership (LLP) is a general partnership with a full or
partial liability shield attached. KLEINBERGER, supra note 97, § 12.1.4. In an LLP
with a full shield, the partners are no more exposed to vicarious liability for the
business' debts than are the shareholders in a corporation. Id. The trend is for
LLP statutes to provide a full shield. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 8, §
1.03[2][a], at S-12 to S-16 (Cunun. Supp. 2 1996).
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then newly-enacted Fair Labor Standards Act,' an employer
sought to suddenly transmute hundreds of unskilled employees
into cooperative members. 7 Wheeler could easily have dealt
with. Goldberg by characterizing the Goldberg cooperative as a
sham.
Wheeler's second mishandling involves the mechanics of
creating a partnership. In a footnote, Wheeler attempts to buttress its personal liability argument by stating that "[tlhere are
many additional distinctions between Goldberg and this
case."2 However, as its sole additional example the footnote
asserts only that "[clooperatives are typically viewed as a form
of corporate organization; their existence is dependent upon
state cooperative incorporation laws or general incorporation
laws. " ' This distinction exists but makes no difference. General partnership can indeed arise informally,' but there is no
reason why the mechanics of creating an entity should bear on
whether the entity's owners can constitute "employees."

226. See Goldberg, 366 U.S. at 28.
227. The Goldberg opinion describes the origins and structure of the so-called cooperative in detail and then states:
[The so-called members] work in the same way as they would if they
had an individual proprietor as their employer. The members are not
self-employed; nor are they independent, selling their products on the
market for whatever price they can command. They are regimented under one organization, manufacturing what the organization desires and receiving the compensation the organization dictates. Apart from formal
differences, they are engaged in the same work they would be doing
whatever the outlet for their products. The management fixes the piece
rates at which they work; the management can expel them for substandard work or for failure to obey the regulations. The management, in
other words, can hire or fire the homeworkers. Apart from the other
considerations we have mentioned, these powers make the device of the
cooperative too transparent to survive the statutory definition of "employ"
and the Regulatimw governing hoiew.Iork.
Goldberg, 366 U.S. at 32-33 (footnoes omitted).
For another case that
overemphasizes the importance of partner personal liability, see Grantham v.
Beatrice Co., 776 F. Supp. 391, 401 (N.D. III. 1991) (noting that "the economic reality of partnership status itself, which carries with it risks of loss and liability that
employee status does not").
228. Wheeler, 825 F. 2d at 275 n. 34.
229. Id.
230. See KLEINBERGER, supra note 97, § 7.2., at 204.
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The Sixth Circuit's opinion in Simpson v. Ernst &
Youngf 1 takes the same general approach to the partner question as Wheeler. Noting that Wheeler and a couple of other preDarden cases had reached their respective conclusions by reviewing traditional partnership law factors which differentiate
partners from employees,' the Simpson court did likewise.
This court, in addressing the distinction between partners and employees.., evaluates the... facts of
the... case against the common-law principles as codified in the UPA, including, but not limited to: the right
and duty to participate in management; the right and
duty to act as an agent of other partners; exposure to
liability; the fiduciary relationship among partners; use
of the term "co-owners" to indicate each partner's "power of ultimate control;" participation in profits and losses; investment in the firm; partial ownership of firm
assets; voting rights; the aggrieved individual's ability to
control and operate the business; the extent to which
the aggrieved individual's compensation was calculated
as a percentage of the firm's profits; the extent of that
individual's employment security; and other similar
indicia of ownership.'
The trial court had found Simpson to be an employee rather than a bona fide partner. 4 The appellate panel affirmed,
relying heavily on the trial court's "well-reasoned opinion. " '
Like the trial court, the appellate court viewed Simpson as
lacking virtually every indicator of true partner status.2
"[T]he firm's business, assets, and affairs were directed exclusively by a [self-perpetuating] 10 to 14 member Management
Committee and its chairman," 7 who together exercised "vir-

231.
232.
233.
234.
Ohio
235.
236.
237.

100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 443.
Id. at 443 44 (footnotes omitted).
See id. at 479 (citing Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 850 F. Supp. 648 (S.D.
1994)).
Id.
See id.
Id. at 441.
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tually absolute, unilateral control. " ' Simpson, though denominated a partner, "actually had no bona fide ownership interest,
no fiduciary relationship, no share in the profits and losses, no
significant management control, no meaningful voting rights, no
meaningful vote in firm decisions, and no job security." '
At first reading Simpson seems far less problematic than
Wheeler. Certainly, Simpson is more easily reconciled with
Hishon. Like Wheeler, Simpson involves a large, hierarchical
organization. Unlike Wheeler, the Simpson decision sets aside
the label of partner and includes the plaintiff within the class of
protected employees. Indeed, the facts in Simpson are so extreme as to render the defendant's claim of "partner" close to a
sham.' One key partnership agreement refers to Simpson as
a party rather than a partner," and Simpson's firm actually
denominated him an employee for state law tax purposes. 2

238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Compare Loomis Cabinet Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 20 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 1994) (upholding the OSHR Commission's determination that a hastily organized partnership was a sham and that the so-called partners
were mere employees). For a case at the other end of the spectrum, see Serapion
v. Martinez, 942 F. Supp. 80 (D.P.R. 1996). In Serapion, one of five proprietary
partners in a law firm unsuccessfully sought "employee" status and Tile VII protection even though:
(1) she participated in the administration and control of the firm; (2)
she had a share - albeit a small one - in the firm's profits and losses;
(3) despite the fact that she made no equity contribution to the firm, her
compensation at the time the partnership was dissolved was 9296 of that
of the senior partners; and (4) her voting rights were undisputed - in
fact, it was precisely her voting power as proprietary partner which rendered the other partners unable to make any significant changes in the
partnership agreement and forced them to resort to a management consulting firm to address their problems.
Id.at 85. See also Rhoads v. Jones Fin. Cos., 957 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mo. 199T)
(rejecting a general partner's claim to employee 'status and distinguishing her situation from Simpson's situation).
241. Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 850 F. Supp. 648, 663 (S.D. Ohio i994) (stating
that "Ernst & Young U.S.... did not refer to Simpson as a partner, but rather as
a 'Party'").
Simpson's firm apparently had a hard time keeping its story
242. Id. at 651.
straight even within its own accounting practices.
Ernst & Young U.S. paid Simpson an annual salary [i.e as an employee]
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The district court opinion spends much of its time dismantling as pretense the firm's "genuine partner" claim. For example, after cutting through the firm's complex and elaborately
documented organizational structure, the district court rejects
the firm's "conclusory contentions" that Simpson had meaningful management authority.2 3 As for the notion that Simpson's
management role supports treating him as a partner rather than
an employee, the court characterizes the firm's proffered evidence as "slim, at best."2' As for Simpson's supposed economic stake in the firm, the court is even more blunt. "We view
Simpson's Capital Account as a paper transaction designed to
give him the appearance, but not the reality, of a partner."245
Still, Simpson has its problems. Although the appellate
panel accurately describes the trial court's opinion as "well
reasoned,"' the trial court seems uneasy with its own legal
analysis. Despite overwhelming evidence that "[tihe characterization of [Simpson as a] 'partner' was a title that carried no
legal significance which could be disclaimed when convenient
to the defendant's management,"2" 7 the district court takes
pains to buttress its conclusions with numerous comparisons to
the facts of other cases. For instance, after concluding that
Simpson's compensation did not comport with partner status,
the trial court compares Simpson to the plaintiffs in Wheeler
and Fountainv. Metcalf, Zima & Co. :'

in an amount the Management Committee determined, which was charged
as a business expense [rather than as a distribution to a partner] ....
For state tax purposes, Ernst & Young U.S. treated Simpson's salary as
just that-a salary.... For federal tax purposes, however, Ernst & Young
U.S. reported his salary on a Schedule K-1 as a distribution of partnership earnings.
Id. (citations omitted).
243. Id. at 662.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 660. See also Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 444 (6th Cir.
1996) (discussing "the convoluted Partnership and U.S. Agreements which were
calculated to create only an illusion that the firm's personnel were partners").
246. Simpson, 100 F.3d at 439.
247. Id. at 441.
248. 925 F.2d 1398 (l1th Cir. 1991).
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In contrast to Simpson, the plaintiff in Wheeler, found
to be a partner, received a share of the firm's profits
and an allocation of profits based on points. The plaintiff in Fountain, found to be a partner, shared in the
firm's profits, losses, and expenses and was compensated on the basis of a share in the firm's profits. u 9
Similarly, after concluding that Simpson lacked partner-like
management rights, the trial court invokes not only Wheeler "
and Fountain," but also Caruso v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
& Co.252 and an unreported decision involving Price Waterhouse.2"
The reference to Caruso is especially interesting because it
has an a fortiori flavor,' as if the court is unsure of the footings underlying its own legal analysis. That uncertainty appears
again when the trial court seeks to support its overall finding
that Simpson is not a genuine partner.
In addition to our finding being directed by traditional
legal principles, it is also an equitable result, putting
Simpson on par with other business executives and
professionals who have held positions of greater responsibility in their firms than Simpson and who were found
to be protected by ADEA. See, for example, Hawley v.
Dresser Industries, Inc., 958 F.2d 720 (6th Cir.1992);
Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Associates, P.C., 794
F.2d 793 (2d Cir.1986); Gorman v. North Pittsburgh
Oral Surgery Associates, Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 212
(W.D.Pa.1987). Particularly instructive in this regard is
Barnhartv. Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling, Co., L.P.A., 12

249. Simpson, 850 F Supp. at 660-6-1 "-c-ta250. Id. at "661 (citing Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 260).

-m-ittd(emphasis added).

251. Id. at 661 (citing Fountain, 925 F.2d at 1401). See also Maher v. Price Waterhouse, No. 84-1522 C(2), 1985 WL 9500, at *1 (E.D. Mo. April 8, 1985).
252. 664 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
253. Simpson, 850 F. Supp. at 661 (citing Maher v. Price Waterhouse, No. 84-1522
C(2), 1985 WL 9500, at *2 (E.D. Mo. April 8, 1985)).
254. Id. (stating that "even the plaintiff in Caruso, who was ultimately found to
be an employee, had more voting rights than Simpson, as he had the power to
block a partnership appointment") (emphasis added).
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F.3d 1382 (6th Cir.1993), decided in this District, and
affirmed by the Sixth Circuit.2"
These references are especially telling. Hawley involved a corporate executive whose employee status was never at issue.2
Hyland involved a professional corporation and expressly rejected any analogy between corporations and partnerships for
federal employment law purposes.2 5 Gorman rests on
Hyland.2 Barnhart's reasoning is conclusory and rests on
the now-rejected "remedial purposes" approach to construing
the term "employee."' Moreover, the reasoning appears in
the unreported district court opinion, 2 ° not the reported appellate decision. The appellate panel never addressed the question of employee status.2 "1
Why does the trial court's "well reasoned" Simpson opinion have to reach so much? Perhaps the judge sensed the basic
infirmity in the legal rule he was obliged to apply. Because that

255. Id. at 663.
256. Hawley v. Dresser Ind., Inc., 958 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1992).
257. Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 798 (2d Cir. 1986).
For a critique of Hyland, see inf'ra notes 296-303.
258. Gorman v. North Pittsburgh Oral Surgery Assocs., Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 212,
213-14 (W.D. Pa. 1987).
259. Barnhart v. Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling, Co., No. 90-CV-330, 1992 WL
551487, at *2 (S.D. Ohio May 25, 1992). The district court relied on LiUey v. BTM
Corp., 958 F.2d 746, 746 (6th Cir. 1992) for the proposition that "ItIhe term
'employee' is broadly construed in order to effectuate the remedial purposes of the
ADEA." Id.
260. Id.
261. The appellate panel in Barnhart never addressed the question of employee
status. Barnhart v. Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebling, Co., 12 F.3d 1382 (6th Cir. 1993).
The Simpson trial court states that it was "[t]he District Court's decision that
Barnhart was an employee under ADEA" but then asserts-a touch disingenuouslythat the decision "was undisturbed on appeal to the Sixth Circuit." Simpson v.
Ernst & Young, 850 F. Supp. 648, 664 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
In a footnote the
Simpson trial court acknowledges that, because the defendant firm had won at
trial on the merits of the discrimination claim and had not cross-appealed the finding of employee status, "the issue whether Barnhart was an owner or employee
was not directly before the Sixth Circuit." Id. at 663-64 n.5.
However, the
Simpson trial court then argues nonetheless that the appellate panel had approved
that aspect of the district court's unreported decision: "The issue was discussed
• . . in Barnhart's appellate brief. (See Doc. 163, p. 35). Since the issue is jurisdictional in nature, the Sixth Circuit implicitly affirmed the District Court's decision
that Barnhart was an employee by finding that he established a prima facie case."
Id.
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rule focuses inquiry on the wrong question, the judge is at
pains to demonstrate that Simpson is an a fortiori case. He is
right, but in light of overwhelming evidence the very need to
make that argument is revealing. Simpson can do little to help
in cases involving more moderate deviations from the default
partnership norm.'
Simpson also illustrates the third problem occasioned by
Hishon. In discussing plaintiffs departure from the defendant
fim, the trial court misconceives the susceptibility of partners
to dissociation, the appropriate form of payout for partners
upon dissociation, and the relationship of partner dissociation
to partner fiduciary duty.2"
As for plaintiffs susceptibility to dissociation, the court
states: "There is a degree of permanence associated with the
status of partner that is absent from the status of employee. " " That assertion is simply untrue. The Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) expressly contemplates the expulsion of a partner,2 ' and guillotine expulsion provisions are commonplace.'
262. The trial court opinion does recognize that some deviation is permissible.
For example, with regard to governance, the opinion "acknowledge[s] that the N.Y.
PARTNERSHIP LAW permits delegation of such duties, and . . . agree[s] that the larger the partnership, the more delegation is to be expected" Simpson, 850 F. Supp.
at 662. The opinion also recognizes the continuum nature of the issue: "at some
point, delegation destroys partner status." Id. at 663. The opinion gives little guidance, however, as to how to calibrate that continuum.
263. To its credit, the Simpson district court opinion declined to overemphasize
the personal liability aspect of partner status.
Ernst & Young argues that only the "essential" elements of partner status
should be considered, which it identifies as sharing profits and unlimited
personal liability. It deems other partnership indicia, such as capital
contribution, ownership interest, and meaningful participation in partnership decisions to be non-essential. Traditional partnership law concepts
do not support this selective categorization of partnership indicia. All factors should be considered, with no one factor being decisive.
Simpson, 850 F. Supp. at 659.
264. Id. at 662.
265. UNIF. PARrNERSHIP Acr § 31(l)(d), 6 U.LA. 771 (1914) (listing as a cause of
dissolution "expulsion of any partner from the business bona fide in accordance
with such a power conferred by the agreement between the partners"). The 1994
version of the UPA (commonly referred to as "RUPA") was being promulgated
when the district court was deciding Simpson, but it too expressly contemplates
expulsion. See UNFORM PARTNRSHiP Acr § 601(3), 6 U.LA. 72 (1994) (providing
that "[a) partner is dissociated from a partnership upon . . . the partner's expulsion
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As to Simpson's payout on departure, the court states:
When Simpson left the firm, Ernst & Young U.S. calculated his compensation in December, nine months prior
to the firm's fiscal year end, using an estimate based on
the prior year's figures. Thus, Simpson's discharge compensation was not measured by any ownership interest
in the firm's assets but was a salary.... [that] does not
provide for a distribution of an undivided interest in
firm assets. 7
Based on this arrangement, the court concluded that "Simpson
did not possess an undivided interest in firm assets."'
Again, this assertion ignores both the law and practice of
general partnerships. The UPA provides that a departing partner "may have the partnership property applied to discharge
[the partnership's] liabilities, and the surplus applied to pay in
cash the net amount owing to the respective partners."'

pursuant to the partnership agreement").
266. Under a guillotine provision, a partnership may expel a partner without having to state or prove cause. See, e.g., Gelder Med. Group v. Webber, 363 N.E.2d
573, 576 (N.Y. 1977); Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 523-24 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
The notion that a partner is a more permanent fixture of a firm than an employee
is also at odds with the portrait of an employee drawn by Clancey v. American
Management Ass'n., Inc., 781 F. Supp. 286, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), an independent
contractor case. Clancey sees permanence as an indicator of employee status:
"The duration of plaintiffs' working relationship with AMA is another factor which
the Court must consider. If a worker's relationship with an employer appears
permanent, or continues with little or no interruption for a significant period of
time, then that worker's status tips toward employee and away from independent
contractor." Id. at 289. Simpson is not alone in misconceiving the permanence of
a partner's status. See, e.g., Caruso v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 664 F. Supp.
144, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). (stating that "a partner traditionally works as a permanent
employee of his finn. The typical firm may not fire a partner or otherwise terminate his employment merely because of disappointment with the quantity or quality
of his work"); Ehrilch v. Howe, 848 F. Supp. 482, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (describing
"[tIhe final Caruso factor [as looking) at . . . employment security to determine if
partners in the enterprise have greater job security than employees" and holding
that this factor supports the partner label because the plaintiffs "termination required a unanimous vote of all other partners"); Rosenblatt v. Bivona & Cohen, 969
F. Supp. 207, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing and following Caruso).
267. Simpson, 850 F. Supp. at 661.
268. Id.
269. UNIF. PARTN RSmP ACT § 38(1), 6 U.LA 880 (1914). Under the revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA"), a dissociated partner has even less ability to force
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However, that provision is merely a default rule. Contrary
agreements are commonplace, and professional partnerships
often involve payout calculations quite similar to those de70
scribed in Simpson."
As to the relationship between fiduciary duty and partner
dissociation, the court had ample basis for impugning the motives of defendant's Management Committee and for concluding
that Simpson was "discharged, without any voice in the matter,
in order to insure the financial gain of other Parties. "27 What
is remarkable is the court's further conclusions that, by disregarding its fiduciary obligations to Mr. Simpson, the Management Committee: (i) negated the existence of those obligations,
and (ii) thereby undercut the firm's claim that Simpson was a
partner.2" These conclusions turn partnership law on its head;
fiduciary duties flow from a partner's status as partner, not vice
versa. Moreover, if a party can negate fiduciary duties simply
by disregarding them, then partner fiduciary duty has no teeth.
A miscreant need only act harshly and then proclaim, there can
be no breach because my conduct belies my victim's contention
that my victim was a bona fide partner to whom I owed a fiduciary duty."h In sum, as illustrated by Wheeler and Simpson,
the partnership cases are problematic; they provide at best an
oblique perspective on how a business owner can provide services to the business without becoming, for federal employment

liquidation. See UNIn. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 801, 6 U.LA. 92 (1994) (listing events
causing dissolution and winding up of the partnership business); id. § 701 (providing for purchase of a dissociated partner's interest when the partnership is not dissolved and wound up).
270. See, e.g., Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150 (Cal. 1993); Anderson v.
Aspelmeier, Fisch, Power, Warner & Engberg, 461 N.W.2d 598 (Iowa 1990); Jacob v.
Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142 (NJ. 1992); Leonard & Butler v. Harris,
653 A.2d 1193 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); Graubard Mollen Dannett &
Horowitz v. Moskovitz, 653 N.E.2d 1179 (N.Y. 1995); Hackett v. IMlban, Tweed,
Hadley & McCloy, 654 N.E.2d 95 (N.Y. 1995); Denburg v. Parker Chapin Flattau &
Klimpl, 624 N.E.2d 995 (N.Y. 1993); Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410
(N.Y. 1989); Hagen v. O'Connell, Goyak & Ball, 683 P.2d 563 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
271. Simpson, 850 F. Supp. at 662.
272. Id.
273. See id. In Simpson, the negating of fiduciary duty paved the way for the
plaintiffs claims under federal employment statutes. The Simpson approach will
not, however, always produce such benign results for plaintiffs. Not every breach
of partner fiduciary duty is remediable as a violation of some employment statute.
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law purposes, an "employee."
IV. THE CLOSE CORPORATION CASES

The partnership cases use the concept of genuine partner
as a surrogate picture of those with "'the unique status as business owners and managers' that is incompatible with status as
employees. " ' The close corporation cases divide as to whether that picture should apply by analogy to those who own,
control, and operate closely held corporations.'

274. EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1545 (2d Cir. 1996) (Jacobs,
J., dissenting) (quoting Hyland, 794 F.2d at 797).
275. Different jurisdictions use different approaches to defining the term "close
corporations." Some jurisdictions have case law that adopts a functional approach.
See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505,
511 (Mass. 1975) (defining a close corporation as "typified by (1) a small number
of stockholders; (2) no ready market for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial
majority stockholder participation in the management, direction and operations of
the corporation"). Other jurisdictions have statutes that take a numerical approach.
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 302A.011(6a) (1996) (defining a close corporation as having
35 or fewer shareholders). Still other jurisdictions accord close corporation treatment only to those corporations that meet a numerical limit and expressly opt for
close corporation status. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341, 342 (1974 &
Supp. 1996) (establishing an opt-in approach); Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366,
1380 (refusing to apply close corporation doctrines to a closely held Delaware
corporation that had not elected close corporation status). The analysis in the text
does not depend on the approach of any particular jurisdiction. As will be seen,
the following description encompasses the corporations under discussion:
Certain key attributes characterize close corporations. Close corporations
have a limited number of shareholders, and most, if not all, of the shareholders are active in the corporation's day-to-day business. The corporation typically is an important (and often principal) source of income for
each shareholder. Payout is frequently in the form of salary rather than
dividends. The success of the business usually depends on harmony and
cooperation among the co-owners.
Daniel S. Kleinberger, Why Not Good Faith? The Foibles of Fairness in the Law
of Close Corporations, 16 W,t MrrcnEa L REV. 1143, 1148 (1990) (footnote omitted). For a detailed discussion of the nature of close corporations, see F. HODGE
O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMrsON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1996). The analysis
in the text is limited to closely held corporations because in other contexts the
"employee" aspect clearly predominates over the "shareholder" aspect.
See
Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 32 (1961) (stating that "[i]f
members of a trade union bought stock in their corporate employer, they would
not cease to be employees within the conception of this Act"); Jones v. Baskin,
Flaherty, Elliot & Mannino, 670 F. Supp. 597, 602 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (holding that
"the fact that [plaintiff] was a shareholder of [the defendant professional corpora-
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The fight centers on the impact of state-law based labels.
In a formal, state law sense, a shareholder/employee relates to
a corporation in two capactities: as an owner, qua shareholder;
as a service provider, qua employee." For some courts, the
latter role and its label are dispositive. The state law term "employee" forecloses not only any analogy to partner status but
also any additional, deeper inquiry. There is no need even to
ask whether Congress' picture of an "employee" actually encompasses a co-owner/co-manager of a closely held enterprise.2" For other courts, the state law label is not even material, much less dispositive. These courts happily analogize close
corporations to partnerships and shareholder/employees to
partners.2"

Most of the close corporation cases involve professional
corporations.27 However, for the most part, the reasoning de-

tion], particularly one who owned less than one percent of outstanding shares,
does not disqualify him from being protected as an 'employee' under the ADEA").
276. This formal distinction results from the formal structure inherent in corporate law. See Kleinberger, supra note 275, at 1144 (discussing the tripartite structure of corporations). See also Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assoc., 794 F.2d
793, 794-95 (2d Cir. 1986) (describing shareholder/employees as being signatories
not only to a shareholder agreement but also to individual employment agreements). This role differentiation does not exist in general partnerships, because
there the single category of "partnere encompasses ownership, management, and the
providing of services. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT §§ 24 & 25, 6 U.LA. 697 (1914)
(defining partner property rights); id. §§ 18(e) & 18(h) (describing partner management rights); § 18(f) (contemplating partners providing services). See also UNIF.
PARTNERSHP AcT §§ 501 & 502, 6 U.LA. 66 (1994) (RUPA) (defining a partner's
property rights in partnership property); id. §§ 401(0 &401(j) (describing partner
management rights); id. § 401(h) (contemplating partners providing services).
277. See infra notes 279-83.
278. See infm notes 279-83.
279. The following cases address professional coroporations:
Devine v. Stone,
Leyton & Greshman, 100 F.3d 78 (8th Cir. 1996) (involving attorneys); Fountain v.
Metcalf, Zima & Co., 925 F.2d 1398 (lth Cir. 1991) (involving accountants); Hyland
v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., -74F.2d 792. (2d C. 1986) (invlvin radiologists); EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984) (involving attorneys); Moebus v. OB-GYN Assocs., Inc., 937 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (involving
physicians); Goudeau v. Dental Health Services, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1139 (M.D. La.
1995) (involving dentists); Jones v. Baskin, Flaherty, Elliot & Mannino, 670 F. Supp.
597 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (involving attorneys); Barnhart v. Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebling,
Co., No. 90-CV-330, 1992 WL 551487 (S.D. Ohio May 25, 1992) (involving attorneys);
Gorman v. North Pittsburgh Oral Surgery Assocs., Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 212 (W.D.
Penn. 1987) (involving oral surgeons). The following cases do not: EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529 (2d Cir. 1996) (involving an insurance brokerage
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pends neither on the shareholder/employees being professionals
nor on any special aspects of the law of professional corporations. For example, the Second Circuit follows the per se rule
rejecting the partnership analogy, and the Circuit's seminal case
involved a professional corporation.' Recently, however, the
Second Circuit confronted the issue in a case involving an ordinary corporation,2 1 discussed the seminal case in detail, reaffirmed the per se rule, and gave no sign that the rule depends
on professional corporation status.'
A few opinions have observed that an employee/shareholder of a professional corporation remains personally
liable for his or her own malpractice.' However, the rulings
in those cases do not depend on that personal liability, and that
personal liability is not distinctive. Nothing in the law of agency
or ordinary corporations shields shareholder/employee from
liability for his or her own negligence.' Consequently, hold-

and employee benefits consulting corporation); Robinson v. Linomaz, 58 F.3d 365
(8th Cir. 1995) (involving a closely held corporation in the hardware business);
Golizio v. Antonine Holding, Inc., No. 96-3142, 1997 WL 47781 (E.D. La Feb 5,
1997) (involving a closely held corporation that owned a restaurant); Powell-Ross v.
All Star Radio, Inc., No. 95-1078, 1995 WL 491291 (E.D. Pa Aug. 16, 1995) (involving a closely held coporation that owned a radio station); Pucket v. Mangelsdorf,
Inc., No. 96-CV-1240-R, 1997 WL 135614 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 1997) (involving a
closely held corporation that brokered annuities arising from structured settlements).
280. Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986).
281. EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529 (2d Cir. 1996). "Johnson &
Higgins is an international insurance brokerage and employee benefits consulting
firm." Id. at 1531.
282. See infra notes 295-303.
Cf. Serapion v. Martinez, 942 F. Supp. 80, 84
(D.P.R. 1996) (stating "that the factors for determining one's status as a partner
under Title VII remain the same regardless of the type of business or partnership
involved-).
283. See, e.g., EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177, 1178 (7th Cir. 1984)
(analogizing a professional corporation to a partnership and stating that
"[sihareholders in a professional corporation are not immune from malpractice liability"); Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 800 (2d Cir. 1986)
(Cardamone, J., dissenting) (arguing that a professional corporation should be
analogized to a partnership in part because "shareholders in a professional corporation rarely achieve the total limitation of personal liability enjoyed by owners of a
corporation and are subject to liability for malpractice").
284. See KLEINBERGER, supra note 97, § 4.2.3, at 138 (explaining that an agent of
an enterprise is not immune from tort liability simply because the agent committed
the tort while acting on behalf of the enterprise); BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra,
note 8,
6.04, at 6-30 (explaining that neither the corporate nor LLC shield pro-
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ing a professional personally liable for his or her own torts
does nothing to distinguish professionals from other types of
shareholder/employees.
One professional corporation case
does expressly "look for guidance to the cases in other circuits
that have specifically addressed [the shareholder/employee]
issue in the context of professional corporations,"' but the
decision does not allude to anything that would distinguish a
professional corporation from any other closely held corporation. Another professional corporation case asserts that "[tihe
professional corporation enjoys a unique existence among business combines,"' but fails to substantiate that assertion.
"[Bleing a corporation for liability and tax purposes but a partnership in other respects" 7 does not distinguish professional
corporations from close corporations owned and operated by
nonprofessionals. Indeed, the modem close corporation is often
referred to as an incorporated partnership.' Likewise, enabling a firm's owner "to employ him or herself" is an "economic reality"' common to every close corporation. In sum, to
the extent the owners of an ordinary close corporation also
manage and staff the business, that enterprise is, for federal
employment law purposes, indistinguishable from a professional corporation.
The foremost corporate case rejecting the partnership analogy is Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Associates.' Hyland
involved a professional services corporation organized by five
radiologists. As the Second Circuit explained:
[Ejach of the five founding members contributed the
same amount of capital for equal shares in the corporation and an equal voice in management. Profits and
losses were divided evenly among the members, all of
whom served as corporate officers and directors. The

tects owners from liability resulting from their own torts).
285.
1995).
286.
287.
288.

Goudeau v. Dental Health Services, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1139, 1143 (M.D. La.
Gorman, 664 F. Supp. at 214.
Id.
See Kleinberger, supra note 275, at 1150-51 rL19-21 (discussing the origin of

this term).
289. Gorman, 664 F. Supp. at 214.
290. 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986).
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stockholders agreed that stock could be held only by
shareholder-members, who were required to be licensed
physicians. Upon the death, withdrawal or termination
of any member, the member or his estate was required
to sell, and [the professional corporation] to purchase,
that shareholder's stock at a price fixed in accordance
with the valuation provisions of the agreement. No
stock could be held in the corporation by a non-member
or non-employee. The stockholders' agreement provided
for the admission to membership of additional "Stockholder-Employees," who would enjoy the benefits of the
corporation and participate in the management of its
affairs equally ....
Each shareholder also signed a separate two-year
renewable employment agreement with the corporation,
and the terms of these agreements were substantially
identical." 1
When the corporation fired Dr. Hyland, one of its founders,
he sought protection under the ADEA. At the district court level, the defendants prevailed on summary judgment. The district
court adopted the partnership analogy, holding that the professional corporation amounts to a partnership in all but name,
that Hyland was, in effect, a partner in the enterprise, and that
Hyland therefore was not an employee entitled to claim the
benefits provided by the ADEAJ'
The Second Circuit rejected the analogy, declaring "that
there is no basis for a finding that [a professional corporation]
is a partnership."' Instead, by a 2-1 majority the appellate
panel held that "where the individual involved is a corporate
employee,... every such employee is 'covered' for purposes of
the ADEA."'
The Hyland majority gave several reasons for what has
since come to be seen as its "absolute rule. " " Most funda291. Id. at 794-95 (footnotes omitted).
292. Id. at 794 (citations omitted) (quoting Hyland v. New Haven Radiology
Assoc., 606 F. Supp. 617, 621 (D. Conn. 1985)).
293. Id.
294. Id. at 798.
295. EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 682, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1995),
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mentally, Hyland viewed the choice of corporate entity as dispositive. The corporate form inexorably excluded any partnership analogy.
It is one thing to apply an economic realities test to
distinguish an employee from an independent contractor
or partner, but it is quite another to apply the test in an
attempt to identify as partner one associated with a
corporate enterprise .... [Tihose who own shares in a
corporation... cannot under any circumstances be
partners in the same enterprise because the roles are
mutually exclusive.'
In short, as the dissent put it, "once a corporation, then always
a corporation." 7
Hyland also saw the corporate form as ineluctably characterizing the role of shareholders who provide employee-like services to a corporation. "'Once a contractual relationship of

affd, 91 F.3d 1529 (2d Cir. 1996). The EEOC has misunderstood the "absolute"
aspect of Hyland. See Partners, Officers, Members of Boards of Directors, and
Major Shareholders, Eq. Empl. Compl. Man. (Callaghan)
2179, at 2336 (stating
that "[wihether an individual is characterized by the organization as a partner or a
shareholder, the more important consideration in Hyland . . . is whether, after
examining all the facts of the employment relationship, (s)he also should be considered an employee").
296. Hyland, 794 F.2d at 798. For the Hyland court it was the entrepreneurs'
choice of the corporate form that mattered, not the fact that a corporation is a
legal entity distinct from its owners. In contrast, a partnership formed under the
original (i.e., 1914 version) of the Uniform Partnership Act has a schizoid nature,
appearing as an entity for some purposes and as an aggregate for others. See
KLEINBERGER, supra note 97, § 7.2.7, at 209-10.
Neither Hyland nor its progeny
make anything of this distinction between corporations and general partnerships.
The distinction largely disappears under the newer Uniform Partnership Act, which
declares that "[a] partnership is an entity distince from its partners." UNIF PARTNERsHIP AcT § 201(a), 6 U.LA. 27 (1994). See also Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d
982, 98&89 (ist Cir. i997) (rejecting the state-law entity versus aggregate distinction
as a basis for determining the federal question of employee vel non).
297. Id. (Cardamone, J., dissenting). In EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc. the
district court characterized this aspect of Hyland as follows: "In reaching its decision, the Hyland court stated that the adoption of the corporate form, despite the
defendant organization's similarities to a partnership, ended the inquiry as to its
liability under the ADEA." 887 F. Supp. 682, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). See also Golden
v. A. P. Orleans, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (stating that "[t]he
Hyland decision can certainly be read to suggest that form should be favored over
substance in some circumstances").
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employment is established, the provisions of [federal employment law] attach and govern.'"'
It was immaterial that
Hyland shareholders also managed and controlled the corporation. "In various situations calling for the application of these
statutes, an individual's status as a major stockholder, officer or
director of a corporation has been found to be compatible with
his or her status as an employee."' In other words, if a
shareholder provides employee-like services and receives remuneration on account of those services, nothing else matters."
As additional support for its decision, the Hyland majority
offered a somewhat petulant, "live by the sword, die by the
sword" rationale.
The fact that certain modem partnerships and corporations are practically indistinguishable in structure and
operation... is no reason for ignoring a form of business organization freely chosen and established. Concededly, the physician members of NHRA found that
incorporation provided them with important tax advantages and employee benefits not available in any other
type of business organization. Having made the election
to incorporate, they should not now be heard to say that
their corporation is "essentially a medical partnership
among co-equal radiologists.""'

298. Hyland, 794 F.2d at 797 (quoting Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69,
74 (1984)).
299. Hyland, 794 F.2d at 796. The Hyland maority provided a string cite to
support its assertion.
As will be seen, the cited cases do not support the
majority's assertion and the string citation borders on the disingenuous. See infra
notes 371-79.
300. See also Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d at 1538, 1539 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that "although corporate directors are traditionally viewed as employers, they
may also be considered employees depending upon their position and responsibilities within the corporation" and noting that "the Hyland court looked to
the director's role in the company to determine whether there existed an employment relationship in addition to the role of director"); Gorman v. North Pittsburgh
Oral Surgery Assocs., Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 212, 214 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (holding that "the
shareholders of [a professional corporation] are employees of the professional corporation for ADEA purposes" and stating that "[tihe professional corporation . . .
enables a professional to employ him or herself and that is the only economic
reality with which we need be concerned").
301. Hyland, 794 F.2d at 798. Hyland's view is reminiscent of the attitude that
until recently pervaded federal tax classification law. Prior to the advent of LLCs,
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Hyland's "labels are destiny" approach is at odds with the
weight of federal employment case law, which is replete with
statements that labels do not determine outcome.' In addi-

entrepreneurs seeking a full, corporate-like liabililty shield had to pay some form of
tax cost. See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 8, I.0112], at 1-5 (discussing the
"tax-shield conundrum"). The Hyland dissent takes a more accepting view of the
shareholders' tax planning motivation: "[T]he original group of radiologists . . .
founded a business that they could manage and profit by. They were employees
in name only, and organized their entity as a corporation only to the extent that
the tax laws required them to do so." Hyland, 794 F.2d at 802 (Cardamone, J.,
dissenting). EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 681 F. Supp. at 698, echoes and
applies the point made by the majority in Hyland: "Hyland... set forth an absolute rule that, in our view, prevents us from ignoring J & H's freely-chosen status
and treating J & H for purposes of this action as a partnership rather than a corporation." Id. (emphasis added). See also Johnson v. Cooper, Deans & Cargill,
884 F. Supp. 43, 45 (D.N.H. 1994) (holding that shareholder/employees are "employees" for Title VII purposes and stating that the defendant firm had "elected to
organize in the corporate form and cannot now avoid the reach of Title VII by
calling its shareholder-employees partners").
The Hyland majority offered one further rationale for its decision: "The statute
is considered remedial in nature and must be given a liberal interpretation in order
to effectuate its purposes . . . . Its language demonstrates a single congressional
aim - to prohibit 'age discrimination by employers against employees and applicants for employment'" Hyland, 794 F.2d at 796 (citations omitted). Darden
clearly undercut this rationale. Consequently, in Johnson & Higgins, 91 F.3d 1529
(2d Cir. 1996), the Second Circuit took pains to demonstrate that "remedial purpose" is not central to Hyland's holding.
[T~he Hyland court began its analysis with a recitation of the "liberal construction" language subsequently rejected in Darden and Frankel [a Second Circuit independent contractor case that applied Darden]. However,
Hyland did not turn on the court's adoption of an unduly broad definition of an "employee" or its deviation from the common law agency test
for employment. While the court did discuss the definition of an employee and the various tests used to distinguish an employee from an independent contractor, that discussion was not directly related to its simple
holding that the partnership exemption from the ADEA was unavailable to
a corporate enterprise.
Id. at 1538 (citations omitted). Compare Devine v. Stone, Leyton & Greshman, 100
F.3d 78 (8th Cir. 1996) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (ignoring the Darden-based demise
of the "remedial purpose" approach and advocating the Hyland rule because "[iun
my view, this interpretation is consistent with the broad, remedial purpose of this
anti-discrimination statute").
302. Hyland's dissent makes the point emphatically:
The reality of the situation, i.e., management, control, and ownership
closely resembled a partnership and these realities control, not the cor-
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tion, Hyland's label fixation renders totally irrelevant whatever
picture Congress had in mind when it sought to protect "employees." As the Hyland dissent stated:
First, we are not obliged to adopt a take-it-or-leaveit attitude toward the status of [a firm] and hold that
once a corporation, then always a corporation. The
manner in which a corporation functions determines
what kind of entity it is for purposes of the discrimination laws. Neither labels, nor tifles dictate the answer.
Second, regardless of the talismanic words used to characterize the actual manner in which [the firm] functioned - corporation or partnership - the ADEA does
not mandate that everyone who works for a corporation
must be an employee within the Act, as the majority
believes. The label that characterizes the substance of
an entity does not necessarily determine the employment status of all those who work within it.'
Despite its flaws, Hyland has been followed by other
courts. In Gorman v. North Pittsburgh Oral Surgery Associates, Ltd., for example, a district court acknowledged cases

porate label under which the entity operated. Armbruster v. Quinn, 711
F.2d 1332, 1340 (6th Cir. (1983)), ref'g denied, (1983) (while parties' view
of relationship is evidence of whether one is an employee, it is not determinative; the economic reality of the relationship is examined); Spirides
v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 829, 832 (D.C.Cir. 1979) (in applying the statutory language and legislative history of Titie VII mere fact that contracting parties label an individual an independent contractor does not bind a
court when an examination of the substance of that relationship dictates
otherwise).
Hyland 794 F.2d at 799. (Cardamone, J., dissenting). See also Simpson v. Ernst &
Young, 100 F.3d 436, 441 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating in the context of an ADEA case
that "[tihe characterization of 'partner' was a title that carried no legal significance"); Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Co., 925 F.2d 1398, 1400-01 (1lth Cir. 1991)
(stating that, in determining whether the ADEA covers a shareholder, "we focus not
on any label, but on the actual role played by the claimant in the operations of
the involved entity"); Golden v. A. P. Orleans, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 (E.D.
Pa. 1988) (stating, in the context of an ADEA'independent contractor case, "[tihere
is considerable authority for the proposition that the parties' view of the relationship is not controlling where the label employed by the parties cannot withstand reasoned scrutiny").
303. Hyland, 794 F.2d at 798-99 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
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disagreeing with Hyland, but found "the reasoning of the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit... more persuasive."' The
Gorman court's reasoning was quite brief and echoed both
Hyland's petulance and its deference to labels:
The professional corporation enjoys a unique existence
among business combines, being a corporation for liability and tax purposes but a partnership in other respects.
It enables a professional to employ him or herself and
that is the only economic reality with which we need be
concerned. We hold that the shareholders of [the professional corporation] are employees of the professional
corporation for ADEA purposes."
Hyland has also been influential in a recondite area of
ERISA law. ERISA preempts claims pertaining to any ERISAencompassed benefits plan' and a number of cases have had
to consider whether a plan covering only a sole corporate
shareholder/employee constitutes an ERISA plan. That question
depends in part on whether the sole shareholder/employee is an
"employee" for ERISA purposes. The cases are split, with those
finding employee status relying in part on Hyland-like formalism. For example, Madonia v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Virginia holds that since "Virginia courts have 'long recognized
the basic proposition that a corporation is a legal entity separate and distinct from its shareholders,'" even a sole shareholder is an employee. 7

304. 664 F. Supp. 212, 214 (W.D. Pa. 1987).
305. Id, at 214. See also Johnson v. Cooper, Deans & Cargill, 884 F. Supp. 43,
45 (D.N.H. 1994) (citing Hyland with approval, holding that shareholder/employee
are employees for Title VII purposes and stating that Title VII's "remedial purpose
is best served by declining defendant's invitation to ignore legal reality in deference
to economic reality"); Rosenblatt v. Bivona & Cohen, 969 F. Supp. 207, 215
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (following iyland's per se rule, while noting that "[e]ven were defendant corporation organized not as a professional corporation, but as a partnership, plaintiff would still qualify as an employee under Title VII).
306. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
307. 11 F.3d 444, 449 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Perpetual Real Estate Servs., Inc. v.
Michaelson Props., Inc., 974 F.2d, 545, 547-48 (4th Cir. 1992). See also Robinson v.
Linomaz, 58 F.3d 365, 369 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that a sole shareholder of a corporation was an employee, and therefore a beneficiary, under ERISA); McConocha
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ohio, 898 F. Supp. 545, 548 (N.D. Ohio 1995)
(agreeing with Madonia that a "sole shareholder, insured under a health policy
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The weight of authority is to the contrary, however. A
recent district court case, Taylor v. Carter, summarizes the
contrary authority as follows:
[T]he First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits have
all concluded to the contrary. See Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Service Employees PensionFund, 879 F.2d 957,
960 (1st Cir.1989) ("When an individual dominates the
actions of a corporate entity - and who rules the corporate roost more singlehandedly than a sole shareholder doubling in brass as the firm's chief executive and
principal operating officer? - it seems fair to acknowledge the actuality of the situation: such an individual
assuredly acts "in the interest of the corporation. He is
thus subject to classification as an "employer.");
Meredith v. Time Ins. Co., 980 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1993)
(holding that under ERISA, owner of business cannot
simultaneously be employer and employee); Fugarinov.
HartfordLife and Accident Insurance Co., 969 F.2d 178,
186 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc) ("... a sole proprietor or
sole shareholder of a business must be considered an
employer and not an employee of the business for purposes of ERISA."); Giardono v. Jones, 867 F.2d 409, 411
(7th Cir. 1989) (".. . employer cannot ordinarily be an
employee or participant under ERISA"); Peckham v. Bd.
of Trustees of the Int'l Bd. of Painters and Allied
Trades Union, 653 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1981) (finding
that sole proprietors were precluded from maintaining a
dual status as employer/employee under ERISA); Brech
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 845 F. Supp. 829, 833
(M.D. Ala. 1993); Kelly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 814
F. Supp. 220, 228-29 (D. R.I. 1993) (holding that despite
the fact that the sole proprietor worked for the corporation, as an employer, she cannot occupy employee status under ERISA).3

purchased by his corporation, was a 'participant' in the company's ERISA plan").
308. 948 F. Supp. 1290, 1296 (W.D. Tex. 1996). See also Matinchek v. John Alden
Life Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 96, 101 n.3 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that "an insurance coverage plan covering only a sole business owner and his or her immediate family
members cannot qualify as an employee welfare benefit plan covered by ERISA"
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Taylor itself goes even further than the anti-formalist cases
it cites and relies on. "[Riefusing to follow Madonia and its
progeny," Taylor holds "that Plaintiff, who is a minority shareholder and an officer of the corporation, is [not] an employee."M
In 1993 it appeared that Darden might have broken
Hyland's hold on the Second Circuit. In Frankel v. Balley, Inc.,
a panel considered whether the sole shareholder/employee of a
corporation could be considered for ADEA purposes as the
employee of another entity for which the corporation (and its
shareholder/employee) provided services."' In that context,
the panel stated "the corporate form under which a plaintiff
does business is not dispositive in a determination of whether
an individual is an employee or an independent contractor
within the meaning of the ADEA. Indeed, no per se rule applies
in such circumstances."3 1'
Three years later, however, another Second Circuit panel
emphatically reaffirmed Hyland. EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins,

and noting that "this holding applies to all businesses solely-owned by immediate
family members, regardless of whether the owners are sole proprietors, sole shareholders, or partners").
309. Taylor, 948 F. Supp. at 1297 (emphasis added). The plaintiff in Taylor
"own[ed] no more than 25.296 of the corporation during the relevant time period."
Id. at 1291-92. See also In re Kaplan, 162 B.R 684, 693-94 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993)
(considering whether ERISA applied to a benefits plan in a corporation with only
two shareholders, noting from the inception of the Plan until [one shareholder]
terminated his interest [in the corporation], the [other shareholder] and [the first
shareholder] were the sole participants in the Plan and the sole owners of the Plan
sponsor [which] had no other eligible employees, and holding that "owners of plan
sponsors do not come within the definition of employees of the sponsor, regardless
of whether they are husband and wife"). Contra Finn v. Nachreiner Boie Art Factory, 549 N.W.2d 273, 278 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (stating "we have not located any
case law establishing that a 51% owner 'and his or her spouse shall not be deemed
to be employees' under ERISA" and declining to so hold).
Even if a business owner is not an "employee" for ERISA preemption purposes, the owner could be a beneficiary of a plan that encompasses other employees.
See Prudential Ins. Co. of An. v. Doe, 76 F.3d 206 (8th Cir. 1996); Harper v. American Chambers Life Ins. Co., 898 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1990). See also Eichhorn,
Eichhorn & Link v. Travelers Ins. Co., 896 F. Supp. 812 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (discussing conflicts in the case law).
310. 987 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1993).
311. Id. at 91.
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Inc."2 involved "an international insurance brokerage and employee benefits consulting firm... incorporated under New
Jersey law... [and] managed by a Board of Directors ("the
Board") consisting of at least twenty and no more than fortyfour members.""'a The Board was self-perpetuating and selected its members exclusively from the firm's top officers. Board
members continued to perform their officer duties following
election to the Board, so in their day-to-day activities some of
the Board members perforce reported to other members. "
Board membership went together with stock ownership.
All Board members had to purchase stock, and "J& H stock is
owned almost exclusively by its directors."1a ' A director who
retired or left the Board for any other reason was obliged to
sell his or her stock back to the firm. The repurchased stock
was then reallocated among the remaining directors." 6
Johnson & Higgins had a mandatory retirement policy for
its directors. Under that policy "the normal retirement date for
Directors [was] the earlier of (a) the end of the year in which
the age 62 is attained or (b) the end of the year in which age 60
is attained and 15 years of service on the Board is completed."1 7 The required retirement entailed all aspects of
director's involvement in the firn. "When a director retire[d]

312. 91 F.3d 1529 (2d Cir. 1996).
313. Id. at 1531. A recent district court opinion misreads Johnson & Higgins as
departing from Hyland. See Moebus v. OB-GYN Assocs:, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 867,
869 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (stating that "in a recent opinion, the Second Circuit has limited the holding of Hyland). Johnson & Higgins was also the defendant in a Third
Circuit case. See Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 732 (3d Cir. 1995)
(reversing summary judgment for defendant because, "[w]hen the evidence is read
in the light most favorable to Sempier, a jury could reasonably find that J & H did
not terminate him because of poor performance but rather discharged him because
of his age;" further, overturning the district court's discovery orders). Sempier
does not address the employee vs. owner question, coming no closer to the issue
than a footnote description of the defendant firm: "J & H is a closely held New
Jersey corporation. It operates as if it were a partnership. All stockholders are
members of the firm. All directors are employees of the firn." Id. at 725 rl 2.
314. Johnson, 91 F.3d at 1531-32.
315. Id. at 1532.
316. Id.
317. Id. (quoting the defendant firm's amendments to its by-laws). As to the latter .prong, "in cases of corporate need determined by the Chairman and approved
by the Executive Committee, a Director may continue on a year-to-year basis up to
but not beyond the end of the year in which age 62 is attained." Id.
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pursuant to this policy, he not only cease[d] to be a director,
but he also cease[d] to be a stockholder, officer, and employee
of the company.""'
The EEOC challenged the retirement policy as a violation
of the ADEA, and the case turned on whether the Johnson &
Higgins directors were "employees" for ADEA purposes. Johnson & Higgins characterized its directors as "owner-managers"
1 9 The Secand sought to analogize them to genuine partners."
ond Circuit invoked Hyland and sided with the EEOC.
[W]e... stated in Hyland that the partnership exemption is limited to actual de jure partnerships and would
not be extended to closely-held corporations or other
organizations whose structure resembles that of a partnership .... Hyland remains good law, and J & H is
precluded from arguing that it is exempt from the ADEA
because it is a defacto partnership." °
Johnson & Higgins also reiterated another key holding of
Hyland - namely, that a shareholder's exercise of top management authority is immaterial if the shareholder/manager is also
performing employee-like functions:
We attach no particular significance to the fact that a
director's employment by J & H is "but an aspect of the
fundamentally entrepreneurial relationship that the Directors have among themselves and to the firm as a
whole." This merely indicates, as the district court held,
that J & H's directors have a dual status as employees
and directors."'

318. Id.
319. Id. at 1532.
320. Id at 1537-38.
321. Id. at 1540 (citing EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 682, 685,
688 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). The dissenting judge objected to this approach for practical
reasons:
Ascertaining employee status by reference to the most workaday tasks
that a director performs in a business muddles the analysis. As the
Tenth Circuit noted (in a case involving partners), such a rule would
create "[a] potentially chaotic situation ... with partners drifting into and
out of covered 'employee' status, remaining partners all the while, with
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Outside the Second Circuit a number of courts have rejected Hyland's formalistic approach. For the most part, these
cases adopt and apply the partnership analogy without any indepth discussion. In EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd.,322 for example, the Seventh Circuit decided a professional corporation
case by invoking Burke v. Friedman, a partnership case.' As
to the EEOC's contention "that Burke is inapplicable to the
present case because it involved a partnership rather than a
professional corporation, " ' 4 the court responded:
We disagree. As Dowd correctly contends, this distinction is of little value to Title VII purposes. The role of a
shareholder in a professional corporation is far more
analogous to a partner in a partnership than it'is to the
shareholder of a general corporation. 5
The court's support for this assertion was largely conclusory:
The economic reality of the professional corporation in
Illinois is that the management, control, and ownership
of the corporation is much like the management, control, and ownership of a partnership. We therefore see
no reason to treat the shareholders of a professional
corporation differently for purposes of Title VII actions
than we
did partners of the accounting firm in
326
Burke.
A couple of more recent district court opinions are even
more conclusory. Goudeau v. Dental Health Services, Inc."s
simply states that "Hyland and the cases following it focus

no one ever quite knowing who is an employee/partner and who is a
'pure' partner."
Johnson, 91 F.3d at 1545 n.4 (2d Cir. 1996) (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (quoting Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 274 (10th Cir. 1987)) (alteration in original) (citations

omitted).
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984).
556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977).
Dowd, 736 F.2d at 1178.
Id.
Id. (citing Burke, 556 F.2d at 867).
901 F. Supp. 1139 (M.D. La. 1995).
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more on the business form chosen by the professionals rather
than the economic realities of the work relationship" and then
declares that "EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. and the cases following it are more persuasive."' Wright v. Kosciusko Medical Clinic, Inc.' briefly acknowledges the split in the case
law but then states baldly that "[s]hareholders are not treated
as employees of the corporation."' °
Another circuit case, Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Co."3
reasons to somewhat greater depth. The case first rejects "the
exaltation of form over substance that resides in reliance on a
label 'corporation' applied to the entity as in Hyland, or on a
label applied to a claimant."' It then expressly adopts the
partnership analogy:
Consideration of the statutory language, the legislative
history, and federal case law having reduced the issue
to the single question "partner or employee," we look to
the particular circumstances of the case at hand, and, in
so doing, we focus not on any label, but on the actual
role played by the claimant in the operations of the
involved entity and the extent to which that role dealt
with traditional concepts of management, control, and
m
ownership.3
Finally, after detailing the facts of "the role [plaintiff] played
and the status he occupied in the firm, " ' 4 the court concludes

328. Id. at 1142-43 n.7 (involving Title VII claims by dentist shareholders).
329. 791 F. Supp. 1327 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (involving an ADEA claim by a physician
shareholder).
330. Id. at 1329 n.5.
331. 925 F.2d 1398 (11th Cir. 1991).
332. Id. at 1400.
333. Id. at 1400-01 (citations omitted).
3;34. id. at 1401. The court described *!,at role and status as follows:
It is undisputed that, unlike the firm's employees, Fountain: shared in
the firm's profits, losses, and expenses; was compensated on the basis of
a share in the firm's [sic] profits; was liable for certain debts, obligations,
and liabilities of the firm; and had a right to vote his thirty-one percent
ownership on member/shareholders' amendments to the agreement, on
admission of new member/shareholders, on termination of relationship
with member/shareholders, on draws, and on distribution of profits and
income.
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that "[t]hose facts are virtually a textbook listing of the management, control and ownership factors that establish [plaintiffs]
role as that of partner, not employee."'
A few cases reject Hyland without expressly embracing
the partnership analogy. In Jones v. Baskin, Flaherty, Elliot &
Mannino, for example, the corporate form causes the court to
shy away from the partnership analogy.' "On its face [the defendant firm] is a corporation rather than a partnership. This
fundamental structural difference would seem to undermine the
assertion that [the plaintiff] enjoys the rights and prerogatives
of partnership. "337 Yet the court does not embrace Hyland's
per se rule' but looks instead to the "economic reality" of
the plaintiff s situation. Noting that plaintiff had no right to
participate in firm profits, "had little control over [firm] man-

Id.
335. Id. Moebus v. OB-GYN Associates Inc., 937 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Mo. 1996),
involving a professional corporation of physicians, is another example of a case
that rejects Hyland and then assesses in detail the relevant circumstances:
During the relevant time period, all of defendant's stock was owned by
three or four physicians. The Board of Directors of the corporation was
made up of these physician/shareholders and a retired physician who
co-founded the corporation. Each had an equal vote. All major decisions of the corporation, including acquisitions of material assets, execution of material contracts, funding decisions concerning the corporation's
benefit plans, and bringing in new physicians were made by the Board of
Directors.
The physician/shareholders did not report to any party except the
Board of Directors. Each physician/shareholder set his or her own hours
and conditions of work. The physician/shareholders' share in the profits,
losses and expenses of the corporation is based upon the percentage of
the corporation's business they generate, and each is entitled to a bonus
based upon a pre-determined formula.
Id. at 868. This approach is consistent with the EEOC's position. See Partners,
Officers, Members of Boards of Directors, and Major Shareholders, Eq. Empl.
Comp. Man. (Callaghan)
2179 at 2335 (stating that the "analysis [for determining
the employee vel non issue in a closely held corporation] is similar to determining
whether a partner in a partnership is also an employee").
336. 670 F. Supp. 597 (W.D. Pa. 1987).
337. Id. at 602.
338. Id. at 601-02 (citing Hyland, but only to hold that the fact "that Jones was a
shareholder does not itself mean that he is not an employee under the ADEA")
(emphasis added).
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agement," and "owned less than one percent of outstanding
shares," the court classifies the plaintiff as an employee." 9
A recent Eighth Circuit case straddles the competing perspectives more elaborately. Devine v. Stone, Leyton &
Greshman, rejects "[a] rigid per se rule that stresses organizational form over substance"' and opines that "[tihe better
reasoned cases hold that the substance of the employment relationship determines whether an individual is an employee under Title VII." 4 The case does not, however, adopt the partnership perspective. Instead, the case holds directly that "[i]f
the shareholder-directors manage and own [the firm], they
should not be counted as employees."'
To determine the "manage and own" question, the case
prescribes a factor approach:
All relevant factors must be examined; any one may not
be decisive in deciding whether an individual is an employee. A factor important to consider in evaluating the
degree of management and control is the ability to participate in setting firm policy. Participation rights need
not be equal, but the test is whether the shareholder-

339. Id at 602. See also, Barnhart v. Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebling, Co., No. 90-CV330, 1992 WL 551487, at *2 (S.D. Ohio May 25, 1992) (eschewing both the partnership analogy and the per se rule, holding that the question turns on the "economic
realities" of "whether the putative employee is economically dependent upon the
principal" and stating, without any supporting detail, "that plaintiffs position . . .
was more akin to that of an employee than that of a partner").
340. 100 F.3d 78, 80 (8th Cir. 1996). The Eighth Circuit had previously taken a
"substance over form" approach in ordering enforcement of an EEOC subpoena
issued to a large partnership. Recalling that earlier case, Devine points out that
the "substance over form" door swings both ways:
This court has indicated that the form of the organization does not control whether an individual is an employee =d - - the AJ),
EEOC-.
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 775 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1985). The firm in
Peat Marwick was organized as a partnership, but the EEOC argued that
at least some of the 1300 partners were employees under the statute.
The EEOC was permitted to investigate by subpoena whether the partners
were in fact employees.
Examination of the circumstances would not
have been necessary if the form of the organization were controlling.
Id at 80-81.
341. Id. at 81.
342. Id.
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directors have a meaningful voice in decision-making.
Indicia of ownership include such things as contributions to firm capital, liability for debts, and compensation based on profits.m
In support of these factors, the court cites without differentiation cases involving partnerships and cases involving close
corporations.3'
Devine is refreshingly eclectic in its rejection of the per se
rule, its eschewing of the partnership approach and its "foot in
both camps" reliance on authorities. In contrast to Devine,
however, most of the close corporation cases line up on either
side of a schism.' If those cases are to help explain how a
business owner can provide services to the business without
becoming an "employee," that schism must be surmounted.
V. SURMOUNTING THE SCHISM AND JETTISONING
THE SURROGATE

This section proposes a rule for determining whether an
LLC member is an "employee" for federal employment law
purposes and in the process attempts to make sense of the case
law involving partnerships and closely held corporations. It

343. Id. (citations omitted).
344. Id. (citing Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Co., 925 F.2d 1398, 1401 (11th Cir.
1991) (involving a corporation); Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867, 869 (7th Cir.1977)
(involving a partnership); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324
(1992) (involving an employee/independent contractor dispute); Wilde v. County of
Kandiyohi, 15 F.3d 103, 106 (8th Cir. 1994); Strother v. Southern Cal. Permanente
Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 867-68 (9th Cir. 1996) (involving an employee vs. partner
issue); Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 286 (1946) (noting that a partnership
is generally created when there is a "community of interest in the profits and losses"); Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 274 (10th Cir. 1987) (involving a partnership)).
345. A recent unreported case is an exception. Puckett v. Mangelsdorf, Inc., No.
3:96-CV-1240-R, 1997 WL 135614 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 1997), considered whether
three shareholder/employees of a closely held corporation were "employees" for
purposes of meeting the 15 employee jurisdictional threshold under Title VII. The
opinion ignores both Hyland and the partnership analogy cases. The court acknowledges that the three shareholder/employees "comprise 100% of the ownership
and control of this closely-held corporation ....
and are the very nerve center of
the . . . operation." Id. at *2. Nonetheless, the court holds them to be employees, stating that "[m]ere ownership and control does not detract from an
individual's status as an employee." Id.
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would have been simpler to argue that an LLC member is not
an employee so long as he or she has at least the management
role enjoyed by Wheeler and is remunerated through a share of
the enterprise's profits rather than through any guaranteed payment.' That approach has some surface appeal, for it appears faithful to both Wheeler and Hyland. After all, the typical
LLC takes its management structure from the partnership model, 7 and in a formal sense a member provides services to the
LLC qua owner rather than qua employee.'
Unfortunately for the sake of simplicity, that type of formalism makes no better sense with LLCs than it does with
partnerships and close corporations. Any rule applicable to LLC
members must be faithful to Darden, not to Wheeler and
Hyland. That is, the rule must describe a category of owners
who represent the antipode to the common law's picture of a
servant. In doing so, the rule must overcome the conceptual
difficulties that arise because service-providing owners combine
the roles of capital and labor."9
Not every combination poses a problem. For example, a
mere scintilla or appearance of ownership cannot negate employee status. As the Supreme Court stated in a case involving
a sham cooperative:
There is no reason in logic why these members [of the
so-called cooperative] may not be employees. There is
nothing inherently inconsistent between the coexistence
of a proprietary and an employment relationship. If
members of a trade union bought stock in their corpo-

346. Cf. Definition of Limited Partner for Self-Employment Tax Purposes, 62 Fed.
Reg. 1720-01 (1997) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. Part 1) (proposing regulations to
determine when an LLC member's distributive share is subject to self-employment
tax and proposing to exempt that share in certain circumstances involving guaranteed payments).
347. See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 8, § 7.02[21, at 7-5. As discussed
above, the "check the box" tax classification regulations may increase the use of
corporate style governance. See supra note 63.
348. Id. § 7.03[1], at 7-9 to 7-10.
349. The terms "capital" and "labor" are used in the same general sense as they
were used by Karl Marx. The "capital" role involves effective ownership of the
means of production, i.e., of the enterprise. The "labor" role involves selling work
in return for payment, without effective control over the means of production.
KARL MARX, DAs KAPrrAL 89 (1952).
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rate employer, they would not cease to be employees
within the conception of this Act. For the corporation
would "suffer or permit" them to work whether or not
they owned one share of stock or none or many. We fail
to see why a member of a cooperative may not also be
an employee of the cooperative. In this case the members seem to us to be both "members" and "employees."W
It is equally clear that some "owner/operators" are far too
much the capitalists to be properly considered "employees."
For example, as the Third Circuit recently stated in an ERISA
preemption case:
We presume that Congress, in defining the terms employer and employee under ERISA, did not intend to
recognize a legal fiction that would consider a sole business owner both an employer and employee. We are
confident that, given that Congress' stated purpose in
enacting ERISA was to protect participants in employee
benefit plans, Congress did not intend to protect a splitpersonality business owner whose ego may act as an
employee and whose alter-ego may act as an employer
threatening to take away his or her own benefits."I
Or, as the Simpson court put it in a different context, "a bona
fide partner is one who owns the business - i.e., an employer."' The rule proposed here identifies the ownership attrib-

350. Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 32 (1961).
351. Matinchek v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 96, 101 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996).
See also Resolutions Relating To Labor, 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(c) (1996) (defining
.employee" for ERISA purposes). That regulation states:
(c) Employees. For purposes of this section:
(1) An individual and his or her spouse shall not be deemed to be
employees with respect to a trade or business, whether incorporated
or unincorporated, which is wholly owned by the individual or by the
individual and his or her spouse, and
(2) A partner in a partnership and his or her spouse shall not be
deemed to be employees with respect to the partnership.
352. Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 850 F. Supp. 648, 656 (S.D. Ohio 1994), affd, 100
F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996).
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utes that must exist for a service-providing owner to be considered an owner rather than an employee.
The rule is not entity specific. It applies regardless of the
form of business organization involved and contains two comparatively simple "knock out" principles for negating employee
status in the conceptually simplest of circumstances.
The cases make clear that genuine ownership involves
some substantial management role as well as some substantial
chance of profit,' and the proposed rule accepts those two
prerequisites. It seeks to give more specific contours to the
vague concept of substantiality and to address some of the
more nettlesome particulars connected with the governance
and financial role of owners, including how much governance
power an owner must have to fall outside the protections of
federal employment statutes and the various ways in which an
owner may take his or her profit. In addition, the rule puts in
context and resolves the problems of numerousness, liability
shields, and the parties' efforts at self-definition.
Under the proposed rule:
1. The same analysis will apply regardless of the form of
business organization involved and will distinguish "genuine owners" from "employees" for federal employment
law purposes.
2. For an owner's services even to raise the employee
vel non issue, the owner must both receive remuneration for the services and provide services that involve
some traditional, employee-like tasks.
3. A "genuine owner" must have a substantial role in the
organization's internal governance. This aspect of the
rule focuses on an owner's involvement in the management of the business, not on the scope of an owner's responsibilities in carrying out the business.

353. A third characterization is possible - namely, independent contractor. Cf.
REv. UNIF. LTD. PAR. ACT § 303, 6A U.LA. 144 (1976) (contemplating a limited
partner being inter alia "a contractor for ... the limited partnership"). The analysis in the text assumes an owner whose efforts are sufficiently integrated into the
business' operations as to negate independent contractor status. See supra notes
161-65 (discussing how the question of integration is at the core of the independent
contractor analysis).
354. See supra notes 190-345.
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a. When an organization uses a decentralized management structure, with important decisions made
by a vote or consensus of all owners, each owner
has a substantial involvement in governance.
b. When an organization uses a centralized management structure, with important decisions allocated to a governing elite, an owner has substantial
involvement in governance only to the extent that
he or she either comprises part of the elite or has a
meaningful role in selecting the elite.
4. An owner can be "genuine" without having contributed capital to the organization, although a capital contribution strongly favors a finding of "genuine owner"
status.
5. A "genuine owner" must have some opportunity to
share in the organization's entrepreneurial success. That
opportunity can come as an ongoing share of operating
income, a delayed right to share in appreciation, or in
any other form that allocates to the owner some part of
the "cream" due to residual claimants once creditors are
paid.
6. The more numerous an organization's owners, the
more likely it is that each owner is an employee for
federal employment law purposes. The issue is whether
the numerosity prevents an owner from having a substantial role in the organization's governance.
7. The presence of a liability shield does nothing to undercut "genuine owner" status.
8. The parties' labels are not dispositive.
Each of these aspects will be explained in turn.
1. An Overarching Rule: Any rule for identifying
nonemployee owners should apply whatever the legal form of
organization involved. Just as the term "employee" has the
same meaning regardless of statutory context,' the antipodal

355. See supra notes 114-24 (explaining that, since the term "employee" reflects a
Congressional picture separate from any particular statute, the term should have
the same meaning regardless of the statute involved). But see also supra notes
125-31 (explaining that under the FLSA the term "employee" has a different and
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concept (i.e., the owner/operator) should have the same
meaning regardless of organizational context. The concept of
employee is not entity specific, and its opposite should not be
either.'
2. Knock Out Principles: For an owner's services
to raise
the employee vel non issue two things must be true: (i) the
owner must receive remuneration for the services, and (ii) the
services must involve some traditional, employee-like tasks. If
the owner's services bring no payment (however denominated)
and the owner's right to receive profits (however denominated)
does not depend on the providing of services," then the owner cannot be an employee. Employee status presupposes some
form of compensation."
Even if an uncompensated owner's "efforts are an integral
part of the business,"" the result is the same. Those efforts
"result from [the owner's] status as an owner who wishes to

broader meaning, due to the statute's expansive defiinition of the term "employ").
356. See supra notes 202-73 (explaining how the partnership cases miss the core
issue by using the concept of a "genuine" partner as a surrogate from the real issue). See also In re Kaplan, 162 B.R. 684, 692 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993) (stating that
"the term 'employee' does not seem to encompass owners of, or investors in, a
business entity"); Loomis Cabinet Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Rev.
Comm'n, 20 F.3d 938, 942 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that "[in determining whether an
employment relationship exists, the label of 'partner' is meaningless" and holding
that "[tihe central inquiry is:
who controls the work environment?"); Partners,
Officers, Members of Boards of Directors, and Major Shareholders, Eq. Empl.
Compl. Man. (Callaghan)
2179 at 2335 (stating that the "analysis [for determining
the employee vel non issue in a closely held corporation] is similar to determining
whether a partner in a partnership is also an employee"); Rhoads v. Jones Fin.
Cos., 957 F. Supp. 1102, 1106 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (deciding whether a general partner
was an employee and citing both close corporation cases and partnership cases in
support of its analysis).
357. See infra notes 403-10 for a discussion of the various ways in which an
owner's profit share might be expressed.
358. Graves v. Women's Profl Rodeo Ass'n, 907 F.2d 71, 73 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that "an employer is someone who pays, directly or inoirectly, wages or a salary or other compensation to the person who provides service - that person being
the employee. Compensation by the putative employer to the putative employee in
exchange for his services is not a sufficient condition, but it is an essential condition to the existence of an employer-employee relationship."). See also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(g) & § 220(g) cmt. j (listing among the factors
used for determining servant status "the method of payment, whether by the time
or by the job" and thereby presupposing that some payment is involved).
359. Thomason v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 866 F. Supp. 1329, 1334 (D. Kan.
1994) (quoting Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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increase the value of his [or her] property."' "Traditionally,
one who is compensated solely through the increased value of
his [or her] ownership share of an entity is an owner, rather
than an employee."31
As for the nature of the work, employee status is at issue
only if the owner's services go beyond the policy-making and
supervisory tasks characteristic of a corporate board of directors. Even under a broad construction of the term employee,
"members of boards of directors are not employees.., under
any standards."3 For owner services to raise the employee
issue, therefore, the services must involve at least some day-today, operational tasks. As the Seventh Circuit said in
Zimmerman v. North American Signal Co., "[wie do not believe Congress intended the term 'employee' to include persons
who are no more than directors of a corporation. " '

360. Norman v. Levy, 767 F. Supp. 1441, 1446 (N.D. 1ll. 1991).
361. Id.
362. Chavero v. Local 241, Div. of the Amalgamated Transit Union, 787 F.2d 1154,
1156 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing Title VII and citing I LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 5.25, at 2-22 (1985) and York v. Tennessee Crushed Stone Ass'n., 684
F.2d 360, 361 (6th Cir.1982)). See also Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs.,
794 F.2d 793, 798 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that "[d]irectors who do not possess the
common law indicia of employment are clearly not 'employees'"); Grantham v.
Beatrice Co., 776 F. Supp. 391, 393-94 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (stating that the "decision of
the circuit courts not to extend the protection of the broadly-applied
anti-discrimination acts to . ..
directors, assist this court in concluding, consistent
with the common law, that for purposes of ERISA directors are not employees");
McGraw v. Warren County. Oil Co., 707 F.2d 990 (8th Cir. 1983) (affirming on the
basis of the district court opinion holding that directors are not employees).
Chavero also discussed some legislative history behind the notion that directors
qua directors are not employees:
Senator Dirksen raised a number of questions as to the feasibility and
wisdom of Title VII. Senator Clark prepared a list of those questions and
his responses in memorandum form. Among the objections and answers
was the following colloquy:
Objection: It is arguable that the bill apply [sic] to the election of
the Board of Directors by stockholders.
Answer It will not. Board members are not employees ....
110 Cong. Rec. 7218 (April 8, 1964).
Chavero, 787 F.3d at 1156-57 n.4. Chavero also notes that "a director is not an
employee [merely] because he draws a salary." Id. at 1157 (citing Zimmerman v.
North Am. Signal Co., 704 F.2d 347, 351-55 (7th Cir. 1983)).
363. Zimmerman, 704 F.2d at 352.
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The exclusion for directors should apply to owners performing comparable functions in other business organizations.
The tightest parallel is to governors in a limited liability company organized under either the Minnesota or North Dakota
LLC statutes. Both of these statutes establish a corporate-like
governance structure, with a board of governors functioning
just like a corporation's board of directors.'
The parallel
would also exist, however, in a manager-managed LLC, where
the manager delegates all operational matters to a CEO or similar functionary and, in a member-managed LLC, where the
members make the same delegation.'
The exclusion will not apply, however, if those with top
supervisory power also perform "traditional employee duties."1 If, for example, the top policy makers also supervise
individual employees, manage the business office and maintain
records, employee vel non becomes an issue."

364. Compare MINN. STAT. § 302A.201 (1995) (providing for a board of directors)
with MINN. STAT. § 322B.606 (1995) (repeating the language of § 302A.201 almost
verbatim and providing for a board of governors). Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 1019.1-32 (1995) (providing for a board of directors) with § N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-3269 (1995) (repeating the language of § 10-19.1-32 almost verbatim and providing for
a board of governors). See also BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 8, at
9.07, at
9-34.
365. Cf. Daniel S. Kleinberger, LLC/LLP Joint Ventures and Hart-Scott Rodino, 3
J. LTD. LIAB. Cos. 157 (Spring 1997) (discussing whether, for Hart-Scott Rodino Act
purposes, the management of an unincorporated organization constitutes a corporate "board equivalent").
366. EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1539 (2d Cir. 1996).
367. EEOC v. First Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass'n., 694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir.
1982) (holding directors of nonprofit society employees for ADEA purposes where
the directors also maintained records, prepared financial statements, and managed
office). See also EEOC v. Pettegrove Truck Serv., Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1430, 1433
(S.D. Fla. 1989) (holding Donna Pettegrove, a corporate director, to be an employee
under Title VII and noting that "she . .. performs traditional employee functions, .
. . is the bookkeeper, is respnible for sales and appears, for all i-ntents and purposes, to be the manager of the operation"); Johnson, 91 F.3d at 1531 (holding
corporate directors to be employees for ADEA purposes; further, noting that "it is
undisputed that a person continues to perform his duties as an officer of J & H
after he has been named a director"). See also Powell-Ross v. All Star Radio Inc.,
No. 95-1078, 1995 WL 491291, at *10 (E.D. Pa Aug. 16, 1995) (noting that, "[wihile
a director or owner is traditionally considered an employer, and not an employee,
some courts have held that under certain circumstances a director or owner may
be considered an employee") (citations omitted); Puckett v. Mangelsdorf, Inc., No.
3:96-CV-1240-R, 1997 WL 135614, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 1997) (characterizing as
employees for Title VII purposes three shareholders who "comprise[d] 100% of the
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3. Oumer Governance: For some courts, once an owner/manager performs any traditional employee functions, at
least in the context of a corporation the analysis is over. The
"employee" label attaches regardless of how much power and
influence the owner/manager has within the organization and
regardless of whether the owner/manager has a substantial
share in the profits.'
As explained, these courts have misconceived the employee vel non question, and the weight of authority is to the contrary.' Indeed, the seminal "label triumphant" case, Hyland
v. New Haven Radiology Associates, rests on a string citation
that does not withstand scrutiny. In labelling as "employees"
the five radiologists who controlled the corporation and divided
its profits, Hyland stated: "In various situations calling for the
application of these statutes, an individual's status as a major
stockholder, officer or director of a corporation has been found
to be compatible with his or her status as an employee."' 0
In support of that proposition - and its application to the
shareholder/employees of a close corporation - the Hyland
court cited five cases as direct authority:
Zimmerman, 704 F.2d 350-54 (7th Cir. 1983) (ADEA
plaintiff, a corporate vice president and one-third shareholder, considered as employee); First Catholic Slovak
Ladies Association, 694 F.2d at 1070 (officer-directors

ownership and control of [a]closely held corporation" because the shareholders
performed employee-like functions). But see Golizio v. Antonine Holding, Inc., No.
1 96-3142, 1997 WL 47781, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 5, 1997) (rejecting a shareholder/employee's claim to be an "employee" for FLSA purposes and holding that the
mix of managerial and operational tasks performed by the plaintiff "favors
defendents").
368. Supra notes 209-303 (discussing Hyland and the cases that follow it or take
a similar approach). See also Puckett, 1997 WL 135614.
The case considered
whether three shareholder/employees of a closely held corporation were "employees" for purposes of meeting the 15 employee jurisdictional threshold under Title
VII. The court acknowedges that the three shareholder/employees "comprise 100%
of the ownership and control of this closely-held corporation . . . . and are the
very nerve center of the . . . operation." Id. at *2. Nonetheless, the court holds
them to be employees, noting that they performed some ordinary, employee-like
functions. "Mere ownership and control," explained the court, "does not detract
from an individual's status as an employee." Id.
369. Supra notes 302, 308-09, 322-44.
370. Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir. 1986).
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held entitled to ADEA protections); Stanojev v. Ebasco
Services, Inc., 643 F.2d 914, 920 (2d Cir. 1981) (high
level executive employee protected by ADEA); Novotny
v. Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association, 584 F.2d 1235, 1261 (3d Cir. 1978) (person holding
positions of secretary and director held an employee for
Title VII purposes), vacated on other grounds, 442 U.S.
366, 99 S.Ct. 2345, 60 L.Ed.2d 957 (1979); Hoy v. Progress Pattern Co., 217 F.2d 701, 704 (6th Cir. 1954) (oneeighth shareholder, vice president, director and chairman of7 board may be employee within purview of
3
FLSA). '
The cited cases do not, however, support Hyland's rule.
Stanojev, for instance, involved a member of "the management
cadre,"M but there is no indication that the manager was a
shareholder. Novotny did not involve a close corporation, and
there is no indication that the secretary/director had any substantial ownership interest.3' Zimmerman did involve a close
corporation and a shareholder/officer of that corporation, but
the decision does not analyze whether he was an employee for
ADEA purposes.3 ' Apparently the parties conceded his employee status, and the opinion focuses instead on whether the
defendant5 firm fell below the jurisdictional threshold for other
reasons.

37

Hyland's reliance on Hoy is even more problematic, for
Hoy is flat-out inconsistent with Hyland's per se approach. The
trial court in Hoy had ruled against the plaintiff on the employee vel non issue and had accordingly dismissed the plaintiffs
claim. The court of appeals reversed, because the trial court
had considered affidavits relating to the employee vel non issue, and because disputes as to material facts precluded even
summary judgment in the defendant's favor. In that context, the
court of appeals stated: "it seems clear to us that [a stockhoider-officer-director] relationship [with the corporation] by itself

371.
372.
373.
374.
375.

Id.
Stanojev v. Ebasco Servs., Inc., 643 F.2d 914, 917 (2d Cir. 1981).
Novotny v. Great Am. Say. & Loan Assoc., 584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1978).
Zimmerman v. North Am. Signal Co., 704 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 350-51.
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does not prevent a stockholder, officer, or director from also
being an employee covered by the Fair Labor Standards
Act."376 The court of appeals did not hold that employee status
necessarily trumps owner status. To the contrary, the court
stated specifically that "a factual question was presented whether the appellants are actually employees, or by reason of their
stockholder-officer-director relationship with the corporation
are not to be treated as such employees. " '
Eschewing a per se approach, the court remanded the case
with the following directions:
In determining the issue in the present case, it is necessary to know and consider all of the facts bearing upon
appellants' employment including its origin, the nature
and extent of appellants' authority and duties, and the
actual relationship existing between them and the dominant stockholders and officers of the appellee corporation, regardless of the titles which were conferred by
the corporation upon these workers.37
Other cases accord with Hoy in refusing to take a categorical approach to the owner/manager role." The question
remains, however, - what sort of "authority and duties" suffice

376. Hoy v. Progress Pattern Co., 217 F.2d 701, 704 (6th Cir. 1954).
377. Id. at 704.
378. Id.
379. See supra notes 336-44 (discussing close corporation cases that eschew both
the Hyland approach and the partnership analogy. See also Powell-Ross v. All Star
Radio Inc., No. 95-1078, 1995 WL 491291, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 1995) (stating
that "[e]ntrepreneurs in small, start-up businesses often of necessity wear many
hats and get their fingers dirty"); EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, 91 F.3d 1529, 1545
(2d Cir. 1996) (Jacobs, J., dissenting). Judge Jacobs stated:
This hands-on role for all directors may be unusual in a company as
large as J & H. But day-to-day work is not inconsistent with status as a
director who is an employer-owner.
Some directorships may be sinecures, but there are innumerable corporations in which the sole workers
are the owner-directors. A J & H director does not surrender powers
and duties as a director, or legal rights as a shareholder in the firm,
because she runs a division or pitches a client There is no support for
the idea that persons who do the heavy lifting in a business are employees as opposed to directors and owners.
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to mark an individual as an owner/manager rather than an
employee?"
The case law suggests an answer to that question, although
as will be seen, the answer is moderately complex and somewhat vague at its margins. In at least one respect, however, the
answer is quite simple. If an organization employs a New England town-meeting style of governance, then, assuming appropriate profit sharing, no owner is an employee. Where authority
is decentralized and decisions are made through open discussion and either consensus or vote, the owners collectively comprise an organization's "ruling class."" In that case they hardly fit the picture of "the full range of workers" Congress sought
to protect.n
This is true even though each owner/manager may be individually subject to review and control by his or her counterparts. "Partners, for example, often agree to evaluation by a
committee of their peers. But that does not make them employees. " ' Even as the members of the ruling class sit in judg380. See, e.g., Loonis Cabinet Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n., 20 F.3d 938, 942 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that "[tlhe central inquiry is:
who controls the work environment?").
381. See, e.g., Caruso v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 664 F. Supp. 144, 148
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that if plaintiff acted as a central corporate decisionmaker
or owner, as the term "partner is traditionally conceived, plaintiff could not qualify
as an employee under the ADEA. However, if plaintiffs duties . . . more closely
resembled those of a typical salaried worker, with little role in corporate
decisionmaking, plaintiff may bring an action under the ADEA.")
382. Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1319 (6th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added).
See also Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 985 (1st Cir. 1997); Matinchek v. John
Alden Life Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that "Congress clearly
intended 'employer' and 'employee' to be mutually exclusive definitions" and that
"an owner cannot at once be deemed both an employer and an employee");
Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Serv. Employees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957, 959 (1st
Cir. 1989) (stating that "'[e]mployee' and 'employer' are plainly meant to be separate animals . . . [and] the twain shall never meet"); Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet
Co., 548 F.2d 19, 143 (6th Cir. 1977) (stating that "[tihe legislative debates [on the
FLSA] indicate that the prime purpose of the legislation was to aid the unprotected, unorganized and lowest paid of the nation's working population") (quoting
Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Nedl, 324 U.S. 697, 706-07 (1945)); Golizio v. Antonine
Holding, Inc., No. 96-3142, 1997 WL 47781, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 5, 1997) (rejecting
shareholder/employee's claim to "employee" status under the FLSA in part because
"plaintiffs investment was more akin to an entrepreneur than to a wage earning
employee").
383. Johnson, 91 F.3d at 1545 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). See also Moebus v. OBGYN Assocs., 937 F. Supp. 867, 868 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (noting that "the physi-

1997] "MagnificentCircularity"And The Churkendoose

569

ment on each other, they remain the ruling class. Peer review
does not change their essential character, they are simply not
"those who toil,.. . those who sacrifice a full measure of their
freedom and talents, to the use and profit of others."' To the
contrary, they toil in a collectively self-regulating way to their
mutual benefit.'
Matters get more complex the more an organization's governance structure deviates from the town-meeting model. That
deviation is likely to occur in one of two ways: a formally decentralized structure with a dominant, even autocratic leader,
or a formally centralized structure.
As to the former, the case law seems more interested in an
owner/manager's formal rights than in any informal dominance
exercised by any other manager. For example, the plaintiff in
Erlich v. Howe claimed that he should be considered an employee because "the 'autocratic' behavior of the senior partner
at the Firm eliminated his control of Firm affairs."' The
court rejected this claim:
Although Ehrlich claims that the senior partner "made it
very clear to [him] in a private discussion prior to a
partners' meeting that none of [his comments] would be
made or entertained," he recalled that at least one of his
comments was discussed at the meeting. Clearly, the
"autocratic" senior partner was unsuccessful at silencing
Ehrlich and, if the discussion of his comments had garnered sufficient support, the Agreement provides that it
could have been adopted by vote."7

cian/shareholders did not report to any party except the Board of Directors," which
they comprised).
384. Dun/op, 548 F.2d at 144 (quoting Tennessee Coal Co. v. Muscoda Local, 321
U.S. 590, 597 (1944)).
385. See supra note 198 (quoting Justice Powell's concurrence in Hishon). See
also Grantham v. Beatrice Co., 776 F. Supp. 391, 399 (N.D. 111.1991) (stating that
.'a partnership contains a self-policing feature largely absent in the typical
employer-employee relationship. In the partnership situation the partners have an
incentive not to agree to provisions that may harm certain members of the partnership because each partner knows that he could end up being the partner who is
harmed.'") (quoting Robertson v. Alexander Grant & Co., 798 F.2d 868, 870-71 (5th
Cir. 1986)).
386. 848 F. Supp. 482, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
The court also notes that
387. Id (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Co. is even more direct:
"Domination by an 'autocratic' partner over others is not uncommon and does not support a finding that the others are
'employees. ' '
The question of centralized management is more difficult.
An extreme hierarchical structure deprives almost all owners of
any meaningful role in governance. Caruso v. Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co. provides an excellent example.' The partnership agreement labelled Caruso a partner, but the court found
him to be an employee.'
Caruso largely lacked any control over even his own
office in New York, which was operated by the Partner
in Charge, much less Peat Marwick's business as a
whole, which was managed by a board of directors
separated from plaintiff by six levels of. hierarchy.
Plaintiff possessed authority to make discretionary decisions only with respect to his own relatively few clients,
and even on these decisions he typically sought the

Erlich had the power, when combining with only one other partner, to block major
management decisions. Id. at 487-88.
388. 925 F.2d 1398, 1401 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d
257, 273-74 (10th Cir. 1987)). See also Rhoads v. Jones Fin. Cos., 957 F. Supp.
1102, 1107 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (discussing plaintiff general partner's contention that
she lacked real governance authority because "she was never 'given the opportunity' to vote on [important] matters" reserved the general partners under the partnership agreement; rejecting that contention because "plaintiff has come forward with
no evidence to show that she did not, in fact, possess these voting rights or was
denied the opportunity to exercise her right to vote her ownership interest on
these matters"); Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 991 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating that
"[a] person with the requisite attributes of proprietary status is properly considered
a proprietor, not an employee, regardless of the fact that others in the firn may
wield more power").
Cf. Wirtz v. Constr, Survey Coop., 235 F. Supp. 621 (D.
Conn. 1964). Wirtz seems slightly uncomfortable with the dominant role played by
two members of a cooperative but notes that the dominance came from suasion
rather than formal power. "It is true, as the plaintiff contends, that Szmak and
Martini exerted some measure of leadership over the groups in New York and
Connecticut, respectively. But the Court finds this was due to their longer experience, more extensive knowledge, and driving interest rather than due to positions
of control or power. What little guidance they supplied was by consent not authority." Id. at 624-25.
389. See 664 F. Supp. 144, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
390. See id.
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approval of the Partner in Charge or another management-level partner.
Plaintiffs only formal authority with respect to Peat
Marwick personnel decisions was his ability to block
the appointment of new partners. Plaintiff was not consulted on which employees should be nominated for
partnership. Plaintiff could not prevent the termination
of any partner or non-partner, and, indeed, largely
lacked a voice in any such decision. As to support personnel, Caruso only could recommend changes to the
Partner in Charge. In short, plaintiff had almost no control over the operation of defendant's business."
To characterize Caruso as a member of Peat Marwick's ruling
class would be absurd. He was merely at the top level of those
who were ruled.
This observation suggests that Wheeler was wrongly decided, for, as in Caruso, the plaintiff in Wheeler lacked any meaningful control over her firm's operation. Disagreeing with
Wheeler, though, is not problematic. As previously discussed,
that case makes too much of the trappings of partner status
and is at odds with the authority on which it relies.' What
remains problematic is determining how close an organization's
governance structure must resemble that of Caruso and Wheeler before owners begin turning into employees.
Unfortunately, there is no mechanical rule for determining
how much centralization and hierarchy is too much; an almost
sociological approach is necessary.' A hierarchical organiza-

391. Id.
392. See supra notes 210-15 (discussing how the hierarchical governance structure
in Wheeler is inconsistent with the view of genuine partners expressed in Justice
Powell's Hishon concurrence).
393. Comparable problems exist in other areas of federal law. See, e.g., Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981). The case considers whether general
partnership interests constitute securities and notes the inverse relationship between
the number of partners and the meaningfulness of partner control:
[Olne would not expect partnership interest sold to large numbers of the
general public to provide any real partnership control; at some point
there would be so many partners that a partnership vote would be more
like a corporate vote, each partner's role have been diluted to the level
of a single shareholder in a corporation.
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tion necessarily involves a governing elite.' Those owners
who belong to that elite - i.e., those owners whose governance role includes a say and a vote on issues'of major importance 5 - are not employees. The remaining owners are "genuine" owners for federal employment law purposes to the extent that they have a meaningful role in periodically selecting
the members of the governing elite.'

Id. at 423.
394. See, e.g., Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 991 (1st Cir. 1997) (characterizing a law firm's Executive Committee as "the nerve center of the Firm");
Rosenblatt v. Bivona & Cohen, 969 F. Supp. 207, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that,
although a law firm referred to various individuals as "partners," the firm was organized as a professional corporation and only two of so-called partners actually held
shares in the coporation). See IvAN S. BANIa, DICTIONARY OF ADMINISTRATION &
MANAGEMENT 354 (1981) (defining hierarchy as "[a] systematic, often pyramidal arrangement of formal organizational relationships, functions and activities in which
each level or rank is subordinate to the next one above it"). See also JERALD
HAGE, THEORIES OF ORGANIZATION:
FORM, PROCESS, AND TRANSFORMATION 130-01
(1980); 2 HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 14345 (PAUL C. NYSTROM & WILLIAM H. STARBUCK eds. 1981).
395. What constitutes an "issue of major importance" will vary somewhat depending on the nature of the business. The following, however, are likely to be of
major importance to any business organization:
the recruitment of new owners
and the expulsion of current ones; the allocation of profits; substantial changes in
the scope or nature of services provided or products sold; capital expenditures that
are large relative to net worth, revenue or past capital expenditure patterns; substantive changes in the documents defining the relationship among the owners.
396. A couple of cases have also commented on the extent of an alleged owner's
authority to bind the organization to third parties. See Simpson v. Ernst & Young,
850 F. Supp. 648, 663 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (finding employee status and noting that
Ernst & Young had acted "to prevent Simpson from binding the firm to promissory
notes by his signature and from pledging firm assets [and] to require reviews of
certain audits or the engagement of new clients"); Erlich v. Howe, 848 F. Supp.
482, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding nonemployee status and noting that the plaintiff
"had 'discretion and leeway' with respect to certain client matters, . . . executed
partnership signature cards so he would have authority to sign checks drawn on
the Firm accounts, [wrote] such checks [, and] . . . signed a counsel agreement
with a retiring partner as a partner of the Firm"). This "power to bind" comments
is, however, secondary to t*he governance roie anf!lsis. Sc Simpson, 850 F q,
at 663 (stating that while the limitations on Simpson's power to bind might have
been "'normal business caution' . . . it was not 'normal business caution' to prevent him from voting on substantive matters, to deny him a proportionate share of
firm profits, to eliminate his share in the finm's accounts receivable, to deny him
personnel authority, to prevent him from examining the fim's books, and to prevent him from learning what legal advice the firm's attorneys provided"); ErTich,
848 F. Supp. at 487 (noting the plaintiffs role in personnel matters and emphasizing that the plaintiff had the power, when combining with any one other partner,
to block major management decisions). See also, Golizio v. Antonine Holding Inc.,

1997] "MagnificentCircularity"And The Churkendoose

573

Consider, for example, a 50 owner organization with a five
owner management committee. Each of the 50 owners provide
employee-like services to the organization, and the management
committee has exclusive authority to make all important management decisions. None of the five committee members is an
employee. As for the other 45 owners, their federal employment
law status depends on whether the management committee is
self-perpetuating (formally or de facto) or is instead subject to
an open election on some regular, recurring basis."
The analysis will be even more complicated when a "ruling
elite" does not have complete authority over all important decisions. Consider, for example, a large firm in which most owners have little real say in the selection of a management committee, but many apparently important decisions must be approved by the owners as a whole. In those circumstances, other
aspects of "genuine ownership" will take on increased importance in the employee vel non analysis. If those other factors
are not dispositive, the employee vel non question will depend
on the extent to which the non-manager owners actually exercise the approval authority formally reserved to them. If situations calling for their approval never arise, or arise only when
approval is afait accompli, the management committee should
be seen as a self-perpetuating ruling elite and the non-management owners should be treated as "employees" for federal employment law purposes.' 9

No. 96-3142, 1997 WL 47781, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 5, 1997) (noting FSLA plaintiffs'
power to contract for advertising as "indicat[ingi that plaintiff had control over the
advertising for [the closely held corporation] and other aspects of its management").
397. The assertion as to the management committee members is true regardless
of whether that committee is self-perpetuating, although the analysis differs depending on that fact. If the management committee is self-perpetuating, then its members comprise the ruling class. If, in contrast, the committee is subject to open
election, then none of the firm's owners are employees. In that event, membership
on the management committee adds nothing to the analysis.
398. See Rhoads v. Jones Fin. Cos., 957 F. Supp. 1102, 1107 (E.D. Mo. 1997)
(holding that a general partner was not an employee, in part because "the [general]
partner's voting rights . . . were not illusory inasmuch as the general partners had
ultimate control over the managing partner and the executive committee by virtue
of the right to vote them out of office"). Compare Simpson, 850 F. Supp. at 661
(characterizing voting rights as illusory because managing elite determined which
matters came before the general partners).
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4. Owner Finances: An owner's financial relationship to a
business has two aspects: putting money in and taking money
out. Both aspects help identify nonemployee owners, although
the latter is by far the more important.
Contributing capital to a business is certainly a marker of
nonemployee, "capitalist" status,' 9 but contribution is by no
means a necessary condition to that status. As the phrase
"sweat equity" suggests, it is commonplace for entrepreneurs to
buy into an entreprise on the basis of their labor." The lack
of contribution should be significant only in connection with a
feeble role in governance"' or, perhaps, if an apparent capital
contribution is revealed as an artifice.'
How an individual extracts money from a business is, in
contrast, crucial to the employee vel non determination. Several
cases suggest that a genuine owner must derive regular remuneration through a share of the firm's operating profits,4 3 and

399. See, e.g., Lilley v. BJM Corp., 958 F.2d 746, 750 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting that
"[a]lthough [the plaintiff] paid some of his own expenses, [he] did not make an investment in the business;" considering that fact significant in the employee vel non
determination); Zajac v. Harris, 410 S.W.2d 593 (Ark. 1967) (holding for state law
purposes that an individual's contribution of capital supported his claim that he
was a partner rather than an employee); Golizio, 1997 WL 47781, at *4 (holding
that a shareholder's investment of $150,000 in a closely held corporation substantially undercut his claim to be an employee for FELA purposes); Rhoads, 957 F.
Supp. at 1108 (stating that "capital contributions . . . . are indicia of partner status").
400. See supra note 67.
401. Compare Serapion v. Martinez, 942 F. Supp, 80, 81 (D. P.R. 1996) (emphatically holding that, in light of plaintiffs governance power, she was a partner even
though "she was spared the requirement of having to contribute to the firm's capital"); with Eriich, 848 F. Supp. at 487-88 (rejecting an individual claim of employee
status from an individual who had made no contribution because he had the power, when combining with any one other partner, to block major management decisions). (The Circuit Court opinion in.Serapion saw differently the facts relating to
capital contribution. Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 991 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating
that in the months following the plaintiffs elevation to proprietary partner "she
made substantial capital contributions to the Firm").)
402. This situation seemed to strongly influence the district court in Simpson v.
Ernst & Young, 850 F. Supp. 648, 659-60 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (stating that "[S]impson's
payment to Ernst & Young U.S. was more akin to a loan than a capital contribution;" further stating that "[w]e view Simpson's Capital Account as a paper transaction designed to give him the appearance, but not the reality, of a partner").
403. See, e.g., Caruso v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 664 F. Supp. 144, 149
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that "partners typically receive their compensation as a percentage of their firm's profits, rather than in the form of a fixed hourly wage or
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the Hyland dissent (in most respects an excellent opinion) goes
so far as to assert that the "compensation" factor "is more accurately stated as whether profits and losses were shared according to a predeterminedformula. "
These opinions take far too narrow a view of the means by
which an owner might receive his or her entrepreneurial reward. An owner is a "residual claimant," with a right to share
the "cream" left over once creditors are paid. 5 To be "genuine," an owner must have some chance of sharing in the
cream," but the employee vel non determination should not
depend on how that share is styled or structured. 7
If, for example, the shareholders in a close corporation
provide themselves a base salary and then divy up the pre-tax
profits in the form of year-end bonuses, that arrangement
should be recognized as profit sharing.4 Likewise, if partners
weekly salary"); Moebus v. OB-GYN Assocs., 937 F. Supp. 867, 868 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(holding that shareholder/employees were not "employees" for statutory purposes
and noting with approval that "[t]he physician/shareholders' share in the profits,
losses and expenses of the corporation is based upon the pei-centage of the
corporation's business they generate, and each is entitled to a bonus based upon a
pre-determined formula'). See also EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529,
1540 (2d Cir. 1996) (recognizing that "the compensation of J & H's directors consists of a percentage of the annual profits [which suggests] that they do not have
a traditional employment relationship," but deeming the directors employees because "their compensation is tied to their performance as evaluated by the senior
members of the Board").
404. Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 802 (2d Cir. 1986)
(Cardamone, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
405. See, e.g., Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 990 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating that
"[tlo the extent a partner's remuneration is subject to the vagaries of the firm's
economic fortunes, her status more closely resembles that of a proprietor"); Eliasen
v. Itel Corp., 82 F.3d 731, 733 (7th Cir. 1996) (characterizing stockholders as residual claimants).
406. Cf. United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 850-51 (1975) (holding that stock in a cooperative housing association was not "stock" for federal
securities law purposes because the cooperative's stock paid no dividends and
lacked the ability to appreciate).
407. Cf. 29 C.F.R § 1620 (1996) (containing the Department of Labor regulations
under the Equal Pay Act and stating for those purposes that "[tlhe term [wages]
includes all forms of compensation . . . whether called wages, salary, profit sharing, expense account, monthly minimum, bonus, uniform cleaning allowance, hotel
accomodations, use of company car, gasoline allowance, or some other name").
408. See, e.g., Golizio v. Antonine Holding, Inc., No. 96-3142, 1997 WL 47781, at *4
(E.D. La. Feb. 5, 1997) (rejecting a shareholder/employee's claim of "employee" status under the FLSA, in part because "plaintiff was to share on a pro rata basis on
(sic] any bonus, insurance, and other perks commensurate with the number of
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in a firm allocate compensation on the basis of points, and the
compensation encompasses some or all of the firm's surplus,
that allocation also should be recognized as profit sharing."
The presence of a guaranteed payment should be immaterial.
The question is whether the owner stands a chance of profiting
beyond the guarantee.1 °
When an owner stands to receive his or her share should
also be immaterial. By far the most common arrangement involves regular distributions of operating profits, but not all
entrepreneurs expect to extract profit in that fashion. For example, although the key enterpreneur of All Star Radio Inc.
"took a modest draw from All Star in 1992 and 1993, in accordance with the owners' initial business objectives he [was to]
realize his pro rata share of the capital gain (or loss) of WPGR
following FCC approval of the station's sale."4" Delayed gratification may be a sign of entrepreneurial wisdom; it should not
be a sign of employee status.
5. Numerousness: The greater the number of owners, the
more likely that each service-providing owner will be deemed

shares outstanding").
409. Compare Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 850 F. Supp. 648, 650 (S.D. Ohio 1994)
(finding no profit sharing because "Simpson's salary did not vary based on the rise
and fall of firm profits"). According to the district court, "[t]here was no evidence
that Simpson or any other Party were required to return any amount of salary due
to declining profits. Nor was there evidence that his salary was calculated as a
proportionate share of the firm's profits." Id.
410. Of course, if the profit possibility is de minimus compared to the guaranteed
payment, then no real profit sharing exists. See KLEINBERGER, supra note 217, §
7.4.3, at 219 (discussing state law partner vel non cases; noting that "[ilf a profit
recipient receives no other remuneration from the business, that fact favors the
partnership characterization" but if "the profit share is just a bit of 'icing' on top
of some other payments, courts are more inclined" to reject the partner label).
See also Separion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 984, 991 (lst Cir. 1997) (deeming a
would-be Title VI employee to be a partner, in part because "although her [profit
alnocation] wa less th,an that of the name partners, it was nonetheless significantly
greater than that of even the most well-endowed junior partners" and noting that
"[hier compensation was predicated in substantial measure on the Firm's profits").
411. Powell-Ross v. All Star Radio, Inc., No. 95-1098, 1995 WL 491291, at *11
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 1995). See EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, 91 F.3d 1529, 1532 (2d
Cir. 1996) (noting that "[a] retiring director must surrender his stock pursuant to a
purchase contract and consulting and non-competition agreement referred to by J &
.H as the 'Ten-Year Contract.' Under this contract, J & H promises to pay the
retiring director the equivalent of the dividends that would have been payable for
the next ten years if the director had continued to hold the stock.").
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an employee. Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc.,
conjures up an extreme example: "If members of a trade union
bought stock in their corporate employer, they would not cease
to be employees within the conception of this Act.""'2
The relationship between numerousness and employee
status is not, however, direct; it is mediated through the governance issue. The greater the number of owners, the less likely
each is to have the signficant governance rule that marks an
owner as a member of the organization's ruling, capitalist class.
The proper question, therefore, is not "how many owners" but
rather "how much governance"?"'3
6. The Irrelevance of the Liability Shield: Although some
of the partnership cases attach importance to a partner's vicarious liability for partnership debts,"" that importance is misplaced and overstated.4"5 A partner's personal liability is a
consequence of a particular form of ownership,"'6 but it is not
a precondition to ownership status in general. To argue otherwise would exalt the "partner exemption" surrogate into a general rule and forstall the appropriate and far broader question
of "genuine" ownership."'7

412. 366 U.S. 28, 32 (1961).
413. One case suggests that numerousness negates "genuine" ownership because it
undercuts profit sharing. To support its holding that plaintiff was an employee,
Caru~so states: "Neither party has presented facts showing precisely to what extent
plaintiff's salary was based on Peat Marwick's profits. However, the fact that
plaintiff held no more than 350 'units,' a relatively low figure, suggests that
plaintiffs salary would vary little with the firm's profits."
Caruso, v. Peat,
Marwick, & Mitchell & Co., 664 F. Supp. 144, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). In this respect,
Caruso is wrong. If dependence on profits is the issue, the key is not what percentage of profits an owner enjoys but rather the extent to which the owner's
remuneration depends on profit sharing.
414. See, e.g., Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 990 (1st Cir. 1997); Wheeler v.
Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 274-75 (10th Cir. 1987); Rhoads v. Jones Fin. Cos., 957 F.
Supp. 1102, 1107 (E.D. Mo. 1997).
415. See supra notes 220-27 (explaining how Wheeler mishandles the liability
shield issue) and notes 283-84 (explaining how the professional corporation cases
handle the liability shield issue).
416. KLEINBERGER, supra note 217, § 7.3, at 210 (describing "partner's personal liability for the partnership's debts" as "the hallmark consequence of partnership").
417. Like the presence of a capital contribution, the absence of a liablity shield
helps mark a genuine owner. However, just like the absence of a capital contribution, the presence of a liability shield does nothing to negate the status of genuine owner.
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7. The Significance of the Parties' Self-Description: The
case law is replete with statements that the parties' self-imposed labels are not dispositive,"' and that "the parties' view
of the relationship is not controlling where the label employed
by the parties cannot withstand reasoned scrutiny."" 9 In this
respect the federal employment case law dovetails state partnership law.42 Ironically but logically, a label is more likely to
be influential when it works against the party responsible for
adducing it.Y'
VI. APPLYING

THE OVERARCHING

RULE

-

LLC EXAMPLES

The rule proposed in the preceding section could be
termed an "agglomeration test"4' - i.e., a rule that: (i) specifies the factors to be used in making a legally significant characterization; (ii) states that each factor is important but that
none is sufficient by itself to determine the characterization
issue; and (iii) provides little or no guidance as to the relative
importance of each factor.423 Given the relevant case law, an

418. See, e.g., Golden v. A.P. Inc., 681 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (citing
Garrett v. Phillips Mills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979, 982 (4th Cir. 1983) and distinguishing
status that is merely the creation of a formal document from status actually recognized in the working relationship); Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 657 F.2d
909, 915 n.8 (7th Cir. 1981) (noting that relationship identified in contract is not
controlling where other factors suggest that language of contract is inaccurate);
Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See also Caruso, 664 F.
Supp. at 147; cases cited supra note 190.
419. Golden, 681 F. Supp. at 1103.
420. Kleinberger & Wrigley, supra note 67, at 248-49; KLEINBERGER, supra note
217, § 7.4.3 at 219-20.
421. See, e.g., Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 910 F. Supp. 225,
228-29 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (emphaiss added) (finding the plaintiff to be an employee,
noting that payments to the plaintiff were reflected on a form 1099 rather than a
W-2 and emphasizing that "[a]t no point does [the plaintiff] explain why she never
objected to the 1099 or why she treated herself as self-employed"). The same logic
underpins the hearsay rule's exception for statements against interest FED. R
EVID. 804(b)(3).
422. Webster's Dictionary defines "agglomeration" as "a heap or cluster of disparate elements."

WEBSTER'S NEw COLLEGATE DICtiONARY 17 (7th ed. 1972).

423. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is the epitome of an agglomeration rule. See, e.g., Arnold v. Browne, 103 Cal. Rptr. 775 (Cal Ct. App. 1972)
(listing 19 factors to be used in determining whether to hold shareholders personally liable for a corporation's debts); Victoria Elevator Co. of Minneapolis v. Meridian
Grain Co., Inc., 283 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 1979) (listing eight factors). An agglomeration test is involved almost anytime a court refers to "the totality of the
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agglomeration test is inevitable424 but nonetheless frustrating.
Agglomeration inevitably means imprecision.
The imprecision carries with it a flavor of "you know it
when you see it," 4's and can be mitigated by seeing the agglomeration rule in operation. Accordingly, this article concludes by applying the proposed employee vel non rule to four
different LLC scenarios.
EXAMPLE #1: Five physicians form an LLC to house their
medical practice. They take turns being "on call" and consult
with each other on an ad hoc basis regarding difficult or interesting cases. They do not, however, have a system of "peer
review." They do meet regularly, albeit informally, to make
business decisions, e.g., hiring and firing staff, dealing with
health insurance providers, etc. Each of the members has con-

circumstances." See supra notes 72-77 (discussing the open-ended nature of that
phrase).
424. Darden is the Supreme Court's key pronouncement in this area, and Darden
adopts an agglomeration test See supra note 84 (noting that Darden identifies
various factors to be considered in determining whether a person is an employee
or an independent contractor). Most lower court decisions likewise take a factor
approach. See supra notes 72 & 91-99. Only Hyland and its progeny eschew
agglomeration. See supra notes 290-303 (discussing and criticizing Hyland's per se
approach). The First Circuit recently explained the matter as follows:
We express a note of caution. Status determinations are necessarily
made along a continuum. The cases that lie at the polar extremes will
prove easy to resolve. The close cases, however, will require a concerned court to make a case-specific assessment of whether a particular
situation is nearer to one end of the continuum or the other. In performing this assessment, no single factor should be accorded talismanic
significance. Rather, a status determination ... must be founded on the
totality of the circumstances 'which pertain in a particular case. Given
these verities, any effort to formulate a hard-and-fast rule would likely
result in a statement that was overly simplistic or too general to be of
any real help, or both.
Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 990 (1st Cir. 1997).
425. See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(declining to endorse a precise definition for obscenity, but stating "I know it when
I see it.") See also KLEINBERGER, supra note 97, § 3.2.5, at 92 (discussing the
"frolic and detour" exception to an employee's scope of employment and advising
that "those seeking to predict outcomes should read a range of scope of employment cases, try to develop a sense of their 'flavor,' and keep in mind [certain]
themes" that reflect that flavor).
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tributed capital to the LLC, and that capital has been used to
purchase office furniture and medical equipment. The LLC rents
its office space. The landlord initially sought a personal guarantee from each of the members, but the physicians declined.
Instead, they offered the landlord a security interest in the
LLC's accounts receivable, and the lease was made on that
basis.
Each member's remuneration consists of a guaranteed
payment plus a bonus. The guaranteed payment is determined
prospectively. At the end of each calendar year, the members
make a conservative estimate of the coming year's revenue and
expenses and then guarantee each member the same set
amount for that coming year. Bonuses are allocated retrospectively. At the end of each calendar year the members allocate
that year's surplus among themselves, taking into account various factors, including each member's productivity, time spent in
administrative matters, etc. Typically the allocation is by consensus, but the LLC's operating agreement allows for allocations to be made by majority vote of the members. Bonuses
usually account for approximately 30% of each member's remuneration from the LLC.
Although the physicians' attorney has explained to them
both the nature of an LLC and the fact that they are "members"
rather than "partners," the physicians continue to refer to themselves as "partners."
ANALYSIS OF EXAMPLE #1: None of these physicians are
employees for federal employment law purposes. The LLC liability shield is irrelevant to the analysis,42 and in every respect the physicians are genuine owners. Each member has a
substantial involvement in governance. They collectively manage the LLC; important decisions - ranging from who to hire
and how to allocate profits - are made by consensus or
_'ote.427

The financial arrangements are equally indicative. Although
capital contribution is not a necessary element of genuine own-

426. See supra notes 414-17.
427. See supra notes 381-82.
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er status,"' a genuine capital contribution strongly supports
that characterization. 42 Even more importantly, the members
derive a substantial part of their remuneration from a share of
the profits. They thus have a significant "opportunity to share
in the organization's entrepreneurial success."'
The physician's habit of referring to themselves as "partners" could create liability problems 4 1 but in no way undercuts the "genuine owner" determination. Self-labelling will rarely be significant, 432 and in any event the word "partner" connotes ownership.
EXAMPLE #2: Countryside LLC ("Countryside") is a manager-managed limited liability company that owns and operates
a golf course.' Countryside's operating agreement provides
that Countryside will be managed by a single manager who
must also be a member. The manager has responsibility for
superintending all day-to-day operations. The operating agreement names the initial manager and provides that members
holding a majority of membership units may replace the manager without cause at any time. Non-manager members have no
day-to-day, operational role in the business. However, under the
operating agreement the consent of members holding a majority of the membership units is necessary to: (i) approve
Countryside's annual budget; (ii) approve any contract that involves expenditures outside the approved budget; (iii) approve
any contract with a value of more than $100,000; (iv) cause
Countryside's dissolution; (v) approve the sale of substantially

428. See supra notes 399-401.
429. See supra notes 399-401.
430. See supra note 354-55. Example #1 does not reveal what, if any, arrangements the LLC has for buying out a member who dissociates. To the extent a
dissociating member has the right to share in any appreciation enjoyed by the firm,
that right would further support the "genuine owner" characterization. However,
the right to share operating profits suffices to establish that the members have the
financial characteristics of genuine owners.
431. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 16, 6 U.LA. 501 (1914) (partner by estoppel);
REv. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 308, 6 U.LA. 49 (1994) (liability of purported partner).
432. See supra notes 418-21.
433. For a brief description of manager-managed LLCs, see supra notes 39-48.
For a more detailed discussion, see BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 8 7.04, at
7-21 to 7-40.
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all of Countryside's assets; and (vi) approve any merger involving Countryside.
Countryside has 35 members, all of whom became members by buying membership units. Proceeds from the sale of the
units were used to fund Countryside's start-up costs and initial
operations. At present, Countryside has 95 membership units.
Profits are allocated proportional to membership units,
except that the manager-member receives both a salary of
$50,000 per year and an additional profit allocation equal to an
additional five membership units. The additional profit allocation does not apply to profits made upon the sale or dissolution
of the business.
The operating agreement requires distribution of sufficient
profits to cover each member's income tax liability arising from
allocated profits. Any further distributions are at the discretion
of the manager-member, except upon dissolution of the company or the sale of substantially all of the company's assets.
ANALYSIS OF EXAMPLE #2: None of the non-manager
members are employees for federal employment law purposes.
None of the members provide services that involve any traditional, employee-like tasks, so for them the employee vel non
question does not arise.4m
For the manager-member, a more detailed analysis is necessary, but the outcome is the same. The manager-member is a
genuine owner, not an employee. He or she has the central role
in company governance and resembles, more than anything
else, the general partner in a limited partnership.' As to finances, both the capital and remuneration aspects point to
"genuine owner" status. The manager must be a member, and
all members bought into the company by buying membership
units, - i.e., by contributing capital.' As to remuneration, a
substantial portion will likely come from the manager's profit
7

share.4

434. See supra notes 362-67.
435. See, e.g., KLEINBERGER, supra note 217, § 12.1.5, at 392-93 (describing the
management structure of a limited partnership). For an explanation of the governance factor, see supra notes 368-98.
436. See supra notes 399-401.
437. This observation assumes that Countryside is profitable. On that assumption,
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EXAMPLE #3: Three entrepreneurs form an LLC to own and
operate a pizza business. Initially, they all have a hands-on role
in the business. The business prospers, and within a few years
the LLC owns three locations. Eventually, the founders relinquish all day-to-day control to four "supervisors." One supervisor has charge of general administrative matters (e.g., payroll,
accounting, and purchasing). The other three each has charge
of one of the three locations. Each supervisor has essentially
the same compensation package, including a guaranteed payment (payable bimonthly), a bonus based on the performance
goals for the supervisor's area of responsibility, and a small
percentage of the LLC's profits. The profit share comes from
membership units given to the supervisors as compensation and
incentive. Together the four supervisors' membership units
comprise 10% of the total outstanding membership units.
The LLC's articles of organization and operating agreement
both designate the LLC as "manager-managed,"' and the operating agreement provides that the four founding members will
serve permanently as the managers. The managers collectively
control all major policy matters, including expansion decisions
and the retention, promotion and compensation of the supervisors. Whether acting singly or collectively, the supervisors have
no power to cause or even threaten dissolution of the LLC.'
Each supervisor has an "Employment Agreement" with the
LLC which inter alia requires the supervisor to sell back his or
her membership units to the LLC if the supervisor ceases "for
any reason" to work for the LLC. The buy-back price is book
value. In contrast, each of the founding LLC members has a
buy-sell agreement that sets the price as a multiple of earnings.
Given the nature of the business, earnings are likely to rise far
more quickly than book value.
a manager's profit share (5,100) qua manager is larger than the average share of a
member (approximately 2.7/100). (The average share results from dividing the
number of actual memberships units [95] by the number of members 135]. The
denominator of "100" reflects the five "phantom" units allocated to the managermember.) For a discussion of profit-share factors, see supra notes 403-11.
438. For a brief description of manager-managed LLCs, see supra notes 39-48.
For a more detailed discussion, see BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 8, 7.04, at
7-21 to 7-40.
439. Since the LLC is manager-managed, this approach would have been possible
even before check-the-box. See supra notes 39-48.
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OF EXAMPLE #3: The four founders are evidently
"genuine owners." They collectively govern the organization,40
and their ownership interests account for 90% of the profits. It
is even questionable whether they continue to perform any
ANALYSIS

employee-like functions. 44 '

Just as evidently, the supervisors are employees for federal
employment law purposes. Although each supervisor has few of
the trappings of ownership, the supervisors are clearly not part
of the LLC's "ruling class."" For example, although each supervisor has significant responsibilities in the LLC's day-to-day
operations, none has any significant role in the LLC's governance. All policy-making is confined to a permanent elite.'2
As for finances, most of each supervisor's remuneration
comes from a salary rather than profits. "[Tihe profit share is
just a bit of 'icing' on top of... other payments."' This fact,
coupled with the buy-back price (merely book value), significantly limits each supervisor's "opportunity to share in the
organization's entrepreneurial success. " "
In addition, the parties' own labels will undercut any attempt by the LLC to characterize the supervisors as "genuine
owners." Each supervisor has an "Employment Agreement,"
and that label will undermine any pretense to the contrary. 6
EXAMPLE #4: International Trading LLC ("International") is
an international trading company with offices throughout the
world. International's U.S. operations are divided into ten regions, with each region headquartered in a major U.S. city. The
overall headquarters for U.S. operations is located in New York
City.
International has approximately 320 members. Approximately 50 of those members office in New York City. The rest
are spread throughout International's regional offices. The dis-

440. See supra notes 380-85.
441. See supra notes 403-11.
442. See supra notes 381-88.
443. See supra notes 393-97.
444. KLEINBERGER, supra note 97, § 7.4.3, at 219 (discussing the same issue in the
context of general partnerships).
445. See supra notes 354-55.
446. See supra note 242.
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sociation of a member has no effect on the continuity of International."7
Although International has only one class of membership
interests, as a practical matter the membership is divided into
two tiers. The top tier comprises a 20 person board of governors, each of whom is a member of the LLC. The board of governors functions much like a corporation's board of directors.
Each board member also functions individually in some
senior executive capacity, including managing the various regions. As a board member, each governor has essentially equal
power, except for the chair who is elected by the board and
who manages and directs board discussions. As a senior executive, in contrast, a board member may well report to or supervise another board member.
The board of governors is essentially self-perpetuating.
Board members serve until death, resignation, or removal. A
board member can be removed by a 2/3 majority of the board
or by a vote of LLC members holding 75% of membership units.
However, the board members as a group always account for
60% of the outstanding units (3% per board member), and no
board member has ever been removed by a vote of the LLC
members. Removals by a vote of the board are rare.
When a death, resignation, or removal creates a vacancy
on the board, the board forms a nominating committee to nominate a successor. The nomination must be approved by LLC
members holding 75% of membership units, and LLC members
holding 20%/ of the outstanding units may nominate an LLC
member to oppose the nominating committee nominee. No
such "renegade" nomination has ever occurred, however.
To become a member of the board of governors, a nominee must increase his or her capital account by $150,000. Each
board member receives a guaranteed annual payment of
$250,000, plus 3% of International's profits. In a typical year, the
profit distribution can amount to $1,000,000.
When a person ceases to be a board member, he or she
must also cease being a member of the LLC. When that happens, the person (or estate) receives an immediate payout of

447. Prior to check-the-box, this fact might have caused International to possess
the corporate characteristic of "continuity of life." See supra notes 20-52.
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the capital account, plus guaranteed "separation payments"
over the next ten years calculated as a percentage of net revenues (prior to any distribution of profits to LLC members).
LLC members who are not members of the board of governors typically have important day-to-day responsibilities and
substantial authority to bind International in trades. The profit
share of most "mere" LLC members is approximately 1/30th of
the share of a board member, and most "mere" LLC members
earn two or three times more in guaranteed payments than they
do through profit sharing. "Mere" LLC members typically have
at least seven years experience as employees of the company
before being "elevated" to LLC member status and must make a
$25,000 capital contribution to obtain that status. However, for
any would-be member who wishes to avoid the out-of-pocket
expense, International will itself loan the member the necessary
capital and then recapture the loan amount (plus nominal interest) by withholding part of the member's profit share over the
next five years. Even with this withholding, in the first year following the change from "employee" to LLC member, the typical
new LLC member sees his or her remuneration increase by
20%.' An LLC member who terminates membership receives
an immediate payout of his or her capital account (less any
loan amount still due), but nothing else.
ANALYSIS OF EXAMPLE #4: For federal employment law purposes, the board of governor members are "genuine owners";
the "mere" LLC members are employees.
The governors epitomize a self-perpetuating ruling
class." 9 They collectively control the enterprise. Moreover,
they have the financial attributes of true owners. They all have
made a real and significant capital contribution and, through
operating profits and separation payments, stand to benefit as
owners from the success of the enterprise. The number of
overall LLC members is not a problem, 4' ° because for deter-

448. This Example combines many of the elements of Johnson & Higgins, see
supra notes 312-18 with some of the elements of Wheeler. See supra notes 206-08.
449. See supra notes 393-97.
450. See supra notes 412-13 (discussing numerosity as a factor cutting against
genuine owner status).
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mining the status of board members the relevant number is 20,
i.e., the size of the board.
In contrast, the "mere" LLC members have no significant
role in governance. The board of governors has close to absolute control over the most important decisions. "Mere" LLC
members have a say only in a very limited number of matters,
and even that very limited say is illusory. The board of governors qua LLC members have a dominant block of voting power.
Moreover, even in an age of email and teleconferences, the
large number of LLC members and their geographic dispersion
makes unlikely any effective collective action.45
The fact that each LLC member has considerable day-today responsibility and authority does not change the governance analysis. Employees often have important duties and
powers, but those duties and powers do not amount to governance. Governance refers to the owner-like ability to control
the enterprise, not the employee-like role of acting for the enterprise.4"
The financial characteristics of "mere" LLC members also
point strongly toward "employee" status. The so-called capital
contribution can be recast as creative bookkeeping (i.e., compensation deferred until termination of membership) rather
than as an economically real increase in the business' capital.
The profit share does suggest owner status but is overshadowed by the guaranteed payments and the absence of any substantial separation payments. Compared to board members,
"mere" LLC members have significantly less opportunity to
profit with the enterprise.
That limited opportunity, coupled with their virtually nonexistent governance role, means that the "mere" LLC members
are clearly employees.
While these four examples do not exhaust the spectrum of
possible LLC arrangements, they do illustrate how the rule
proposed by this Article functions to separate "genuine owners"
of limited liability companies from erstwhile members properly
classified as "employees" for federal employment law purposes.

451. See supra notes 412-13.
452. See supra notes 344, 345, 391.
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